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FICHTE AND SCHELLING: THE SPINOZA CONNECTION 
ABSTRACT 
The influence of Spinoza on Post-Kantian Idealism has been acknowledged by virtually all 
commentators in the area. Much research on the influence of Spinoza on Hegel has been 
already carried out by many of Hegel's commentators in both the Continental and Anglo-
American tradition, and Hegel himself wrote a great deal on Spinozism. Detailed research 
and study on the influence of Spinoza on Fichte and Schelling, however, is still to be carried 
out in the Anglo-American tradition; and this situation is in contrast to the current 
scenario in Germany, where much effort has been devoted to this topic. Commentators in 
the Anglo-American tradition acknowledge the influence of some of Spinoza's views on 
Fichte's and Schelling's respective projects but fail to provide a detailed account of this 
influence. This thesis will attempt to help fill in the gap in this area by providing a detailed 
study of the influence of Spinozism on Fichte and Schelling. This will be done by drawing 
parallels and by demonstrating similarities between some of their philosophical views, as 
well as referring to textual evidence where Fichte and Schelling acknowledge, overtly or 
not, their debt to Spinoza. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. In Part I I shall provide the context or 
background to this thesis. This part focus on the reception of Spinoza's writings in the 
Netherlands and Germany (chap. 1), the Enlightenment and Romantic movement as well as 
the Enlightenment crises (chap. 2), and Kant's attempt to solve the crises (chap. 3). In Part 
11 and Ill I deal with Fichte's and Schelling's Spinozism respectively. Part 11 is divided into 
three chapters, which are entitled: "Metaphysics, Knowledge and Freedom" (chap. 4), 
"Theology and Religion" (chap. 5), and "Ethics" (chap. 6). Part Ill is also divided into 
three chapters, which are entitled: "From Kant to Fichte to Schelling: Spinoza's 
contribution to Absolute Idealism" (chap. 7), "Pantheism and God" (chap. 8), and finally 
"Deep Ecology" (chap. 9). 
Finally, in this abstract I find it important to draw the reader's attention to a few 
issues. My sympathies with, or antipathies to, t-he various positions taken by the authors I 
discuss will no doubt be apparent as the thesis unfolds. And it could be said that this thesis 
is primarily intended as an exercise in the history, influence and study of some conceptual 
views particular to Spinozism, and as such it shall be of great interest to metaphysicians. 
But in doing so this thesis will also set the background for a proper understanding of 
Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical systems - this is an important point as there is a 
tendency in philosophical and academic circles to 'box in' philosophical systems as if these 
systems were self-contained and bore no connection with previous philosophical systems; 
moreover, there is also a tendency in these circles not to appreciate the legacy of 
philosophical systems either. As such, this thesis aims to help correcting this situation 
insofar as Spinoza, Fichte and Schelling are concerned - but it can be also viewed as a 
template for similar research in connection to other philosophical systems. It is also 
intended that the interpretations of Fichte and Schelling in the light of their Spinozism, 
which I propose will be useful to other scholars in their attempt to critically appraise the 
writings of these important figures. 
2 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this thesis has been inspired by Di Giovanni's chapter in the Cambridge Companion 
to Kant, "The First Twenty Years of Critique: The Spinoza Connection", where he gives an 
overview of the reception of the First Critique by scholars such as Jacobi, Reinhold and Fichte 
and which throws some light on the appreciation of Spinoza by the Post-Kantian Idealists (Di 
Giovanni I 992:4 I 7-448). 
This thesis has been written m an effort to improve the understanding of Spinoza's, 
Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical views, and to shed some light onto the connection between 
Spinoza's views and Fichte's and Schelling's philosophical development. If, by reaching the end 
of this thesis, the reader feels that his understanding of these philosophers views has improved, 
and if the reader also feels that he has gained a good understanding that Fichte and Schelling 
searched in Spinoza for answers to the problems they faced in developing the Critical Philosophy 
of Kant, then I judge that my efforts here have been successful. 
I first came into contact with Spinoza and his philosophy many years ago through the 
works of the Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chaui, who was and still is a prominent figure in 
Brazilian academia and politics. Marilena Chaui has in Brazilian society much the same status 
that Jean-Paul Sartre had in France. I became fascinated by Spinoza's persona and philosophy. 
His naturalism and determinism as well as the ethical and political implications that followed 
from his metaphysical views were, and still are, very appealing to me. 
My appreciation for German Idealism, and particularly Kant and Hegel, happened much 
later whilst studying for my undergraduate degree in philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. 
It was around this time that my real motivation for writing this thesis occurred. Whilst studying 
----------
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Schopenhauer for one of my courses in my undergraduate degree I came across a passage from 
Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation where he claimed that: 
After Kant's critique of all speculative theology, almost all those who 
philosophised in Germany followed Spinoza. All essays which are best known as 
post-Kantian philosophy are nothing more than a disguised Spinozism replete 
with a flowery incomprehensible terminology that has completely disfigured it. 
(Schopenhauer I 950:7 I 8-720) [my translation] 
I found this an extraordinary thing to claim since I had previously understood that Spinoza's 
doctrines have been, to a certain extent, generally disregarded or dismissed by modern scholars. 
The same is true ofthe post-Kantian German Idealists, JG Fichte and FWJ Van Schelling. GWF 
Hegel escaped this trend as he enjoys the same great status as philosophers such as lmmanuel 
Kant, John Locke and David Hume. As I understand it the significance of the philosophy of 
Spinoza, Fichte and Schelling has not been fully appreciated in the history of modern 
philosophy. By this I mean that the significance of Fichte and Schelling in the development of 
Hegel's and Hegelian philosophy (which was so influential in Continental European philosophy 
and Latin-American philosophy) has not been fully appreciated, particularly in the Anglo-
American tradition. Moreover, the significance of Fichte's and Schelling's development of the 
Critical Philosophy of Kant has barely been acknowledged, as commentators tend to jump from 
Kant to Hegel as ifthere were nothing in between. Without Fichte and Schelling there would be 
no great Hegel and Hegelian philosophy. That said, this situation has started to change recently 
through the works of a few commentators who are writing and commenting on their 
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philosophies, and as such their fate is being revived or revitalised. There is an increasing interest 
in Fichte's legacy which is quite noticeable by the growing number of publications concerning 
his works and philosophical system; unfortunately, insofar as Schelling is concerned, he is still to 
be rediscovered by the majority of history of philosophy scholars as only a few commentators in 
this area have ventured in the study and on publishing material on Schelling's works and 
philosophical system. This is a welcome change to the current status quo. It is worth noting here 
that these commentaries on Post-Kantian German Idealism are usually divided into two groups, 
those who pursue a metaphysical reading and those who interpret Post-Kantian German Idealists 
in a non-metaphysical light. Those who pursue a metaphysical reading tend to read Post-Kantian 
Idealism as a direct development from Kant's Critical philosophy and argue that the Post-Kantian 
Idealists, by and large, disregarded Kant's advice that we should not engage with concepts of 
which we can have no experience (for instance, Fichte's concept of the Absolute I when this is 
interpreted as God). Those who interpret Post-Kantian Idealism in a non-metaphysical light tend 
to try to demonstrate that Post-Kantian Idealism still bears importance for today's philosophical 
development by revisiting their insights into problems, which are still troublesome for 
contemporary philosophy (for instance, Fichte's concept of the Absolute I when this is 
interpreted as the rationality and spontaneity of the mind). Some commentaries have tried to 
strike a balance between these two positions and this will be my aim in this thesis. In this thesis 
I shall not, I could not, unload the metaphysical content; but whenever possible I shall also point 
out that Fichte's and Schelling's approach were very insightful and that they bear importance for 
particular problems faced by contemporary philosophy. 
To the same extent that Fichte's and Schelling's importance has not been acknowledged, 
the impact of Spinoza's views have not been fully appreciated either. That is to say that the 
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importance of Spinozism for the development of subsequent philosophical schools has not been 
acknowledged. Spinoza tends to be referred to as the great metaphysician of the 17th century 
who defended a monism; a monism that perplexed most of his contemporaries and which still 
perplexes many philosophy students who attempt to study his thought. The influence of his 
thought, the history of the development of Spinozism, is hardly ever an issue which is touched 
upon by commentators, scholars and students. This is perhaps due to the tendency in academic 
and scholarly circles to read philosophical systems as self-contained, as bearing no connection 
with 'what came before' and 'what happened after'. Within this scenario philosophical systems 
are in danger of not being fully or correctly understood, and thus the importance of 
demonstrating and acknowledging the influence of Spinoza in Fichte and Schelling for a proper 
understanding and interpretation of their philosophical systems. Kant's influence on Fichte and 
Schelling is only 'half of the picture', the other 'half, Spinoza, is still to be brought into the light, 
at least insofar as the Anglo-American tradition is concerned. 
But to refer back to Schopenhauer's quote, if Schopenhauer is right and "after Kant's 
critique of all speculative theology, almost all who philosophised in Germany followed 
Spinoza", then Spinoza's impact on the post-Kantian German philosophy has not been fully 
accounted for either; it has only been acknowledged by a handful of commentators who have not 
explored this avenue in its entirety. 
It is interesting to note at this point a passage from Moreau ( 1997:408), where he 
comments on the impact of Spinoza's views on certain philosophical movements. I quote: 
Investigating "Spinozism" teaches at least as much about interpretation of Spinoza 
by other movements - both those approving him and (more often) opposing him -
as it does about Spinoza's thought itself. More than other philosophies, Spinoza's 
has been held up like a mirror to the great currents of thought, a mirror in which 
their distorted images may be seen ... In this way one can see Calvinism, 
Cartesianism, the Enlightenment, and other movements, look upon their 
reflections, and see their own contradictions revealed in it. 
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Since as Moreau acknowledges Spinozism has influenced a number of philosophical schools, 
such as those associated with the Enlightenment, it seems fair to say that Spinozism also 
influenced the German post-Kantian Idealist movement since it was a direct outcome of the 
Enlightenment movement. That said, much investigation is required to establish this point 
satisfactorily. 
In order to demonstrate, and prove, my points I will divide this thesis into three parts. In 
the part I, which is divided into three chapters, I will set the background to my investigation. In 
chapter I I will investigate Spinoza's reception in the Netherlands and Germany, since the early 
reception of Spinoza's works in the Netherlands impinged a great deal on his later reception in 
Germany and elsewhere. In the second chapter I will provide the reader with a snapshot of the 
academic zeitgeist during the 18th century by providing a brief characterisation of the 
enlightenment and romantic movements; in this chapter I shall also demonstrate that Spinozism 
had become fashionable again at the time due to the pantheism controversy, an event that 
involved Lessing, Jacobi and Mendelssohn, who were major philosophical figures at the time. In 
the third chapter I wi 11 demonstrate how Kant, who is the prominent influence in the Post-
Kantian German Idealists, tried to solve the many problems faced by the enlightenment and 
romantic movement, and how he failed, and this concludes part one of this thesis. In part 11 and 
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III I shall respectively assess Fichte's and Schelling's Spinozism. Part 11 is divided into three 
chapters, as follows: "Metaphysics, Knowledge and Freedom" (chap. 4), "Theology and 
Religion" (chap. 5), and "Ethics" (chap. 6). Part Ill is also divided into three chapter, which are 
entitled: "From Kant to Fichte to Schelling: Spinoza's contribution to Absolute Idealism" (chap. 
7), "Pantheism and God" (chap. 8), "Deep Ecology" (chap. 9). In Part 11 and Ill I shall attempt i. 
to investigate to what extent Spinozism influenced Fichte and Schelling, and ii. to try to 
demonstrate that there are some striking similarities between these philosophers' systems and 
Spinoza's, and iii. to try to identify some aspects of the Fichtean and Schellingian philosophy 
which represent further developments of some Spinozian ideas since it is entirely conceivable 
that Fichte and Schelling modified some aspects of Spinozism, aspects which they might have 
considered problematic, to suit their own philosophical pursuits, which was to solve the 
problems of the Kantian philosophy, and iv. to try to demonstrate that Fichte's and Schelling's 
philosophical systems are better understood in the light of their Spinozism as a reaction to the 
problems of Kant's critical philosophy, and as such both Kant and Spinoza provide the 
background for a proper understanding of Fichte's and Schelling's philosophy. I shall then 
conclude this thesis. 
I beg the reader to note at this point that I shall concentrate my efforts in dealing solely 
with Fichte's and Schelling's Spinozism, and as such, I shall not deal with the influence of 
Spinozism on Hegel, the other great Post-Kantian German Idealist, in this thesis, since his 
Spinozism has been acknowledged, accepted, and studied in some detail by various 
commentators, such as Yovel ( 1989) in his book Spinoza and Other Heretics, Oittinen (2005) in 
his chapter "Hegel und Spinoza in 'Giauben und Wissen"', Michelini (2004) in his article 
"Sostanza e assoluto: La funzione di Spinoza nella 'Scienza della Logica' di Hegel", Savorelli 
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( 1998) and his "Bertrando Spaventa e la via stretta a Spinoza tra Bruno e Hegel", Hosle ( 1997) in 
his "Hegel and Spinoza", Molinu (1996) and his "Logica del cominciamento in Hegel e 
Spinoza", Armour ( 1992) and his "Being and Idea: Developments of Some Themes in Spinoza 
and Hegel", Garcia ( 1981) and his "He gel ante Spinoza: Un Reto", Parkinson ( 1977) in "Hegel, 
Pantheism and Spinoza", Shmueli (1972) in "Some Similarities between Spinoza and Hegel on 
Substance", and Foss (1971) in "Hegel, Spinoza, and a Theory of Experience as Closed", and 
Gatens and Lloyd in their Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present (1999). These are 
but a few of the writings that can be found on the topic of Hegel and Spinoza, and added to this 
is the fact that Hegel himself wrote extensively on some of Spinoza's views in various writings. 
As such I have decided in this thesis to concentrate my effotts on Fichte's and Schelling's 
Spinozism since the literature here is much sparser and I judge this particular field deserving 
some development. 
9 
PART I 
CONTEXT: SPINOZA IN 18TH CENTURY GERMAN THOUGHT 
10 
CHAPTER 1 
SPINOZA'S RECEPTION IN THE NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY 
When one hears the name Baruch Spinoza what springs to the mind is an image of the great 17th 
century rationalist who was vilified by his contemporaries for what they judged to be atheism or 
pantheism. Recent research in this area has demonstrated that this matter is not as clear cut as it 
first seems, and thus, I propose to investigate the reception of Spinoza's thought from the 
publication of his works to the 1780s when the pantheism controversy brought Spinozism out in 
the open. The starting point for this investigation will be the Netherlands, since this is the place 
where Spinoza was born, lived, worked and died. The second part of this investigation will 
focus on Spinoza's reception in Germany, since the focus of my thesis is to establish Spinoza's 
thought as a major cornerstone in the rise of Post-Kantian German Idealism. Also, it is 
extremely important to try to understand Spinoza's early reception since this is bound to impinge 
on his later reception. If one is able to fully understand how Spinoza's philosophy was first 
received in the Netherlands, how it impinged on the Dutch academic as well as wider life, then it 
will be easier for one to understand how Spinoza's thought was received in Germany, and how it 
impinged on German academic life. In fact, as Schroder ( 1996: 157) argues, 
the process called reception of philosophical theory and the emergency of -
isms, ... , would be described in an over-simplified manner if we assume that only 
(a) the theory adopted and (b) those who adopted the theory were involved in it. 
At least one more factor involved in this process must be taken into considerati9n: 
the understanding and the reception of a philosopher's work depends to no little 
extent on the way in which earlier interpreters and especially his disciples 
represented it - that is to say, the Dutch Spinozists of the late 17th and early 18th 
century- influenced the fortune of their Master's philosophy abroad. 
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Thus, in order for one to understand how and why Spinozism flourished in Germany during the 
18th and 19th century it is important to understand not just what Spinozism is and who adopted 
such a theory but also how Spinozism was received and interpreted by early Dutch and German 
interpreters. 
SPINOZA'S RECEPTION IN THE NETHERLANDS 
How was Spinoza's thought received in the Netherlands? It is usually understood that Spinoza's 
thought was met with extreme hostility, and that his books were banned as soon as they were 
published in the Netherlands. This view is not far from the truth, but it fails to acknowledge that 
some groups and people welcomed Spinoza's revolutionary philosophy, as I shall demonstrate 
during the unfolding of this section. 
The starting point for an investigation of Spinoza's early reception ought to be with the 
publication of his first work. The first book published by Spinoza was his Tractatus Theologico 
- Politicus in 1670, and for reasons of prudence it was published anonymously at Amsterdam, for 
Spinoza must have known that it would stir up strong feelings. The Tractatus is part 
commentary on the Bible and part political treatise, and it has as its main aim the defence of full 
freedom of thought and religious practice. This book soon achieved notoriety due to its author's 
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identification of God with Nature, or as Spinoza puts it Deus sive Natura. That is, people then 
charged the author of the Tractatus with i. atheism since it denied the existence of a personal 
God, and ii. pantheism since it identified God with Nature. Whether or not these charges are 
correct is not relevant at this stage, but it must be said here that there is much debate among 
commentators regarding this matter. 
Let me now go back to the matter ofthe publication ofthe Tractatus. Popkin (1987:101), 
on writing about the Tractatus, notes that "little public printed discussion occurred in the first 
years after its appearance and after its being banned".' This could have been a very peculiar 
phenomenon unless, as Van Bunge (1989:228) notes, "one of the reasons for this phenomenon 
may perhaps have been that two of the most significant intellectual movements within the 
Republic, i.e. the Cartesians and the Remonstrant, simply had the bad luck that their respective 
spokesmen died before they could personally see their replies through the press". This seems to 
be a very plausible reason for the lack of published commentaries and interpretations of 
Spinoza's Tractatus, since there is little doubt that the Tractatus was decried as soon as it was 
published and banned under the Anti-Socinian Act2 of 1653 which remained in force for a 
considerable time and was the foundation for all intellectual censorship in the Republic. 
It is interesting to note that the banning of books and intellectual censorship 111 the 
Republic was not very effective because many copies of Spinoza's works were being read in the 
1 NB. The Remonstrand are a Dutch religious society. It has its origins in the dissidence of 
Jacobus Arminius and the signing of the 'Remonstrance' against strict Calvinism by 44 ministers. 
They put forward some points proclaiming the responsibility of man, pre-ordination through 
foreknowledge of faith, and that Christ's death was sufficient for all. These points are rooted in 
the Gospel of Jesus and based on tolerance and freedom. 
2 NB. Socianism basically held the views that i. Christ was human and not divine, ii. that 
human beings possess free will and thus it preached against the Lutheran idea of predestination, 
iii. argued in favour of pacifism and against all wars, iv. argued for the separation of church and 
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Netherlands and abroad. This inefficacy was likely due to lack of enforcing means by the 
Republic officials, but the banning and censoring of Spinoza's books and ideas was not an empty 
gesture by the authorities of the Republic. Israel ( 1996: 14) corroborates this: 
the banning of Spinoza's books by the Dutch secular authorities ... however 
incomplete and unsystematic was by no means merely an empty formality. It may 
be true that Spinoza's books, despite all these orders and edicts, were still being 
bought and sold ... in the book-shops of Amsterdam. But his books could not be 
advertised, hung up in shop windows ... Nor could Spinoza's books be cited in 
debate, academic discourse, or books. 
Thus, Spinoza's books were being sold under the counter in book-shops in the Republic, even if 
they were banned and censored. 
Another point to be noted is that Spinoza's ideas were so revolutionary in his time, and 
hence offended against the 17th century status quo, that the bad publicity must have added to the 
curiosity of many people, and thus increased considerably the number of Spinoza's readers. It 
must also be noted that after those first few years when little had been published on Spinoza's 
ideas that a great amount of interpretations and commentaries were published since "all 
significant parties within the Republic seem to have found it imperative to provide an answer to 
what they obviously regarded as an extremely serious threat to the very core of their particular 
creeds" as noted by Van Bunge ( 1989:243). Any commentary or interpretation of Spinoza's 
works, however truthful to Spinoza's project, helped to propagate Spinoza's ideas since they 
state, and v. argued in favour of reason over dogma. Thus, it is easy to see why Spinoza's 
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attempted to either refute or explicate Spinoza's thought, which added to the furore over 
Spinoza's name. 
So far it has been established that Spinoza's works and ideas were decried and banned by 
the various authorities in the Republic. Moreover, it is also interesting to note here that 
Spinoza's ideas earned him excommunication (i.e. Cherem or Herem which is actually the total 
exclusion of a person from the Jewish Community and it has no connotation of damnation 
attached to it as in the case of the Christian excommunication), and thus, he became persona non 
grata in the Netherlands. He was asked by the leading rabbis of Amsterdam to retract his views 
and take a low profile. Needless to say that Spinoza did neither. Apparently, he became even 
louder and spoke of his views at every opportunity. The Jewish community had no other option 
but to excommunicate him in their effort to silence him. 
Given that we know that no one in the Jewish community was allowed to maintain 
contact with Spinoza and that he became persona non grata in the Republic, and given that we 
also know that Spinoza's works were been sold under the counter and that the banishing of his 
books was unsystematic and incomplete, and given that later on in the 17th century a number of 
commentaries or interpretations of Spinoza's works were published, the question here is: who 
bought Spinoza's books, and the commentaries and interpretations of such books? And even 
important even: who was writing such commentaries and interpretations? 
As I mentioned above, Spinoza defended the identification of God with Nature, preached 
determinism, advocated the view that only reason is the way to truth and salvation, and he also 
criticised the Bible. All this provoked fiery and lengthy discussion among the various religious 
and academic groups in the Netherlands. Recent research in this area has shown that in the 
Tractatus was banned under the Anti-Socinian Act, since Spinoza held at least i., iv., and v. 
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Netherlands, Spinoza's ideas were being taken up and propagated at a very early time, as 
Siebrand ( 1988: 13) corroborates: "On July 20, 1668, the medical doctor and jurist Adriaan 
Koerbagh was questioned by the Amsterdam police. He was taken prisoner because he had 
written two books for the education of the Dutch people. In answer to their interrogations, he 
conceded that he was associated with Spinoza". Thus, just eight years after the publication of the 
Tractatus books written under the influence of Spinoza were being written and published under 
disguise. This is evidence that Spinoza's ideas were being taken up at a very early stage and that 
at least a few of his contemporaries welcomed his revolutionary thought and ideas. 
Most commentaries and interpretations of Spinoza's works had come from Cartesian 
thinkers, and since Cat1esianism was being discredited and undermined by Spinoza's ideas, the 
Spinozist threat statted growing to new dimensions. Many scholars of this time saw Spinozism 
as a threat to the church and state, and since Spinoza's works, as well as commentaries and 
interpretations of his works, were available in the vernacular, more and more ordinary people, 
and not only the educated, started encountering the revolutionary ideas of Spinoza. There are 
many instances of this and l wish to mention a few cases briefly. 
One of the first commentaries on Spinoza's thought is to be found in Dictionnaire 
Historigue et Critique which was first published in 1695 by the Cartesian Pierre Bayle. Bayle is 
extremely critical of Spinoza's thought, claiming that it is inconsistent and that it leads to a 
number of absurdities. 3 I do not wish to examine Bayle's interpretation here, since this would be 
3 NB. one ofthe main points made by Bayle is to do with his understanding of the concepts of 
substance and mode in the works of Spinoza. Bay le reads Spinoza as a Cartesian, and thus he 
understands that Spinoza uses the term substance and mode in much the same way as Descartes 
and the Scholastics did. That is to say, that he understands that for Spinoza, substance is the 
subject, and that mode is the property which inheres in the subject. Bayle understands that 
Spinoza is inconsistent here because ifthe substance is God and everything else is a modification 
of God, i.e God is the subject and everything else is a property of God, then this implies a 
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straying from the main purpose of this section. The important point here is not the merits of 
Bayle's Cartesian interpretation, but the fact that by the end of the 17th century books which 
explicitly mentioned Spinoza's name and thought were being published and sold in the open. 
Therefore, it seems that by the end of the 17th century the Anti-Socinian Act of 1653, under 
which Spinoza's books were banned, was no longer in force. Another point to be made at this 
point is that Bayle's interpretation was very influential, it became one ofthe classic refutations of 
Spinoza, and thus it set the tone for many Anti-Spinozists during the 18th century in their effort 
to overcome the threat of Spinozism. The Dictionnaire ran to five editions during the 18th 
century, was translated into German and became part of the canon in most universities. 
Wielema ( 1996: I 03-115) notes that in the Dutch province of Zeeland, which in the 1670s 
had been extremely disturbed by religious and political disputes, a new sect called the 
Hattemists, after Pontiaan Van Hattem, was on the rise. Van Hattem held similar views to 
Spinoza, such as the idea of salvation. Both Spinoza and Van Hattem held the view that man can 
achieve salvation by acknowledging that he is part of God, that is, by acknowledging that God is 
immanent to all things. It is true that not all Hattemist ideas can be traced back to Spinoza's 
thought, and that not all Hattemist views were held by Spinoza; nevertheless, the fact that they 
shared some views with Spinoza, and that they acknowledged that some of their views were 
borrowed from Spinoza's, awarded them the title of Spinozists, which by this time was a 
synonym for atheist. Van Hattem, and the Hattemists, are evidence that some people and groups 
welcomed Spinoza's revolutionary ideas and were borrowing some of Spinoza's ideas for their 
own purposes. Van Hattem was using some of Spinoza's ideas, not to undermine religion and 
number of absurdities. For instance, since there are healthy and sick people at any given time, 
then since everything is a modification of God, then God will have contradicting properties at 
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the church, but to merge Spinozism with religion and the church, so that religion and church 
became more rational. By bringing Spinozism to the pulpit Van Hattem, and the Hattemists, 
help to disseminate Spinozism among the less educated. 
Spinozism was also disseminated by the Freemasons. Since any reference to Spinoza's 
name, works, and thought were banned from public life in the Republic under the Anti-Socinian 
Act of 1653, it seems that the only way of discussing Spinozism, at least until the ban was lifted, 
was in secret societies. In this light, Spinozism was widely discussed in Freemasonry lodges, 
and this fact helped the dissemination of Spinoza's ideas until such time when they could be 
publicly discussed. An interesting case has come to light recently regarding the Freemasons and 
Spinozism. Thissen (1996: 117-134) notes that in the middle of the 19th century, Markus Polak 
founded the freemasons lodge Post Nubila Lux, which was not recognised by the het 
Grootoosten, i.e. the Dutch Federation of Lodges. Polak and his sympathisers wanted to institute 
a natural religion, and they believed that with the help of Spinoza's views, such a natural religion 
would eventually replace Christianity. Thissen's research shows that Spinozism was being taken 
up by some groups who firmly believed in it, to the extent that Spinozism could serve as the 
basis for a new religion which would replace Christianity. This shows the great length 
Spinozism had come, that is, in the 17th century Spinoza was vilified as an atheist and his works 
were banned, a hundred and fifty years later Spinozism was seen as providing the theoretical 
basis for a natural religion. 
Thissen ( 1996: 132-133) also reports an interesting case in the latter part of the 19th 
century, where Petrus Van Limburg Brouwer, a firm defender of Spinoza, attempted to show that 
Spinoza was not an atheist. Brouwer firmly denied that Spinozism subscribed to atheism by 
any given time, that is, God will be sick and healthy at the same time (cf. Pierre Bayle, 
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pointing out that the denial of a personal God, i.e. a transcendent God, and in favour of a 
pantheistic God, i.e. an immanent God, was as old as mankind itself. Brouwer based his defence 
of Spinozism by referring to Hinduism and Buddhism. This case shows that, by the end of the 
19th century, Spinozism could be openly defended against the charge of atheism without fear of 
persecution; this would have been unheard of during the 17th and 18th centuries. 
It is fair to say, then, that Spinoza's revolutionary ideas impinged a great deal in Dutch 
life. A vast amount of Anti-Spinozist literature appeared, many tried to merge it with 
Christianity or Judaism, and a few became Spinozists by taking Spinoza's thought to their hearts 
and minds. Thus, in the Netherlands, Spinozism became an issue for many philosophical groups 
and thinkers. By and large, most of these groups and thinkers were criticising and trying to 
undermine Spinoza's thought, but there were a few groups and thinkers who were taking up 
Spinozism favourably. lt must be also noted that many of Spinoza's commentators and 
interpreters did not fully understand Spinoza's philosophical system, which yielded considerable 
misinterpretation and misunderstanding in the literature concerning Spinoza. Nevertheless, both 
anti and pro Spinozists helped in one way or another with the dissemination of Spinoza's ideas. 
shall now examine Spinoza's reception in Germany. 
SPINOZA'S RECEPTION IN GERMANY 
As I have maintained above, the way in which Spinoza's ideas were received by the Dutch during 
the 17th and 18th century influenced the reception of Spinoza's ideas abroad. The last section 
has shown that i. by and large Spinoza's ideas were seen as a threat, but that some small groups 
Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, Rotterdam, 1720). 
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and people welcomed Spinoza's revolutionary ideas, and that ii. most of the literature written on 
Spinoza attempted to refute Spinoza's philosophical system, and iii. many of Spinoza's 
commentators did not fully understand his philosophical system. These three factors indeed 
influenced the reception of Spinoza abroad, not least in Germany. Schroder ( 1996: 168) 
corroborates: 
in the academic and, more specifically, the philosophical sphere, the major effect 
of the circulation of the Dutch Spinozistic treatises in Germany was not 
favourable to the dissemination of Spinoza's thought. They rather hindered than 
promoted the philosophical Spinoza-reception in German. 
Thus, the early reception of Spinoza's ideas in the German academic sphere was not very 
welcoming, and the large literature against Spinoza's philosophical system written by the early 
Dutch commentators and interpreters is a crucial factor in this unfavourable reception of 
Spinoza's thought by German academics. 
Nevertheless, it must be also acknowledge that in Germany, just as in the Netherlands, 
some people welcomed Spinoza's ideas. Most of those who welcomed Spinoza's thought went 
underground and would not openly acknowledge that they were Spinozists. These were the so-
called crypto-Spinozists. Others openly acknowledged that they were Spinozists, but these were 
only a few who put their academic careers and personal lives in danger for openly defending 
their Spinozism. Mathias Knutzen, Wilhem Stosch and Theodor Lau, were openly-Spinozists 
and were persecuted in one way or another for acknowledging their Spinozism during the late 
17th century and first part ofthe 18th century. 
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It is also noteworthy that some people and groups were coming in contact with Spinoza's 
ideas through books which deliberately disguised their Spinozian content, such as works written 
by crypto-Spinozists. Many of these people and groups either took to or disagreed with those 
ideas without knowing that they were based on Spinoza's philosophical system. 
Another interesting parallel between Spinoza's reception in the Netherlands and his 
reception in Germany is that some people tried to merge Spinoza's ideas with Christianity or 
Judaism. Johann Wachter maintained that Spinoza's thought draws heavily from the Jewish 
Kabala, and from this fact he attempted to reconcile Spinoza's thought with Christianity so that 
Spinozism could be respected just as the Kabala was. Wachter was charged with Spinozism and 
was only saved from persecution thanks to the patronage he enjoyed in Berlin. 
This situation remained until the 1780s when the pantheism controversy first came into 
the open. Bell (I 984: 171) concluded that: 
although it has been shown that Spinoza's philosophy was an important issue 
throughout the 18th century, it will also be apparent that it is possible to speak of 
a Spinoza-renaissance in Germany in the 1780's mainly because the subject was 
brought fully into the open for the first time. 
Since Spinoza was an infamous figure due to his vilification by his contemporaries, it seems that 
Spinoza's thought went underground, but it never went away, and it re-emerged from its furtive 
status in the I 780s when the pantheism controversy broke out. The pantheism controversy was 
triggered when Lessing, who was one of the major figures of the German Enlightenment 
movement, confessed to Jacobi that he was a Spinozist. After Lessing's death, Jacobi brought 
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this matter into the public sphere, but not before a fiery exchange of correspondence with 
Mendelssohn, who thought of himself as the heir of Lessing's position. The controversy 
culminated with the publication of works by both Mendelssohn and Jacobi. Mendelssohn 
published Morgenstuden oder Yorlesungen Uber das Daseyn Gottes (Morning Hours or Lectures 
on the Existence of God) in 1785, and An die Freunde Lessing's (to Lessing's Friends) in 1786, 
and Jacobi Ober die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Letters to 
Mr Moses Mendelssohn on the Doctrine of Spinoza) in 1785, and Wider Mende1ssohns 
Beschuldigungen betreffend die Briefe Uber die Lehre des Spinoza (Reply to Mendelssohn's 
Accusations Concerning the Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza) in 1786. Jacobi, sympathetic to 
the Romantic movement, aimed to question the Enlightenment movement's rationalism and 
naturalism, since he understood that any philosophical system based on these two tenets can only 
end up in Spinozism, where Spinozism represents atheism and materialism; Mendelssohn, a 
member of the Enlightenment movement, on the contrary tries to build on a sort of Spinozism 
which did not lead to the serious consequences implied by Jacobi's reading of Spinoza's 
philosophy. Both Jacobi and Mendelssohn agreed that reason alone cannot be the chief basis for 
metaphysical enquiry and that something extra was needed if one was to avoid Spinozism. For 
Jacobi an act of faith and sentiment, or a sa/to mortale as he puts it, was needed to avoid 
Spinozism and enable metaphysical enquiry. Mendelssohn, on the contrary, argued in favour of 
common sense as the extra component which could avoid the atheism and pantheism and enable 
metaphysical enquiry. 
The pantheism controversy had a profound effect on the history of philosophy and this 
effect is not often recognised by philosophers. Beiser ( 1987:4 7 -48) argues that the pantheism 
controversy has three distinct layers, as follows: 
It has an outer shell, the biographical issue of Lessing's Spinozism; an inner layer 
the exegetical question of the proper interpretation of Spinoza; and a hidden inner 
core the problem of the authority of reason ... We have paid a heavy price for our 
ignorance of the pantheism controversy. We have lost our philosophical 
orientation in dealing with the speculative systems ofpost-Kantian philosophy. In 
no small measure these systems grew up as a response to the fundamental 
problem raised by the pantheism controversy. What Fichte, Schelling and Hegel 
were trying to do was to preserve the authority of reason in the face of Jacobi's 
provocative criticism. 
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This third point is extremely imp011ant, and I note that in order for one to understand why reason 
was being challenged by i. Jacobi's faith and sentiment, and ii. Mendelssohn's common sense, as 
the chief basis for metaphysical philosophical enquiry, one must understand the zeitgeist of that 
period, this being so, I shall put the pantheism controversy aside now. It can be said that in the 
18th century there were two major movements. One was the Enlightenment movement, and on 
the other the Romantic movement, and I shall provide the reader with some brief definitions for 
these two movements now. After I have done this I shall come back to the pantheism 
controversy. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND ITS ADVERSARIES 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT MOVEMENT 
Enlightenment, and its equivalent in other European languages, refers to an intellectual 
movement that had its dawn in 17th century England, with Locke and the deists. This movement 
soon spread virtually everywhere in Europe, and France became a major centre for its 
development thanks to the efforts of the philosophes, such as Voltaire, Diderot and other 
Encyclopaedists. It must be noted that Germany did not participate in the early development of 
the movement due to its largely feudal socio-political structures, which were not very favourable 
to change and new ideas. Moreover, when the movement finally started to develop in Germany, 
it became intertwined with rationalism, especially in the figures of Leibniz and Wolff. This fact 
was in direct contrast to the movement in the British Isles, which was directly interlinked with 
empiricism in the figure of thinkers like Hume, Re id, and Butler, to name just a few. Thus, the 
so-called Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy came to dominate German intellectual life during the 
Enlightenment era. This school received Spinoza's thought unfavourably, since it, by and large, 
followed Leibniz's meticulous rejection of Spinoza's system, which was roughly based on 
Bayle's rejection, and which only favoured his (Leibniz's) own system. The Leibniz- Wolffian 
school rejected monism and favoured a pluralism of substances, and concluded that the former 
system, Spinoza's system, can only lead to fatalism and the destruction of religion, freedom and 
morality. 
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In this light, the Enlightenment era, or the Age of Reason as it is sometimes referred to, 
was a far from homogenous movement, being more like an association of intellectuals who draw 
their inspirations from the achievements of the scientific revolution during the 16th and 17th 
century, and who shared a common approach towards the development of mankind, rather than 
subscribing to a particular single belief system. This common approach is the authority of 
reason, that is, the members of the movement praised rational criticism, they held that everything 
had to undergo the tribunal of reason, where reason is the sole judge, prosecutor, defence lawyer 
and jury. Thus, the Enlightenment movement could be defined as being a philosophical 
movement, which i. preached against metaphysical enquiry and revealed religion because these 
are beyond the realm of reason, ii. aimed to reform socio-political institutions so that these would 
conform to the principles of reason, and iii. defended the view that tolerance should be extended 
to different creeds and ways of I ife because rationally leads to the betterment of human relations. 
Thus, it could be said that the Enlightenment movement was a socio-political movement, which 
attempted i. the betterment of society as a whole, ii. the betterment of the individual per se, and 
iii. the betterment of human relations; the basis and catalyst for improvement in all these areas 
being reason and reason alone. Corroborating this is Zac (1990:255): "il ne s'agit pas seulement 
de !'amelioration de l'individu et de ses relations avec autrui, mais aussi des reformes, s'accordant 
avec raison, la religion, I'Etat, le droit, la science et la literature". 
The other great influence, apparent among many members of the movement, was 
naturalism. Beiser (1987:10-11) notes that 'the Enlightenment faith in reason rested last but not 
least upon naturalism, the belief that reason could, if only in principle, explain everything in 
nature'. The movement's reliance on rational criticism rested heavily on naturalism, because the 
movement understood that reason could, eventually, explain everything in Nature, i.e. they 
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understood Nature as a self-contained and self-explanatory system. To many members of the 
movement everything in Nature could eventually be explained by a mathematical system of laws, 
which could be inferred and discovered by the powers of reason. The many advances made by 
the sciences of the time supported this core beliefofthe movement, e.g. the discovery ofthe law 
of gravity by Newton; and moreover, many of these discoveries could be cross-linked, such as, 
the fall of an apple, the ebb and flow of tides and the orbit ofplanets around the sun, could all be 
explained by a particular universal law, Newton's law of gravity. 
The above mentioned characterisation fits well with the movement, but it must be noted 
that at the beginning of the I 8th century the movement took a more moderate approach towards 
revealed religion, only later in the century did it become more radical. That is, the movement, at 
the beginning of the 18th century was more moderate as it was anti-religious only insofar as 
Theism was concerned, and thus, many members ofthe movement still embraced Deism, such as 
Voltaire, Diderot and Wolff, because they held the view that true religion is natural religion, and 
thus, they dismissed Theism or revealed religion as mere fiction. In the middle of the 18th 
century this situation changed and became more radical as Beiser ( 1987 :59) notes: 
theism was suffering at the hands of sciences. Two of the cardinal tenets of 
theism, the belief in miracles and the authority of the Bible, were looking less and 
less plausible. Modern physics had become status quo and its picture of the 
necessary order of nature cast doubt upon the possibility of miracles ... The bible 
seemed to be no longer the product of supernatural inspiration, but of man himself 
writing under specific historical and cultural circumstances. Although deism 
seemed to be consistent with modern physics and biblical criticism, it too began to 
decline deism was the victim of philosophical criticism. The mainstays of deism 
were the ontological and cosmological arguments. But these arguments had 
become discredited by the 1780s. Hume's Dialogues ... Butler's Analogy of 
Religion ... had severely damaged the cosmological argument, while Kant's Kritik 
appeared to provide the fatal expose of the ontological argument. 
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Hence, at first the Enlightenment movement was only anti-theist, but it soon became partially 
anti-deist. That is, at first the Enlightenment movement was only anti revealed religion, still 
accepting the possibility of some sort of creator, i.e. a personal and transcendent God. By the 
middle ofthe 18th century, however, many members ofthe movement also became suspicious of 
natural religion since rational criticism caused some damage to the various versions of the 
ontological and cosmological argument; but, just as many still held on to Deism by subscribing 
to the views of the design argument, since the analogy of a clockmaker fitted well with the 
mechanical universe views of the movement, and not many people in the 18th century were 
prepared to declare themselves to be atheists. Another point which must be made here is that 
many in the movement were anti-religious, because religion was seen by many as preventing 
mankind from implementing changes required by reason, and thus hindering progress. Many in 
the movement held a moral objection to religion because they understood that religion prevented 
mankind from focusing on the principles, such as the principle of utility, which were being 
provided by reason, and thus preventing mankind's improvement. Among those who held such 
views is Bentham ( 1982: 121 ), I quote: 
The dictates of religion are in all places intermixed more or less with dictates 
unconformable to those of utility, deduced from texts, well or ill interpreted, of 
the writings held sacred by each sect: unconformable, by imposing practices 
sometimes inconvenient to a man's self, sometimes pernicious to the rest of the 
community. 
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lt must also be acknowledge, however, that Bentham (1982: 121) was also optimistic, and he 
thought that religion would eventually catch up with things and thus becoming compatible with 
the principle of utility, 1 quote: 
Happily, the dictates of religion seem to approach nearer and nearer to a 
coincidence with those of utility every day. Because the dictates of the moral 
sanction do so: and those coincide with or are influenced by these. Men of the 
worst religions, influenced by the voice and practice of the surrounding world, 
borrow continually a new leaf out of the book of utility: and with these, in order 
not to break with their religion, they endeavour, sometimes with violence enough, 
to patch together and adorn the repositories oftheir faith 
Needless to say, the movement's more radical atheists, such as d'Holbach, were very hostile 
towards religion. Many atheists understood religion not just as a power that prevented mankind's 
progress because it obstructed the powers of reason, but also as the very source of discrepancies 
in society. I quote an interesting passage from d'Holbach (1990:280): 
Concluons done que la Theologie et ses notions, bien loin d'etre utiles au genre-
humain, sont les vraies sources des maux qui aftligent la terre, des erreurs qui 
l'aveglent, des prejuges qui l'engourdissent, de !'ignorance qui la rend credule, des 
vices qui la tourmente, des gouvernements qui l'oprime. Concluons, que les idees 
surnaturelles et divines qu'on nous inspire des l'enfance, sont les vraies causes de 
notre deraison habituelle, de nos querelles religieuses, de nos dissensions sacrees, 
de nos persecutions humaines. 
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I must stress that there were some regional differences in the way the movement approached 
religion, revealed or natural, as a whole. By and large the French were the foremost atheists by 
the end of the 18th century, whilst the Germans held on to deism dearly mainly due to the feudal 
socio-political structures which were in place in Germany at the time. Germany was divided into 
a number of small principalities that were governed by Lutheran absolute monarchs; these 
monarchs did not favour changes and regarded the established status quo as being the political 
and religious ideal. I shall come back to this point later in this section. The decline of theism 
and deism only favoured Spinozism too well. Spinoza's pantheism, and its conception of an 
immanent God or Nature, seemed to be able to stand its ground against naturalism and rational 
criticism. Moreover, Spinozism seemed to be the natural consequence of natural ism and rational 
criticism and thus it was embraced, openly or disguised, by many members of the Enlightenment 
movement. Spinoza's biblical criticism in the Tractatus and the naturalism of the Ethics seemed 
to some philosophers of the Enlightenment movement as representing the very dictums that 
modern science was putting forward. Spinoza's determinism, his denials of a personal and 
transcendent God, his rejection ofthe notion of providence were all thought of as being a natural 
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consequence of modern science. For many members of the movement Spinoza's pantheism 
seemed to be a good solution, the middle way between pure theism and deism on one side and 
extreme materialism and atheism on the other side. 
Towards the end of the 18th century the Enlightenment faced a maJor crisis. As I 
mentioned above, the Enlightenment movement praised rational criticism and naturalism. It 
praised rational criticism because of its power to examine and explain the world around us, and 
naturalism because its members understood Nature to be a self-contained and self-explanatory 
system. Both rational criticism and naturalism had to be radicalised because to put a limit on 
these would be a form of unreason or dogmatism. The radicalisation of these two tenets led the 
Enlightenment movement to a crisis. Beiser (2000:20-21) notes that rational criticism when 
radicalised leads to scepticism, for when one examines one's own beliefs one discovers that the 
evidence supporting these same beliefs can go either way. Naturalism when radicalised leads to 
materialism, for if Nature is a self-explanatory system why presuppose that there is anything 
other than matter. Moreover, rational criticism and naturalism undermine each other. If rational 
criticism ends in scepticism then it undermines naturalism, which is committed to the 
independent reality of Nature and the necessity of scientific laws. For since one has no reason to 
believe one's own evidence then one has no reason to believe the necessity of scientific laws. If 
naturalism ends in materialism, then it undermines rational criticism because materialism ends in 
relativism since it maintains that everything, including human rationality, is the product of 
material forces at a specific time and space. Therefore there is no universal necessity, and this 
undermines rational criticism since rational criticism aims to discover universal truths. 
Fundamentally, those two tenets ofthe Enlightenment were leading it to extreme materialism and 
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atheism as well as undermining any possible metaphysical enquiry, and by no means were all 
philosophers in the 18th century prepared to live with those two consequences. 
Ameriks (2000:5) notes that the crisis in the movement also leads to a crisis in morality. 
On the one hand, achievements in the sciences, specially the advent of Newtonian Physics, 
entailed a deterministic universe where the three most basic claims of traditional philosophy, viz. 
the existence of God, freewill, and the immortality of the soul, became irrelevant. On the other 
hand, morality and its understanding that human beings have freewill, that human beings are 
equal and that we are practical beings seemed to require those very claims which were being 
undermined by data coming from the sciences, thus, the crisis in morality. 
The above characterisation of the Enlightenment, however, is not totally true of the 
Aufklarung, the German Enlightenment. The German Enlightenment had a distinct feature that 
differentiated it from other European Enlightenment movements, as noted by Beck ( 1993 :6): 
The German Enlightenment took place in a feudal environment of scores of small 
absolute monarchies in which Lutheran passive obedience and the eye of the local 
monarch ensured that the established order of things was regarded with sacred 
awe by the Burger. While the philosophes of France were not merely anti-clerical 
but also anti-religious (materialists, atheists, free thinkers, sceptics), what was 
unique to German Enlightenment was that it originally had a profoundly religious 
motive. 
Thus, it could be said that the German Enlightenment was aimed at the reform of socio-political 
institutions and the betterment of mankind and human relations following the principles of 
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reason, but that it was not anti-religious, and thus, not totally anti-metaphysical since it was 
never entirely suspicious of theism and or deism. This peculiarity of the German Enlightenment 
movement, namely its religious motive, forced this movement's members to try to merge rational 
criticism and naturalism with religion. This turned out to be a very difficult, perhaps impossible, 
task. This religious motive of the German Enlightenment only added to the crisis in the 
movement. The Aufklarer searched for possible responses and ways by which the crisis could be 
avoided, and the religious motive maintained. The Aufklarer had to try to keep rational criticism 
and naturalism as the central tenets of the movement and at the same time merge these with his 
own religious convictions - the conciliation of these factors proved to be a conundrum. Many 
AufkUirer, such as Wol ff, embraced deism; others, such as Mendelssohn, kept true to their 
religion and thus were theists. Clinging to theism or deism must have proved very difficult, as 
these had to be defended against rational criticism and naturalism. Thus, whereas the 
Enlightenment philosophers in other European countries were able to embrace Spinozism as the 
middle way between theism and deism on one side and materialism and atheism on the other 
side, many Aufklarer were unable to embrace Spinozism as an option due to their theism or 
deism. The only option open to these Aufklarer was to try to read (or misread) Spinozism in 
such a way that it would neither conflict with their theism or deism nor undermine the powers or 
rational criticism and naturalism. Needless to say these Aufklarer were largely unsuccessful in 
their venture. Fortunately, some Aufklarer chose to embrace Spinozism secretly, i.e. the crypto-
Spinozists, of whom Lessing is probably the best example; others defied the situation in 
Germany and openly acknowledge that they were Spinozists, i.e. the open-Spinozists. These 
crypto and open Spinozists only truly came into the battleground when the pantheism 
controversy broke out, and the Spinozist solution to the crisis could no longer be ignored. In this 
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light, the German scenario during the later part of the 18th century is divided into four groups, 
namely, i. the Aufklarer who were anti-Spinozist because of their theism or deism, ii. the 
AufkHirer who were a crypto-Spinozist, iii. the AufkHirer who were openly Spinozist, and iv. the 
Romantics. The first three have been dealt with during the unfolding of this chapter. I now turn 
to the Romantics. 
THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT 
It is quite difficult, and perhaps fruitless, to try to define Romanticism. it could be said that 
Romanticism is more like a mood and not a well-organised or structured philosophical 
movement. The romantic can be seen as revolutionary or as reactionary depending on one's own 
standpoint, and this is the very reason why it is so difficult to try to pin Romanticism down to 
any possible philosophical or political view, no matter how many times this has been attempted. 
There are, however, some common features that are shared by all Romantics. Quintan 
( 1993 :778) has described these features extremely well, as follows: 
The Romantic favours the concrete over the abstract, variety over uniformity, the 
infinite over the finite, nature over culture, convention and artifice, the organic 
over the mechanical, freedom over constraint, rules and limitations. In human 
terms it prefers the unique individual to the average man, the free creative genius 
to the prudent man of good sense, the particular community or nation to humanity 
at large. 
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In his The Roots of Romanticism, Berlin ( 1999:8-9) maintains that to say that someone is a 
romantic is to say that: 
the values to which they attached the highest importance were such values as 
integrity, sincerity, readiness to sacrifice one's life to some inner light, dedication 
to some ideal for which it is worth sacrificing all that one is, for which it is worth 
both living and dying. You would have found that they were not primarily 
interested in knowledge, or in the advance of science, nor interested in political 
power, not interested in happiness, not interested, above all, in adjustment to life, 
in finding your place in society, in living at peace with your government, even in 
loyalty to your king or to the republic. 
The Romantic movement was a backlash against the Enlightenment movement. The Romantic 
saw the Enlightenment movement as trying to standardise everything according to rational 
principles, and this standardisation was seen as a sort of dictatorship of reason. The Romantic 
philosopher felt that the standardisation of everything according to reason was somehow doing 
away with particular things and the richness of cultural enterprise that comes with variety. Thus, 
the Romantic felt that the individual man or group was worth fighting for; he praised the 
particular and the unique, rejecting the standardised and the average. The Romantic did not 
attempt to do away with reason, but to somehow diminish its dictatorial powers and perhaps to 
put limits to it. Furthermore, the Romantic attempted to show that sentiment, faith and emotions 
are important features of life as well as of social-political structures. 
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It is noteworthy that the Romantic movement understood the Enlightenment movement 
as being too pretentious in its claim that it represented the highest point in human history and 
progress. The Romantic objected to this claim on the ground that reason served to standardise 
things, and this standardisation of things was understood by the Romantic as a sort of 
downgrading, since it stopped i. individuals in their effort to become unique individuals, heroes 
as it were, ii. nations and cultures in their effort to remain independent and pure, and iii. mankind 
in its effort to progress, since without heroes and cultural richness there could be no progress but 
only stagnation. Furthermore, for the Romantic, reason was corrupting mankind, rather than 
bettering it, exactly because reason, as the Enlightenment envisaged it, left no room for faith, 
emotion and sentiment, and the Romantic at any rate considered these as being just as important 
as reason. 
Another point to be made regarding the Romantic movement is that it aimed to 
undermine the Enlightenment notion that all great questions posed by mankind -such as: 'how to 
live the good life? ', 'what is the good? ', 'what is right? ', 'what is beautiful? ', 'how to act? ', and 
so on - have objective and valid answers which can be obtained by the use of reasoning. The 
more ambitious members of the Enlightenment movement understood that a rational system 
could be devised so that all these questions could be answered, and that these answers could be 
stated in the form of propositions, and if all these propositions were true then the whole system 
would be sound. Thus, the Enlightenment movement held an external notion of truth, it aimed to 
answer all great questions by matching the answers of those questions to some external entity, 
and this matching was to be achieved through reasoning. According to some commentators, 
such as Berlin, the Romantic, on the contrary, held a more internalist notion of truth, it held that 
there are no external entities out there to which the answer to the great questions of mankind 
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could be matched. The Romantic thought that truth is pm1icular to individuals, communities, 
nations and periods of time, and hence it is senseless to try to universalise the answer to those 
questions. I quote Berlin (1999:63): 
If the value of every culture resides in what that particular culture seeks after, as 
he says (Herder), every culture has its own centre of gravity ... you must determine 
what this centre of gravity, the Schwerpunkt, as he calls it, is before you can 
understand what these men were about; it is no use judging these things from the 
point of view of some other century or some other culture. 
Therefore, the Romantic movement can be said to have three central tenets, viz. i. an internalist 
notion of truth, ii. it favoured the individual as a particular entity, over the standardised man, and 
iii. it cared for communities in their uniqueness of cultural richness, over the idea of one single 
culture as being proper. 
The German Romantic movement, just as the German Enlightenment movement, had 
also a strong religious motive, drawing much of its inspiration from German Pietism. The 
Pietists were an evangelical Lutheran movement, which first appeared in Germany at the end of 
the I 7th century. It emerged as a reaction against all sorts of Protestant dogmatism, believing 
that "since the Lutheran Church had become part of the state, it had developed an authoritarian 
structure of its own, and had thus become a form of dogmatism and elitism no better than the 
Roman Catholic Church", as noted by Beiser (I 987:5 I). Pietism defended views, such as the 
universal priesthood of believers, freedom of conscience and the necessity of an immediate 
relationship with God and it is this latter belief that is most important here since it understands 
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that rei igion, as the relationship with the creator, is to be understood as an inner rather than an 
outer connection with God. That is, Pietism favoured a form of religiousness which defended an 
inner, sentimental and emotional relationship with God rather than an outward, formal and 
ritualistic liaison with the creator. Gardner (1999:8) notes that "Pietism had ... anticipated the 
crisis into which the Enlightenment would lead religion, and it lay ready with a solution: the 
independence of religion from reason", and thus, it is easy to see why many Romantics, such as 
Hamann, Herder and Jacobi, draw constantly from Pietism. It must be acknowledged here that 
the Pietism also influenced some AufkHirer, such as Kant who was brought up as a Pietist. 
Moreover, since Pietism was one of the major religious movements in Germany it is most certain 
that all Aufklarer were well familiar with it and its criticisms of reason, even if only in the form 
of the arguments which were put forward by people like Jacobi, Herder and Hamann. 
At this point it is worth mentioning Herder. Herder is very important for the 
development of German Romanticism, as he is a central figure in the transition period between 
the Enlightenment and the Romantic movement, and as such, he was a fierce critic of the 
Enlightenments' position, I quote a passage from Herder's "Yet Another Philosophy of History": 
"How strange that anyone in the world should find it hard to understand that light does not 
nourish men, that order and opulence and so-called free thought can be neither the happiness nor 
the destiny of everyone. [Herder (1969: 193)]" 
Herder rejected any form of rational system and was particularly attracted to the idea of 
the existence of supernatural or divine entities, such as the immortal soul in psychology, the 
divine origin of language, and the concept of providence in history. He was particularly 
interested in the philosophy of language, holding the view that all languages descend from a 
single common source. He also claimed that a people's thought and culture could only be truly 
37 
understood through its own language. For Herder it is not blood or race that binds a nation 
together; rather, it is language and all the nuances in this very language that binds a community 
together. Herder understood that it is hopeless to try to universalise the way that people live and 
lead their lives, as the Enlightenment movement tried to do, because the way a community lives, 
its laws, institutions, music, arts, can only be truly understood through its language. What 
Herder tried to demonstrate with this is that there is no single right answer to those great 
questions of mankind, that is, each Volk will find its own answers. In other words, Herder's 
views were a direct attack on the powers of reason, because since he understood that there is no 
single answer to those great questions posed by the movement, then it is hopeless for reason to 
try to find a universal answer, as this answer does not exist. For instance, what is true for the 
Greeks as an ideal, was not true for the Romans as an ideal, but this does not mean that the 
Romans were somehow mistaken, only that the Romans held a different kind of ideal. Different 
nations at different times held different ideals, there is no universal truth, this is the Romantic 
claim against the Enlightenment movement. The following passage of Herder's "National 
Genius and the Environment" encompasses this rather nicely: " ... let justice be done to the other 
ways of life, which from the constitution of our Earth, have been destined, ... , to contribute to the 
education of mankind [Herder (1968:57)]." 
Furthermore, Herder in "Humanity the End of Human Nature" epitomises the Romantic 
movement because he did not only eulogize the individual but he also eulogizes communities, I 
quote Herder (I 968: 122): "a man is but a small part of the whole; and his history, like that of the 
grub, is intimately interwoven with that of the web he inhabits." That is, he did not only praise 
the unique man in his fight against the standardisation of mankind by reason, he also praised 
individual nations and cultures, as he understood that the uniqueness of things lies not only in the 
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individual but also in the communities of which such an individual is a member. Thus, for 
Herder, it was not only important that men became heroes rather than average human beings, but 
also that nations and cultures were safeguarded against the overpowering intrusion of other 
natures and cultures. It is not that Herder defended the view that nations and cultures had to 
exist in complete isolation, but that a nation or culture should not be subjugated, colonised, or 
even destroyed by other nations and cultures. Diversity, rather than standardisation was the 
norm in the Romantic movement. 
Insofar as Spinozism is concerned, it must be said that the Romantic could be either a 
Spinozist or an anti-Spinozist. As I have maintained above, the Romantic movement was a 
response to the Enlightenment movement, and as such it had to deal with the crisis of those two 
tenets of the Enlightenment, namely, rational criticism and naturalism, and thus it also had to 
deal with the obvious consequence of those two tenets, Spinozism. The Aufklarer's attempt to 
solve the crisis was unsuccessful: they simply could not find a way of holding to those two 
tenets, and at the same time avoid the consequences of extreme materialism and scepticism. It is 
at this point that the Romantic appears in the scene. The Romantic understood the problems, 
which were being faced by the Aufklarung too well, and was perhaps better placed to try to find 
a solution to the crisis because the Romantic was willing to limit the powers of reason by 
bringing faith, emotion and sentiment into the equation. Spinozism was a matter that had to be 
reckoned with and its influence was felt in many quarters of the Romantic movement. Some 
Romantics, such as Jacobi, rejected Spinozism because they understood that Spinozism could 
only lead to materialism and atheism. Others, such as Herder, tried to deal with Spinozism by 
subscribing to only some of Spinoza's views, or by interpreting Spinoza's thought so that the 
threat of materialism and atheism could be averted. The truth is that virtually all Romantics tried 
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to deal with Spinozism in one way or another. and thus, Spinozism became one of the major 
influences of the German post-Kantian Idealism. 
It is worth pointing out that Spinozism could have been very attractive to many 
Romantics since it advocates a very unorthodox understanding of Nature. Among other things it 
subscribes to the view that human life has no natural end, i.e. Spinozism does not subscribe to 
the idea of final causes. And thus, since according to Spinozism there is not a purposeful end for 
mankind as a whole, then, difference and diversity becomes a norm for mankind, which can be 
understood in cultural or historical terms. This feature of Spinozism ties in well with the 
Romantic understanding that there is no universal truth, and hence, each people will find its own 
answers to those great philosophical questions, as I noted above. I must also stress that some 
other features of Spinozism, such as its extreme determinism, may have been quite unappealing 
to some Romantics who thought freewill to be very important. 
With this I conclude my characterisation of the Romantic movement and so I return to 
my earlier discussion of the pantheism controversy. 
THE PANTHEISM CONTROVERSY 
The pantheism controversy encapsulates all the components of the German Zeitgeist at the end of 
the 18th century. Lessing, an Aufklarer, represents the crypto-Spinozist; Mendelssohn, an anti-
Spinozist, represents the Aufklarer who try to read Spinozism in an unthreatening way; Jacobi, 
the Romantic, represents those who tried to deal with the Enlightenment crisis by rejecting the 
supreme powers of reason. Mendelssohn's attempt to solve the Enlightenment crisis by virtue of 
a reading of Spinozism, which would not lead to extreme materialism and atheism, was 
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unconvincing since it was based on a number of preconceptions of Spinozism. Nevertheless, 
Mendelssohn's attempt can be said to be one of the last brave efforts by the Aufklarung to defend 
reason against all Romantic criticism. Jacobi had probably a better understanding of Spinoza's 
system than Mendelssohn, since it was not based on preconceptions, but on a very detailed and 
thorough presentation of Spinoza's thought. Jacobi concluded that Spinozism can only end up in 
extreme materialism and atheism, and this was unacceptable to him. Jacobi's conclusions were 
more than a mere attack on Spinozism, they were also a successful attack on the powers of 
reason, and this proved to be very damaging to the Enlightenment. .Jacobi attacked reason as the 
chief tenet because he understood that reason was being too dictatorial and damaging to 
metaphysical enquiry. He held the view that reason had to be limited by faith and sentiment so 
that metaphysical enquiry could be enabled again. Hence, the main consequence of the 
pantheism controversy is that Spinoza could no more be dismissed by mere rhetoric, 
misinterpretations and misguided commentaries, rather, Spinoza had to be considered as a proper 
philosopher. All those who philosophised in Germany, Aufklarer or Romantic, after the 
pantheism controversy had to deal with Spinozism and its materialism and atheism. 
Furthermore, in virtue of Jacobi's damaging attack on the powers of reason, all those who 
philosophised in Germany had to either accept Jacobi's views that reason had to be limited and 
that an act of faith is needed to enable metaphysical enquiry, which leads to dogmatism, or to 
reject it and try to re-establish reason as the sole chief power, which leads to scepticism; or to try 
to find a way by which reason is maintained as a chief tenet but that does not threaten 
metaphysics. This later path could be called the third way, a middle ground between dogmatism 
and scepticism, and this is the path chosen by philosophers like Kant and the Absolute Idealists, 
namely, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. In parts II and III of this thesis I shall demonstrate 
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respectively, how, in one way or another, Fichte and Schelling fell on Spinozism in their effort to 
try to solve the problems faced by the Critical Philosophy of Kant. But before doing that I must 
bring Kant into the scenario since he is the other major influence on the Absolute Idealists, and 
this is a fact that is a well-accepted and well-acknowledged in philosophical literature. The 
following chapter, entitled Kant, will give an overview of Kantian philosophy, and the reception 
of Kant's views by his peers. This is an important chapter as it sets the foreground for the 
development of Fichte's and Schelling's views. 
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CHAPTER3 
KANT'S SOLUTION TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT CRISIS 
Generally speaking, Kant is considered as one ofthe foremost members of the AufkHirung, but it 
is also interesting to note that sometimes Kant can sound like a typical Romantic. Corroborating 
this is Cooper (1996:296): 
... Kant often sounds like a typical Aufklarer in his insistence on a universal 
morality, for example, or his preference for a Republican enlightened despotism. 
But elsewhere, he writes more in the romantic spirit. As the title of his greatest 
work suggests (Critique of Pure Reason), he rejects extravagant claims made on 
behalf of reason ... 
Kant is probably the first Aufklarer to take the Romantic's criticism of the Enlightenment 
seriously, and this was perhaps so partly due to his background as a Pietist. I note that although 
Kant sometimes writes as an Aufklarer and at other times as a Romantic, it is important to bear 
in mind that, by and large, Kant's philosophy remained true to the Enlightenment ideals since it 
advocated uncompromising philosophical criticism as it endeavoured to disclose the powers and 
the limits of reason itself. 
The first edition of the First Critique came out roughly at the same time as Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn started their correspondence regarding Lessing's Spinozism; and the second edition 
appeared roughly when the pantheism controversy became public with the publication of books 
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by Jacobi and Mendelssohn. Kant's main motivation for the publication of this work was to try 
to establish the possibility of metaphysical enquiry, which was being undermined by the crisis in 
the Enlightenment movement. That is to say, the aim of the First Critique was to enquire into 
the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, and thus, the Critique aimed to answer the question: 
is metaphysics possible? If so, how? Gardner ( 1999:22) notes that these questions must be 
understood correctly so that further confusion is avoided. The fate of dogmatic metaphysics, that 
sort of metaphysics which claims to have knowledge of a Deity, of souls and of immortality, the 
sort of metaphysics promised by the Wolff-Leibniz school, the metaphysics that purports 
knowledge of the things-in-themselves, is still to be decided during the unfolding ofthe Critique. 
But the sort of metaphysics, which is required by rationality and morality, the metaphysics that 
make claims about substance and causation is not open to doubt by Kant, as it is for Hume. Thus, 
the question for Kant regarding this type of metaphysics is not whether it is possible or not, but 
how is it possible? The term 'metaphysics' in the introduction of the Critique refers to both the 
old metaphysics, which is being rejected by Kant, and to the new metaphysics, which is being 
defended by Kant, and this can be quite confusing to his readers. What he tries to demonstrate in 
the Critique is that his philosophical system is bringing the old type of metaphysics, i.e. dogmatic 
metaphysics, to its end, and at the same time reformulating a new one, i.e. a metaphysics that 
enquires into the conditions of rationality, experience and morality.4 
4 NB. Bubner ( 1997:xi-xvi) makes an interesting point in his book German Idealist Philosophy. 
He traces the study of metaphysics back to the Greek Ancient philosophers and establishes that, 
then, metaphysical enquiry was an enquiry into the nature of Reality. That is to say, that 
metaphysical enquiry was a study into Being, i.e. a study that aimed to establish knowledge of 
what really exists, why it exists and the way it exists. It is only later, with the rise of Christianity 
and the Scholastics, that the nature of metaphysical enquiry shifts into an enquiry about 
knowledge of the Deity, the soul and immortality. It is this later kind of metaphysical enquiry 
that Kant is rejecting. Bubner argues that Kant is trying to re-establish metaphysics as an 
enquiry into the nature of reality, but as a study of rationality, morality and experience, rather 
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It must be stressed here that in reformulating metaphysics Kant does not give up on that 
classical philosophical dictum that stresses that all philosophy must be systematic, that is to say, 
that Kant as his predecessors, as well as many philosophers after him, subscribed to the view that 
philosophy should start from one single simple and foundational principle, from which a whole 
system could be derived. Corroborating this is the fact that at the end of the Critique, Kant says 
that whatever path one chooses to trail in this field one has "the obligation of proceeding 
systematically" (A 855/B 883). Nor does he give up on his understanding that philosophy has to 
be critical. The systematisation of philosophy has to be done through a prior painstaking 
examination of one's cognitive powers (thus, the title Critique of Pure Reason), whereas non-
critical philosophy only assumes the systematisation, stating its premises dogmatically: 
... reason should take on a new and most difficult of all its tasks, namely, 
that of self-knowledge, .. , by which reason may secure its rightful claims while 
dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees, but 
according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; and this court is none other 
than the critique of pure reason ... (A XI/ AXIl) 
than a study into Being. Moreover, the idealist element of the German philosophical movement 
ofthis period (Kant to Hegel) is very important because, as Bubner (1997:xvi) says: "The Gap 
between consciousness to this model seemed to provide a systematic way to realize philosophy 
as the supreme science, particularly by taking reflection on the self seriously. Ideas allow the 
construction of a world, once the se! f-certainty of consciousness is adequately understood. In 
this sense, the old (ancient Greek) claim of metaphysics is restored (i.e. a study of knowledge of 
Reality), but the old (ancient Greek) form of metaphysics was surpassed (a study of rationality, 
experience and morality rather than a study of Being). This is what shaped the idealistic 
character of philosophy from Kant to Hegel." [my brackets]. 
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Whether or not Kant was successful in formulating a properly critical system is not at stake at 
this point, and I shall come back to this during the unfolding of this thesis. 
It is also important to note that many commentators fail to acknowledge the fact that, on a 
broader sense, Kant was not merely trying to enable metaphysical enquiry, but to the same 
extent, he was also trying to maintain the indispensability of reason as a chief tenet. Kant was 
well aware of the difficulties faced by the Enlightenment and thus, with the publication of the 
Critique, he was attempting to rescue reason from the harsh criticism which it was suffering from 
all quarters, and re-establish its powers, as well as its limits. It is true to say that Kant was 
answering the question: 'is metaphysics possible? if so, how?' But it is also true to say that in 
order for him to answer this question he had to answer some more primary questions, questions 
such as: 'How is experience possible?', 'How can knowledge be attained?', 'and what can I 
know?' By demonstrating how human experience of reality is possible, Kant was able to 
demonstrate how knowledge ofthis reality could be attained and what could be known of reality. 
Once these questions were answered Kant was also able to demonstrate what kind of 
metaphysics was possible and how it was possible to investigate it. During the unfolding of this 
chapter I shall demonstrate how Kant answered these questions and at what costs. 
But before proceeding I note that it is imperative to provide the reader with some 
characterisation of what Kant means by reason, and I note that the better way to provide this is to 
contrast the German words Vernunft and Verstand. The original German title of the Critique is 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, and thus, when Kant attempted to rescue reason, he has in mind 
reason as Vernunft, the power or faculty of reason that human beings possess. In direct contrast 
with this is the German word Verstand, reason as argumentation or as applied judgement, i.e. 
Verstand is the word used by Kant to describe the very source of conceptualisation during one's 
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experiences, which is commonly translated in English as understanding. Hence, in the original 
German, there is a contrast between reason in a narrower sense, i.e. Verstand, or reason as 
argumentation, and reason in a wider sense, i.e. Vernunft, or reason as the capacity or faculty that 
human being possess. 
Let us now look at the Critique in some detail. The Critique could be read as being the 
third way between rationalism and empiricism. In (A 471/B 499) Kant introduces this theme by 
referring to the empiricist Epicurus and the rationalist Plato. Later this theme extends to the 
rationalism of Descartes and Leibniz and the empiricism of Locke and Hume, or as Kant says: 
"with regard to the object of all our rational cognitions, some are merely sensual philosophers, 
others merely intellectual philosophers." (A 853 /B 881) That said, Kant maintains that the 
Critique is supposed to be the middle ground between these two distinct philosophical schools, 
and as such, it is supposed to avert their shortcomings. According to this interpretation, i.e. that 
the Critique is the third way, Kant is siding with the empiricist in rejecting the rationalist view 
that knowledge of reality can be inferred from concepts alone, and that no external perceptual 
experience is needed. That is to say, Kant rejects the rationalist view because he understands 
that knowledge inferred from concepts alone apply only to analytical judgements, i.e. those 
judgements in which the subject encompasses the predicate, e.g. bachelors are unmarried men, 
and these are insufficient to give us an encompassing picture of reality. But Kant will also side 
with the rationalist and reject the empiricist view that knowledge of the external world can be 
solely derived from unconceptualised perceptual experience, since he tries to demonstrate that 
perceptual "experience is itself a species of knowledge that involves understanding" (B XVII), 
where understanding is to be interpreted as conceptualisation. For Kant both sensibility, the 
capacity to receive intuitions, and understanding, the capacity to form judgments using those 
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intuitions are crucial in our attaining knowledge. In A 51 Kant writes "thoughts without content 
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind". This reading is to a certain extent correct, but 
it can also be said to be an oversimplification of the whole scenario. 5 
By looking further in the Critique, one can reach the conclusion that Kant's real targets 
are scepticism and dogmatism, as suggested by Guy er (1998:20) and Cooper ( 1996:297 -298). 
According to this reading, in writing the Critique, Kant tries to solve the dispute over 
metaphysical enquiry between those two extremes positions, namely, the dogmatic and the 
sceptical. The battle ground between scepticism and dogmatism is really over the possibility of 
what Kant calls synthetic a priori truths, i.e. truths which are not derived from experience but are 
still informative about reality, e.g. every event has a cause, since the concept of event does not 
encompass the concept of cause, yet according to some philosophers, such as Kant, these truths 
can be known prior to experience. Interesting to note here is the fact that Kant regarded 
Mathematics and Geometry as synthetic a priori truths. Scepticism holds the view that 
5 NB. This is the standard reading ofKant's philosophy, the reading where sensibility and 
understanding play an equal part on human experience. There is substantial textual evidence for 
this reading as A51/B75 for instance demonstrates. There is, however, a less well-know reading 
of the First Critique which is found in the works of Adorno. In his Kant's Critique o[Pure 
Reason Adorno reads Kant as a Rationalist, that is, the understanding takes priority over 
sensibility which is seen as being only instrumental for the understanding, sensibility is the 
understanding's window into the world. According to Adorno this reading avoids the problem of 
interaction between sensibility and understanding, a criticism which was first raised by Maimon 
(see below pp. 67-68). The following passage is enlightening: " ... to put the matter rather crassly, 
the Transcendental Aesthetic -that is to say, the theory of intuition, of pure intuitions - depends 
on logic. It is a mere illusion of the Critique of Pure Reason that logic is erected on the 
foundation ofthe Transcendental Aesthetic. That is really the schoolmasterly notion that priority 
belongs to the pure forms into which contents, the affects, then flow - and these are followed in 
turn by the understanding which processes and shapes it all. This is indeed how 1 presented it to 
you at the outset because that is what the primer tells us to do, but of course this approach does 
no justice at all to the actual structure of the Critique of Pure Reason. I bet ieve that now you 
have reached the point where you understand that the structure of this Transcendental Aesthetic 
is a function of logic and that what I am attempting to do is to resolve the aporia between 
intuitions and logic ... ". 
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knowledge derives from one's sense experience and that one's sense experience can only provide 
one with individual and contingent items of information. The sceptic cannot accept any claim 
regarding universal and necessary truths which are not analytic a priori, i.e. truths which can be 
known prior to experience and in which the predicate is implied by the subject, e.g. every effect 
has a cause. That is, the sceptic cannot accept what Kant calls synthetic a priori truths because 
these are not grounded in sense experience, yet these truths claim to provide information about 
reality. Dogmatism, on the contrary, allows for synthetic a priori truths, but since this kind of 
knowledge is not grounded on sense experience, it tries to ground these truths as either a special 
metaphysical insight into the nature of reality or as innate knowledge planted in us by God. 
Needless to say that both the former and the later are unacceptable to Scepticism, since there is 
no way of verifying their veracity. This reading ties in well with the zeitgeist of that time. On 
the one hand, one has scepticism as the outcome of the crisis in the Enlightenment, which 
undermined dogmatic metaphysics as well as the metaphysics required by rationality and 
morality, as I have mentioned in previously in chapter 2; and on the other hand, one has the 
dogmatic attitude of many Romantics, such as Jacobi, as well as the dogmatic attitude of the 
enlightened Wolff-Leibniz school towards metaphysics. The former maintained that 
metaphysical claims are not undermined by the powers of reason because metaphysics goes 
beyond these powers, and thus metaphysical claims should be accepted in faith, whilst the latter 
promised to provide knowledge of entities such as souls, immortality and God, which was seen 
as unachievable. 
One can find evidence of Kant's aims in the Critique in the very first pages. There Kant 
tells us that "there was a time when metaphysics was called the queen of sciences ... now in 
accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen proves despised on all sides." (A VIII). This 
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short passage clearly shows Kant's concern with the then current status of metaphysics. 
Metaphysics was suffering under the hammer of those two Enlightenment tenets, viz, rational 
criticism and naturalism, as I explained in the previous chapter, and thus, metaphysics became a 
much disputed arena where sceptics and dogmatists fought for their views. Needless to say that 
neither of them was getting anywhere, or asKant puts it: 
In the beginning, under the administration of the dogmatics, her (metaphysics) 
rule was despotic. Yet because her legislation still retained traces of ancient 
barbarism, this rule gradually degenerated through internal wars into complete 
anarchy; and the sceptics, a kind of nomad who abhor all permanent cultivation of 
the soil, shattered civil unity from time to time. (A IX) 
The publication of the Critique aimed to solve the dispute between sceptics such as Hume, and 
dogmatists such as Leibniz, Wolff and Jacobi, and thus enabling metaphysical enquiry by 
attempting to devise a system i. in which rational criticism would not lead to scepticism, i.e. a 
system in which rational criticism is resistant to Cartesian and Humean doubts, and ii. a system 
which provides a naturalism that does not end up in materialism, i.e. everything in Nature is 
explicable by mechanical laws but there is more than merely matter. Nature is a self-contained 
system but this does not mean that Nature is all that there is. Furthermore, in this philosophical 
system, rational criticism and naturalism would not pose a threat to each other, that is, Kant had 
to devise a system in which i. rational criticism does not undermine naturalism, i.e. a system in 
which reason is an autonomous faculty and a source of universal laws, but also a system in which 
reason is independent of causality; and ii. naturalism does not undermine rational criticism, that 
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is, laws of Physics apply to Nature itself and do not simply consist in our habit of association. 
Moreover, Kant also aimed to solve the crisis in morality by attempting to solve the conflict 
between the sciences and those three basic claims of traditional philosophy, viz. the existence of 
God, freewill, and the immortality of the soul. As I noted in the previous chapter, the advent of 
Newtonian Physics entailed a deterministic, self-contained and self-explanatory universe, and 
this threatened those traditional claims that there is a God, the human beings possess free will 
and that souls are immortal. 
Let me now demonstrate how Kant's critical and systematic philosophy is devised. 
Kant's solution to the problem is based on the reversal of the normally externalist conception of 
truth, as argued by Beiser (2000:23-24) and Di Giovanni ( 1992:418-419). According to this 
view, truth consists in the conformity of concepts with objects, that is, in the correspondence of 
the representations in one's mind with things that exists independent of these representations.6 
The old type of metaphysics was based on the premise that the truth of something consists in the 
mind matching an object in itself, i.e. a thing-in-itself. Kant is willing to accept the externalist 
notion of truth only insofar as ordinary experience is concerned but he says that one cannot 
accept it as a philosophical account of truth, exactly because this externalist conception of truth 
aids the sceptic for it is impossible to get outside one's representations to see if they are 
conforming to an object in itself. In trying to defeat the sceptic's position, the dogmatic does not 
6 NB. Kant understood that the function of reason is to synthesize sense perception. In 
performing any synthesis reason relies on a variety of principles, such as causation and 
substance. Hume had shown that such principles cannot be inductive generalisations from sense 
perceptions, and yet these principles are indispensable to one's experiences. Kant understood 
that if these principles cannot be derived from sense perceptions then they must be a priori. That 
is to say, that such principles must be known prior to the elements they relate. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason Kant tries to demonstrate through a painstaking deduction all the synthetic a priori 
forms, such as causation and substance, which are used by reason in its task of synthesising sense 
perceptions. I shall come back to these points in more detail later in this section. 
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do herself any favours either by trying to diffuse the matter with the assumption that one should 
just accept the external notion of truth as a truism, without questioning it. Kant proposes that a 
philosophical account of truth must be seen as the conformity of objects with our concepts, as the 
agreement of our perceptions with certain universal and necessary concepts that determine the 
form or structure of experience. If truth is seen in this light then we do not need to get outside 
our representations to see if they conform to objects in themselves. Rather, the standard of truth 
will be found within the realm of consciousness itself by seeing whether a representation 
conforms to the universal and necessary principles. 
In this light, the thesis of the internal conception of truth is the backbone of Kant's 
transcendental idealism. These terms, viz. transcendental and idealism, need some further 
explanation due to their complicated usage by Kant. Let me deal with the term 'transcendental' 
first. Transcendental must not be confused with transcendent; transcendent literally means 
beyond, and in this case it would have meant beyond experience, whereas as Kant says "I call all 
cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of 
cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori". (A 12/ B 25) Thus, by 
transcendental, Kant does not mean that which is concerned with things beyond one's experience, 
rather, he means that which is both prior to and which enables one's experiences, and therefore, 
as Gardner (1999:46) notes: 
... transcendental enquiry is therefore enquiry into the cognitive constitution of the 
subject to which objects must conform; ... transcendental knowledge, is at one 
remove from objects, and concerns only what makes objects and a priori 
knowledge of them possible ... 
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Transcendental must also be contrasted here with Empirical. The Distinction between these two 
terms must be grasped fully if one is to avoid misunderstandings, which are quite often found 
among some of Kant's commentators, especially earlier ones, such as Jacobi (I shall address 
Jacobi's main criticism of Kantian philosophy at the end of this chapter). Allison ( 1983:7-8) and 
Gardner ( 1999:89-92) note that the empirical/transcendental distinction is very important within 
the philosophy of Kant. For Kant, any human experience can be understood at two levels, the 
empirical level or the level of ordinary experience, and the transcendental level or the 
philosophical level, i.e. the level that reflects upon the ordinary experience. At the empirical 
level appearances and objects have distinct ontological status. That is, for any given observer, 
any given object can be considered as it really is, i.e. as a physical or empirical object, and the 
representation of this same object which is possessed by this same observer under certain 
conditions is what it is meant by an appearance. At this level the object is a physical object and 
the appearance is a mental object, in the Cartesian sense. At the transcendental level, however, 
the distinction between these two entities is not ontological, it is rather a distinction of how any 
given object can be considered. That is, any given object can be either considered as bearing a 
relation to a human subject, and thus under these spatia-temporal conditions of human 
sensibility, or as independent of any such conditions. In the former case, the object appears to a 
subject as having a set of properties, which are pre-established by the spatia-temporal conditions 
that govern human experience, and in the latter case, the object is considered independently of 
such conditions, and thus if human beings could escape those conditions that govern human 
experience, then human beings would be able to experience the object as it is in itself. 
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Kant's idealism requires some characterisation also. He is an idealist because he 
understands that reality somehow is dependent on the human mind. He is an idealist because 
when he adopts an internal ist conception of truth, he shifts the gap between the representations in 
one's mind and the things that exist independent of these representations from a space outside the 
mind and into a space within the mind. Important here is that Kant maintains that one can only 
know these objects insofar as they fit one's cognitive abilities; one does not create the objects of 
one's cognition, one still requires a contact with reality so that one has access to the content of 
one's judgements; therefore, since Kant subscribes to an internal conception of truth, and since 
he also subscribes to the existence of an empirical reality, he is forced to conclude that one 
knows things only as appearances and not as things-in-themselves. Thus, although being a 
transcendental idealist, Kant is also committed to empirical realism, that is, he is committed to 
the notion that objects are not dependent on a subject for their existence, but they can only be 
known as appearances, since any proper experience of these objects depend on a subject's 
cognitive capabilities; Allison (1983:6-7) writes: 
... when Kant claims that he is an empirical realist and denies that he is an 
empirical idealist he is really affirming that our experience is not limited to the 
private domain of our own representations, but includes an encounter with 
empirically real spatia-temporal objects ... 
Therefore, Kant's idealism could be said to be a sort of epistemological idealism, it runs only 
insofar as it concerns one's knowledge of reality, and this is in direct contrast with Berkeley's 
idealism, which is much stronger in its claims, since it has an ontological claim on one's reality, 
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as it claims that reality is constituted by the representations in one's mind or as Berkeley, 
famously puts it 'esse est percipi'. 
How does Kant argue this? All our theoretical knowledge is restricted to the 
systematisations of what are mere spatia-temporal appearances, i.e. the objects of one's 
experiences must be placed within space and time, where space is the form of or the condition of 
one's 'outer sense', and time is the form of or the conditions of one's 'inner sense' (A 22/B 37). 
By sense, Kant means a way by which objects can be available to a subject's intuitions or sense 
perceptions. Space and time are the pure forms of human sensibility. In the transcendental 
aesthetic part of the Critique Kant puts forward various arguments defending this view. One 
such argument is that space is the outer sense because if one tries to imagine a world without 
objects, one still has to imagine a world of empty space; that is to say, that it is impossible for 
one to imagine no space or as Kant says "Space is a necessary representation, a priori, that is the 
ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can 
very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it." (A 24/B 39) Kant's argument 
for the a priority of time are analogous to his argumentation about the a priority of space. Thus, 
time is the inner sense, because one's inner objects, i.e. one's mental states, can only be available 
to one's perception if these are placed within a temporal framework. It is only within this 
framework that one is able to infer that "several things exist at one and the same time 
(simultaneously) or in different times (successively)". (B 46) Hence, if one tried to imagine a 
world without time, it would be impossible, since it would be impossible for one to infer that 
objects exist simultaneously with one another, or that objects succeed each other in time. All of 
one's thoughts regarding sense experience have in one way or another to be grounded in time: 
"Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuition. In regard to appearances in 
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general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from 
time". (A 31/B 46) Kant goes even further and claims that things could not be different and that 
"time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us." (A 23/B 
3 7) It is in this way that Kant infers that the objects of one's sense experience are a priori spatia-
temporal since if they were not they would not be possible objects of perception for human 
beings. 
But these spatia-temporal intuitions or sense perceptions have an inter-dependent relation 
with concepts or categories, because "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind". It is thus just as necessary to make the minds concepts sensible (i.e., to add 
an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them 
under concepts) (A 5 IlB 75). Thus, for Kant, a priori concepts, such as causation and substance, 
are also preconditions for human's experiences, and hence, as Cooper ( 1996:298) maintains: 
"Experience ... is not a matter simply of receiving sense-data, but also of a self-conscious creature 
employing its understanding to apply concepts to such data." Thus, if one is to have a proper 
experience of a thing, such as a book, one's intuitions or sense perceptions of that same thing 
must be directly linked with the categories or a process of conceptualisation of this thing. In 
other words, for Kant, a proper experience of a thing involves both the receiving of data through 
sense perception and at the same time the making of a conceptual judgement of this same thing. 
Moreover, all proper experiences must be accompanied by an I, that is, there must be a self-
conscious subject who is the proprietor of those experiences, or asKant says: 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is to 
say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be 
nothing for me. (B 131-132) 
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Kant is not claiming in the above passage that every single one of one's representations must be 
accompanied by the I think, nor is he claiming that one must be able to have a single thought that 
encompasses all of one's representations; what he is in fact claiming is that it must be possible 
for one to recognise each of one's representations as belonging to one, as noted by Gardner 
( 1999: 146). Transcendental unity of apperception must not be confused with the empirical I. In 
the Aesthetic, Kant asserts that "the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different 
representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject" (A 133). 
That is, the empirical I is something that resembles the Humean bundle theory, and hence, Kant 
agrees with Hume, insofar as ordinary experience is concerned, that the self cannot be singled 
out over and above the totality of one's mental states. But in contrast with Hume, Kant does not 
think that this is the full picture. Kant maintains there must be some sort of a priori self-
consciousness, and this is the transcendental unity of apperception. (NB the term apperception is 
the English translation of the French s'apercevoir de and it has been borrowed from Leibniz, who 
meant by it: perceiving one's own mental states) That is to say, that transcendentally, something 
must remain numerically identical, so that representations can be attributed to a single subject. 
Thus, self-consciousness, or the transcendental unity of apperception in Kantian terminology, is 
the most basic principle out of which all human cognitive experience is founded, exactly because 
it enabled intuitions or sense-perceptions to belong to a subject, as well as being the source of a 
priori concepts or categories of the understanding or Verstand, whilst also providing the ground 
for the combination of these in pure reason or Vernunft, as noted by Caygill ( 1996:83). Many of 
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Kant's commentators were not satisfied with such a sharp distinction between the empirical I and 
the transcendental I, and I shall come back to this point later. 
Summing up. Kant's transcendental idealism maintains that i. what can be known about 
reality is somehow related to minds, and ii. that the vehicle for such knowledge is based on those 
a priori categories, 1.e. universal and necessary principles, e.g. substance and causation, and 
forms of intuition, 1.e. space and time, that one's cognitive capacities possess. Moreover, 
transcendental idealism defends i. the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, 
and that ii. one can only know things as appearances and not as things in themselves. 
Kant's philosophical system was supposed to be immune to both scepticism and 
dogmatism whilst maintaining reason or Vernunft as a chief tenet in philosophical enquiry. Kant 
could escape scepticism by claiming that the sceptic's doubts over metaphysics were based on an 
external conception of truth, i.e. the conception of truth that maintains that truth is the fitting of 
the representations of one's mind with an object out there, i.e. a thing in itself. Kant agrees with 
the sceptic and concedes that this notion of truth is unrealisable, but he points out that the truth of 
one's judgments about reality would still be maintained if one understands that the truth of these 
judgements consist in the conformity of the representations in one's mind with universal and 
necessary principles that are to be found in one's mind. That is to say, Kant understands that 
whilst one cannot know the thing-in-itself and any knowledge claim about the thing-in-itself 
(such as the claims made by the old kind of metaphysics) is ill founded, that one can still know 
appearances, and thus, knowledge claims about appearances (such as the ones made by new 
metaphysics) are within one's epistemological reach. Kant's conclusion also avoids dogmatism 
because the new metaphysics is within one's cognitive capabilities, it is based on reason, and thus 
it does not require an act of.faith to be accepted. 
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Furthermore, the distinction between things-in-themselves and appearances enabled Kant 
to devise a system where rational criticism does not end up in scepticism, and naturalism does 
not end up in materialism, and in which rational criticism and naturalism do not pose a threat to 
each other. The distinction between things-in-themselves and appearances provides a rational 
criticism immune to scepticism since reason is now fenced off within the realm of appearances, 
i.e. the phenomenal realm, as I have demonstrated above. It also provides a naturalism which 
does not end up in materialism, since natural events are subject to universal and necessary laws, 
but this does not imply materialism because Kant denies that these universal and necessary laws 
apply to the things-in-themselves, i.e. the noumenal realm, rather they apply only to the realm of 
appearances. Transcendental idealism is also supposed to be a system where rational criticism 
ceased to be a threat to naturalism; on the contrary, it supports naturalism, because it discloses all 
universal and necessary laws, which apply to all appearances. Naturalism also ceased to be a 
threat to rational criticism because since universal and necessary laws apply solely to the realm 
of appearances, then, the autonomy of pure reason, as well as its freedom and practicality, is 
maintained since pure reason does not operate from within the phenomenal world, rather it 
operates from the noumenal world. And since reason operates from the noumenal world, 
morality is also saved, that is to say, individuals are free, equal and practical beings, since reason 
is not under the influence of those universal and necessary laws that reign in the phenomenal 
world. 
In this light, the main conclusion drawn by Kant in the Critique is that one can know the 
truth of claims made in theoretical subjects such as pure and applied mathematics and physics 
but that one cannot know the truth about claims, such as claims about the immortality ofthe soul, 
that human beings possess freewill, and that there is a God made by dogmatic metaphysics, such 
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as the metaphysics defended by the Leibniz- Wolff school. In fact, Kant asserts that such claims 
cannot be proved, disproved or even be the subject of knowledge, and that these could be merely 
a matter of faith, I quote: 
.. .1 cannot even assume God, Freedom, and immortality for the sake of the 
necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative 
reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because to attain such insights, 
speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to 
objects of possible experience, and which if they were to be applied to what 
cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it 
into an appearance, and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be 
impossible. Thus, I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. 
(B 30) 
Kant understands that when reason tries to free itself from the limitations of experience, by 
aiming towards the "absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions" (A 326/B 382), it begins to 
see things such as the soul and God as if these were possible objects of experience; and this leads 
reason to a number of antinomies (i.e. antinomies is the word used by Kant to describe some 
paradoxes faced by reason, e.g. Kant provides a valid proof for the thesis that there belongs to 
the world a being that necessarily exists and who serves as the grounds to all contingent 
existents, and Kant also provides a valid proof for the antithesis that denies this thesis). In fact, 
Caygill (1996:34 7) notes that "it was Kant who revealed that reason and freedom could as easily 
undermine as support each other", and it is this very insight that serves as the distinction between 
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pure and practical reason. But if it is impossible for one to gain any sort of knowledge of such 
claims, why should one believe in them? Kant's answer to this question is given at the 
conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason, and in his Critique of Practical Reason, where he 
distinguishes between pure reason and practical reason, or between reason as the faculty that 
enables human beings to gain knowledge, and reason as the capacity to determine the will, where 
will is to be understood as the internal states of a subject, i.e. desires, intentions and choices, no 
matter if these have been, are being, or will be realised. The distinction between pure and 
practical reason is Kant's effort in trying to solve those paradoxical circumstances faced by 
reason. Kant asserts that the limits which are faced by pure reason when it is confronted by what 
is the case does not hold for the practical use of reason when it tries to determine what ought to 
be the case. The following passage is enlightening: 7 
In nature the understanding can cognise only what exists, or has been, or will be. 
It is impossible that something in it ought to be other than what, in all these time-
relations it in fact is; indeed the ought, if one has merely the course of nature 
before one's eyes, has no significance whatsoever. We cannot ask at all what 
7 NB When Kant says that he wants to deny knowledge and make room for faith, he is really 
raising a sharp partition between philosophy and theology. That is to say, he is saying that 
reason and faith are to be given specific places whereby they do not pose a threat to each other. 
note that this sounds a lot like Spinoza's project in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus where he 
says that "they who do not know how to distinguish between philosophy and theology dispute 
whether scripture should be aidant to reason or reason helpful to scripture; that is to say, whether 
the sense of scripture ought to be made to harmonise with reason, or reason be made to bend to 
scripture. Of these two views one is taken by the sceptics, who deny the certainty of reason, the 
other by the dogmatists. That both grossly err, however, is apparent from what has already been 
said ... we have shown that scripture does not teach philosophy but piety." (quote from the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Benedict Spinoza, London: Tri.ibner & Co., 1862, p. 259). 
Hence, it could be said that Kant himself, was already embracing some of Spinoza's themes, 
although further research would be needed to establish whether he was aware of this or not. 
ought to happen in nature anymore than we can ask what properties a circle ought 
to have. (A 547/B 575) 
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On commenting on Kant's views on this issue Dahlstrom (1999: 18) maintains that " ... to the 
extent that someone's choices are in fact determined by a principle issuing from his or her reason 
alone, and not by anything given, ... , then that person is self-determining or free. The moral 
law, ... , is just such a principle." From the moral law, i.e. the capacity to make free and rational 
choices, Kant derives his famous categorical imperative, which asserts that in its three famous 
formulations that: i. one should treat mankind as a whole, oneself included, always as an end and 
not as a means, that is, in an ideal world all mankind would treat each other with mutual respect; 
ii. that we should act as if the maxim of our actions was to become universal isable, that is, if I do 
something I must accept that everybody else has the right to do the same thing; and iii. these 
maxims are to be rational maxims, that is, all rational beings will achieve the same maxims, and 
if they do not then they should be able to resolve any disagreement through rational dialogue. In 
such a world one's will is not at the mercy of natural laws, rather the only law is the categorical 
imperative, which is a law that reason imposes on itself. For Kant, morality does not only 
involve the moral law, i.e. the categorical imperative, and the autonomy of the will, it also 
involves an object towards which all action is directed. Such an object encompasses virtue and 
happiness and it is defined by Kant as the highest good or the summum bonum. Moreover, Kant 
asserts that things such as God, freedom and the immortality of the soul are secured, because i. 
God must exist, since morality belongs to the noumenal world and the requirement of happiness 
involves events in the phenomenal world, and thus in order for happiness to be possible, God 
must exist because only by presupposing a creator who would ensure the exact correspondence 
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between both realms can the achievement of happiness be possible, i.e. God acts as the guarantor 
for the existence of those realms; ii. human beings must be free since one needs freedom to 
satisfy the conditions of independence from natural laws, one must be free from outside 
influences whilst choosing; and iii. the immortality of the soul is secured so that human beings 
are able to fulfil their goal of achieving the highest good, if happiness is not possible in this life, 
then it is possible in another future life. In securing these, Kant delivers his promise in BXXX, 
where he says that he must deny knowledge to make room for faith. 
I cannot assess here the merits of Kant's claims for this would be straying from the main 
point of this dissertation. The crucial point here is to point out yet another dichotomy in Kant's 
philosophy, that is, his distinction between pure and practical reason. This sort of dualism in 
Kant's philosophy, that is, his distinctions between things-in-themselves and appearances, reason 
and faith, pure and practical reason, empirical I and noumenal I, were the source of much 
criticism from his later commentators, such as the post-Kantian German Idealists, and this is 
perhaps one of the reasons why they sought for answers in the monistic philosophy of Spinoza, I 
shall come back to this point later in this dissertation. 
THE RECEPTION OF THE FIRST CRITIQUE 
I turn now to the problem of the reception of the Critique. As soon as it was published the 
Critique caused a furore in philosophical circles both in Germany and abroad, and soon 
numerous reviews appeared, which highlighted the various obscure philosophical points in the 
book, as well as trying to unravel Kant's hard language. This early commentaries on the Critique 
have probably influenced the various directions to which post-Kantian philosophy was to follow. 
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On the one hand, some of Kant's contemporaries welcomed his critical and systematic 
philosophy. The most prominent figure of these supporters is without doubt KL Reinhold. At 
first Reinhold aimed merely to explicate Kantian philosophy in a more simplistic way, and this is 
exactly what he does with the publication of Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. Later his project 
became much grander, as he attempted to improve the critical and systematic philosophy, since 
he understood that Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, i.e. Kant's conception of self-
consciousness, was not simple and foundational enough. Reinhold understood that there must be 
a simpler and more foundational principle, and thus he attempted to devise a new conception of 
self-consciousness. This route was later followed by the post-Kantian Absolute idealists, who, to 
a certain degree, radicalised Reinhold's position as will become apparent during the unfolding of 
this thesis. On the other hand, other of Kant's contemporaries openly attacked his philosophy 
and this led to heated and fiery discussions in all quarters. At this point, it is worth mentioning 
FH Jacobi and S Maimon, since they have provided some of the classical and most successful 
criticisms of Kantian philosophy. 
One of the most quoted criticisms of the Critique comes from Jacobi. In his "David 
Hume on Faith", Jacobi (1994:336) says: " ... without that presupposition [the thing-in-itself] I 
could not enter into the [Kantian] system, but with it I could not stay within it." In this passage, 
Jacobi refers to a possible contradiction in the Critique, that is, that without presupposing the 
existence of the things-in-themselves one could not enter the critical and systematic philosophy 
system, and yet the way Kant presented the thing-in-itself is very problematic. Let us look at 
Jacobi's criticism in some detail now. Jacobi understands that Kant asks one to think of reality as 
a representation and at the same time Kant also asks one to think of reality as the very thing that 
impinges on one's representations. Gardner ( 1999:269-270) notes that Jacobi understands that: 
The latter is essential in so far as transcendental philosophy wishes to stand in 
agreement with our fundamental conviction that our perceptions are of real things, 
things which are independent of our representations and present outside us; ... but 
transcendental idealism also informs us that things-in-themselves, ... , are utterly 
unknown to us ... 
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Jacobi points out what became to be known as the problem of affection. Jacobi understands that 
Kant's system requires that one's mind must be affected by an object if it is to have any sort of 
material for thought, and he points out that within the Kantian system there can be only two 
candidates for the task of affecting one's mind, viz. appearances and a thing-in-itself. Jacobi 
knows that Kant regards the latter as being the object that affects one's mind, but his own 
strategy in criticising Kant is to show that neither appearances nor things-in-themselves can act 
as affecting objects. Jacobi maintains that appearances cannot do the job because on the one 
hand Kant understands that appearances are representations in one's mind, and on the other Kant 
argues that the thing-in-itself cannot be said to be the affecting object because it is an unknown 
entity, and this fact prevents the use of any ofthe categories, causality included, to it, as noted by 
Allison ( 1983:247-248), Di Giovanni (1994: I 00), and Gardner (1999:270). It follows that Jacobi 
understands that the Kantian system is flawed, since it claims that things-in-themselves impinge 
on one's representations, and at the same time claims that one cannot have knowledge of the 
things-in-themselves, and on the face of it, this was a strong objection against Kant. 
In the light of this, commentators have taken one of two stances. Some commentators, 
such as Strawson ( 1966 :20-22) and Turbayne ( 1955:225-244 ), understand that transcendental 
65 
idealism collapses when faced by the problem of affection and that the only way out for 
transcendental idealism is for it to let go the thing-in-itself, and thus turn itself into a much 
stronger form of idealism, something like Berkeley's ontological idealism. In fact these 
commentators take the stance that Kant's transcendental idealism is a misshapen version of 
Berkeley's idealism. For instance, Strawson ( 1966:22) writes: "Kant, as transcendental idealist, 
is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges", and Turbayne (1955:225-244) who explicitly 
argues throughout his paper that Kant's idealism is nothing more than Berkeley's idealism in 
disguise. Others. on the contrary, such as Di Giovanni ( 1994: I 01 ), argue that Jacobi 
misunderstood Kant's terminology and system, and thus do not think that Jacobi's criticisms, i.e. 
the problem of affection, pose a threat to transcendental idealism, I quote: 
... it [the argument] showed by how far Jacobi had failed to grasp the meaning of 
the Critique ... The function of the thing-in-itself is not to account for the origin of 
sense impressions ... but to canonize the limitations to which reason is subject. 
Di Giovanni probably refers here to the two-aspect reading of the distinction of the thing-in-
itself and appearances. This reading was proposed by Bird ( 1962) in his Kant's Theory of 
Knowledge and it has recently been defended by Allison. According to this reading things-in-
themselves are to be understood negatively, that is, as objects completely abstracted from sense-
perceptions; and appearances are not regarded as distorted representations from, or as completely 
different entities from, things-in-themselves. There is very little textual evidence to support this 
modem reading; in fact, the textual evidence seems to support the reading that Kant's 
contemporaries had of the thing-in-itself and appearance, the two-realms reading, that is, that the 
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thing-in-itself and the appearance are different objects. I do not wish to assess commentator's 
positions in any fut1her detail here, since this is not relevant for this thesis. The main point is 
that Jacobi's strong criticism was noted by virtually all of Kant's readers. 
It is also noteworthy that Jacobi's argument, if it is sound, also has a wider implication 
for Kant's views. As I have mentioned above, Kant limited any epistemic claim to the 
phenomenal realm, and he did so, so that some room would be made for faith in the noumenal 
realm. He understood that the Enlightenment crisis could be solved by giving each, reason and 
faith, a role in one's life. That is to say, that reason would reign supreme in the phenomenal 
world, whilst faith would be unchallenged in the noumenal world. But since Jacobi's criticisms 
might cast doubt on Kant's system, exactly because it showed possible inconsistencies in Kant's 
conception of the noumenal world, i.e. the realm of the thing-in-itself, then by default, it also 
threatened faith, and the crisis is back to square one. 
Maimon also provided Kant's critics with powerful ammunition, as noted by Gardner 
(1999:330), Beiser (2000:28), and Bransen (1991 :80-84). Kant's predecessors, such as 
empiricists like Locke, and rationalists like Leibniz, tried to bridge the gap between one's mind 
and the external world by subscribing to either intellectual or sensorial epistemic theories. In 
other words, both empiricists and rationalists understood that either the faculty of sensibility 
(empiricists) or the faculty of understanding (rationalists) as different ways of gaining 
knowledge, i.e. as a way of bridging the gap between one's mind and the external world. 
Bransen (1991:80) maintains that "it might be argued that Kant opened up the possibility of a 
functional approach to concepts and intuitions, instead of the unfruitful relational approach, by 
stressing the fundamental different functions of concepts and intuitions in acquiring knowledge", 
that is to say, that intuitions and concepts are different functions of thought processing, rather 
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than mere connections between one's mind and the external world. Maimon's major problem 
with transcendental philosophy is the sharp distinction between understanding, i.e. the active 
faculty of conceptual isation, and sensibility, i.e. the receptive faculty of perception, that is to say, 
that Kant has separated these faculties so sharply, and this seems to imply the impossibility of 
any sort of interaction between them. In fact, Beiser (2000:28) notes that "Maimon claimed that 
the dualism between these faculties was analogous to the old Cartesian dualism between mind 
and body, and that all the problems of the older dualism should hold mutatis mutandis for the 
new one". I do not wish to assess Maiming criticisms any further; the point here is that 
Maimon's criticism was noted, by and large, by all of Kant's commentators. 
Such criticisms only favoured the foes of the Enlightenment all too well and served to 
point out that Kant had failed to solve the crisis. In fact it could be said that Kant only made 
matters worse by pointing out so well the problems faced by the Enlightenment, and thus Kant's 
project seemed to have failed, mainly due to its reliance on various dichotomies. Kant's reliance 
on so many dichotomies was viewed as a problem by his contemporaries because they 
understood philosophy to be a science, and as such philosophy required a simple and basic 
principle out of which a whole philosophical system could be derived; just as sciences such as 
physics do. Adding to this situation is the fact that Jacobi and Mendelssohn had brought 
Spinoza's philosophy back into the open. As I mentioned in various passages above, Spinoza's 
thought was very attractive to many, exactly because it defended a systematic and monistic 
philosophical system free of the problems faced by Kant's dichotomies, and thus it is not a 
surprise to find the post-Kantian German Idealists seeking refuge in Spinoza's thought and trying 
to succeed where Kant had failed. It is my understanding that Fichte and Schelling (and Hegel) 
attempted to do this by trying to re-establish reason as a chief tenet for philosophical enquiry, 
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whilst avoiding the pitfalls suffered by their predecessors. As I said, Spinoza, the great 
rationalist and metaphysician, was viewed as a good option to be followed, since his 
philosophical system avoided dualisms, and it was founded on those two central tenets of the 
Enlightenment, viz., rational criticism and naturalism, and it subscribed to the view that a 
philosophical system has to be foundational and systematic. The following passage from 
Widgery (1950:291) might corroborate my last point since it describes how much more formal 
and schematic the philosophical systems devised by the German Idealists were in comparison to 
their predecessors, with the exception of Spinoza; again, as I said above, the foundational and 
systematic features of Spinozism might welt have been an attractive feature to Fichte and 
Schelling (and Hegel), I quote: 
The idealist philosophers of early nineteenth century Germany were university 
teachers. The most eminent philosophers of the preceding period, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Bacon, Berkeley, Hume were not. This contrast is 
significant with reference to differences in modes of approach and in 
methodology. The professional philosophers have a more definite schematism 
and formal ism than the others, with exception of Spinoza. 
Lastly, it is worth quoting here a passage by Henrich (2003:94) that corroborates my claim that 
the post-Kantians saw Spinoza as providing many of the answers to the problems that were left 
unanswered by Kant. The post-Kantians, in fact, saw those two doctrines, Kantianism and 
Spinozism, as allied doctrines in the struggle against religious dogmatism and as allies in 
explicating reality. I quote: 
To the generation of Hegel, Schelling and their friends, Spinozism and 
Kantianism, despite their obvious incompatibilities, did appear to be allied: both 
constitute fundamental criticisms of traditional Christian religion, and especially 
of theological doctrines that were dominant at that time ... to the generation of 
Hegel and his young friends, this system of the past- wherein God is conceived as 
the external cause of the world and as continuing to exercise demand on us - is 
just as incompatible with Kant's doctrine of freedom (in which everything is 
subordinated to freedom) as it is with Spinoza' s doctrine of the immanent ensoph 
(in which there are no external causes). 
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Thus, in what follows in this thesis, I shall try to demonstrate how Fichte and Schelling 
understood, or misunderstood, Spinoza's philosophy, as well as pointing out the philosophical 
themes which they borrowed from Spinoza, and how they further developed these themes. In 
short I shall demonstrate how greatly indebted Fichte and Schelling were to Spinoza. 
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PART 11 
FICHTE AND SPINOZA 
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FICHTE 
This part of my thesis will be solely dedicated to the investigation of Fichte's Spinozism. 
Various commentators, such as Jacobi (1994), Di Giovanni (1994), Beiser (2000), Bowie (2003), 
and Henrich (2003) have acknowledged the fact that Fichte was influenced by both Kant's and 
Spinoza's philosophy. Despite this fact, commentators have not researched this issue in detail -
they acknowledge it, but they do not investigate the implications of this fact for a proper 
understanding of Fichte's philosophy. In this chapter, I propose to primarily do just this: to 
investigate the importance of Fichte's Spinozism for a proper understanding of his philosophy. 
In order to establish this I shall first establish if my claim that Fichte subscribed to Spinozism 
has any foundation. Secondly, I shall demonstrate what Fichte was trying to do in writing his 
philosophical system, that is, I shall demonstrate that Fichte was trying to resolve many of the 
problems which Kant unsuccessfully attempted to solve, and that he (Fichte) saw many of the 
solutions for those Kantian dichotomies in Spinoza's monistic philosophy. Thirdly, and lastly, I 
shall demonstrate the various similarities between Fichte and Spinoza's system on a number of 
issues, from determinism to ethics. 
FICHTE, KANT AND SPINOZA 
The first point I wish to try and establish is if my claim that Fichte subscribed to Spinozism has 
any foundation. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762- I 814), German philosopher, is the first great Post-
Kantian Idealist. Despite this fact, Fichte's philosophy has remained relatively unknown and 
little studied in the Anglo-American tradition. Recently, however, his writings have become 
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fashionable, and a number of commentaries and papers have been published. His Kantianism has 
been acknowledged since the beginnings of his career by his commentators, and rightly so. 
Fichte (1993:357), himself, acknowledges in a letter dated August-September 1790 to his friend 
Weisshuhn that: 
... I have been living in a new world ever since reading the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Propositions which I thought could never be overturned have been 
overturned for me. Things have been proven to me which I thought could never 
be proven for example, the concept of absolute freedom, the concept of duty, etc. 
and I feel all the happier for it. It is unbelievable how much respect for mankind 
and how much strength this system gives us. 
This passage clearly shows how fascinated he was with Kant's Critical Philosophy, and thus the 
question here is: Why was Fichte so taken by Kant's writings? To answer this question I must 
refer to events in Fichte's early academic life. Green (1978: 1-2) notes that Fichte: 
like both Schelling and Hegel, the other leading Idealist philosophers, ... began as a 
student of theology, though his subsequent career earned him a reputation 
primarily as a philosopher. He was eighteen years old when he enrolled as a 
theological student at the University of Jena in 1780. Neither there nor in his 
subsequent studies at Wittenberg and Leipzig did he devote himself to a study of 
Kant's philosophy, the crowning works of which were coming into print during 
these years. Rather, he seems to have become convinced of the truth of 
determinism, especially as articulated in Spinoza's Ethics. The struggle to free 
himself from a deterministic view of the world began during his student years and 
remained a major motive throughout his subsequent life and writings ... 
73 
Within the context of his early academic life, it becomes clear that when Fichte says in his letter 
to Weisshuhn that propositions which he thought could never been overturned had been 
overturned for him, he is clearly making reference to his early faith in Spinoza's philosophy, 
especially its determinism, and how it had been overturned by Kant's philosophy. Within the 
Kantian system, as I noted in the previous chapter, both the natural laws that govern the physical 
world and the freedom of the will are secured by the distinction between practical and pure 
reason, as well as by the distinction of phenomenal and noumenal realms. Thus, it can be said 
that the young Fichte was a devotee of Spinozism and determinism, despite being deeply 
concerned by the moral implications. His conversion to Kantianism came about only later after 
reading Kant's Critiques. Fichte understood that Kant's critical philosophy pointed in the right 
direction as it attempted to safeguard both the natural laws that govern the physical world and 
freewill: each had a place within a specific realm. (NB. It is worth reminding the reader here that 
despite the fact that Fichte was much taken by Kantianism, he was also dissatisfied by its 
numerous dichotomies, as I have pointed out in the previous chapter). Corroborating this is 
Breazeale ( 1993:3-4 ), who also noted Fichte's early faith in Spinozism, I quote: 
Little is known concerning Fichte's philosophical orientation during these early 
years. He appears to have subscribed to the Leibnizian-Wolffian system, which 
he interpreted in a strictly deterministic manner. The surviving evidence shows 
how, under the influence of this interpretation, the young Fichte reluctantly 
abandoned his own belief in free will and became a defender of metaphysical 
fatalism. Although such an interpretation was rejected by Leibniz and Wolff 
themselves (who insisted upon the compatibility between 'free will' and 
'determinism'), it was nevertheless widespread in the late eighteenth century and 
was often (and derisively) identified with 'Spinozism'. The debate over the issue 
of 'Spinozism' and its alleged pantheistic consequences was one of the most 
important intellectual concerns of the era and reached its peak in the early 1780s 
(with the pantheism controversy) ... In the debate the young Fichte appears to have 
been firmly on the side ofthe metaphysical determinists. 
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Further corroborating my claim about Fichte's early Spinozism is the following passage from a 
letter dated 211d July 1795 from Fichte to Reinhold where Fichte, himself, acknowledges his 
Spinozism; I quote Fichte (1993:401): 
Judging by what I have read of it, Schelling's entire essay is a commentary on my 
writings. But he has grasped the matter splendidly, and several people who did 
not understand me have found his essay very clear. Why he does not say so [i.e. 
that his essay is a commentary on the Wissenschaflslehre project] I do not quite 
understand. He will not wish to deny this, nor could he do so ... I am glad that he 
has appeared. I am particularly fond of his references to Spinoza, on the basis of 
whose system mine can most properly be explained. 
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Adding to this is the following passage from Wright (2003: 161) who comments on Fichte's 
possible avenues for learning about Spinoza and Spinozism: 
Fichte had several avenues for learning about Spinoza. First he possessed the 
1677 edition of Spinoza' s Opera Posthuma. Beyond that, however deeply he may 
actually have studied Spinoza's texts, Fichte certainly also knew of his ideas 
through Jacobi's writings, especially Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an 
Herr Moses Mendelssohn. 
And adding to this is the fact that Fichte must also have been familiar with Pierre Bayle's 
commentary on Spinoza since this was part of the canon of European Universities, as I 
mentioned previously in chapter 1 ofthis thesis. 
Thus, this far I have established that Fichte, at least in his early academic life, was a 
Spinozist, as acknowledged by commentators and Fichte himself; and I have also established that 
Fichte was able to learn about Spinoza and Spinozism through various avenues and sources. In 
this thesis, however, I want to press on with the stronger claim that Fichte never truly gave up 
Spinozism. That is to say, I understand that Fichte retained many Spinozist themes throughout 
his life, although, perhaps, in a less pure fashion after his encounter with Kantianism. Support 
for my claim is the letter quoted above of Fichte to Reinhold, since he clearly refers to his 
Wissenschaflslehre project (this project encompasses various works which were written during 
Fichte's mature academic years, and written after his encounter with Kantian philosophy) and 
where he pays tribute to Spinoza as the chief and most consistent dogmatic (to be read 
materialistic) philosopher, I quote Fichte ( 1970: 117): 
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So far as dogmatism can be consistent, Spinozism is its most logical outcome ... 
Thus, I believe that there is enough evidence in Fichte's correspondence as well as writings for 
my claim that Fichte was a Kantian insofar as he subscribed to the Critical Philosophy of Kant as 
well as being a Spinozist insofar as he referred back to Spinoza's philosophy to try to solve the 
problems of Kant's Critical Philosophy. In light of this, I shall press on and investigate what 
Fichte was trying to do in writing his philosophical system and demonstrate various similarities 
between Fichtean and Spinozian philosophies. 
FICHTE'S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY USED IN 
DEALING WITH HIS SPINOZISM 
It is generally agreed by Fichte's commentators, such as Copleston (1999:33-36), that his 
philosophical development can be divided into three phases. The first phase of his philosophical 
development is generally regarded as his more Kantian phase and it encompasses his earlier 
writings such as the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (1792) and his two political works, 
which were published anonymously, "Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought from the Princes 
of Europe, Who Have Oppressed It Until Now" and Contribution to the Rectification of the 
Public's Judgement of the French Revolution. The second phase of Fichte's philosophical 
development is usually referred to as the Jena period ( 1794-1799) and it is considered the most 
important phase of Fichte's philosophical development. This is the phase in which Fichte 
matures as a philosopher and where he develops his Wissenshafislehre project, and as such this 
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phase encompasses the various writings of the project; but this is also the phase in which Fichte 
also started to work on some of his more popular writings, such as the "Some Lectures 
Concerning the Scholar's Vocation". Fichte's last philosophical phase is usually referred to as 
the Berlin period (1800-1814), and commentators usually refer to this phase as the eclipse of 
Fichte's career. 1n this last phase, Fichte continue to revise the writings of the project and tried to 
present it in popular form in a text entitled The Vocation of Man; but he also developed more 
popular works in different philosophical areas, such as the The Way to the Blessed Life, which is 
sometimes referred to as a mystical work and which deals with the issue of morality and religion. 
The famous Addresses to the German Nation of 1808 was also written during this phase and it 
was delivered during the Napoleonic occupation, and it advocates a new format for an education 
system for the German peoples so that they could reach the status of a German nation (which 
was non existent at the time). 
My strategy in dealing with Fichte's Spinozism will be the following. I shall divide this 
part of my thesis in three chapters, as follows: "Metaphysics, Knowledge and Freedom", 
"Religion and Theology" and "Ethics". I shall also engage with a number of Fichte's writings, 
such as Attempt at a Critique of All revelation, the Wissenschaftslehre project and The Way to 
the Blessed Life. Most commentators concentrate their studies of Fichte's philosophy on the 
texts ofthe Wissenschaftslehre project. In a way this is understandable, since the writings ofthe 
project form the main canon of Fichte's writings. The consequence of this fact, however, is that 
most of Fichte's other writings have been, by and large, neglected by these commentators. 
understand that different writings of Fichte contain different Spinozistic aspects, and thus my 
proposing to engage with most of Fichte's writings to make my point - for instance, the Attempt 
at a Critique of All Revelation deals with the issue of determinism, religion and revelation 
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which, I hold, have strong echoes of Spinozism, whilst the series of lectures entitled "Morality 
for Scholars" contain some very interesting similarities with Spinozian ethical views. Certainly, 
when possible, I shall not restrict myself to 'one writing' to 'one theme'; rather, I shall try to take 
a more holistic approach, and thus, I shall try to refer to different and relevant writings within 
any given theme. This approach should enable me to demonstrate that Fichte remained a strong 
Spinozist throughout his life, and that his Spinozism was not a mere infatuation of his early 
academic life. 
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CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICS, KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM 
FICHTE'S ABSOLUTE I AND SPINOZA'S SUBSTANCE 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, the chapter entitled "The Enlightenment and its Adversaries", I have 
demonstrated that the Enlightenment movement was facing a major crisis due to the growing 
threat of scepticism. This threat was undermining knowledge, and thus, it also undermined all 
metaphysical and scientific enquiry. In chapter 3, the chapter entitled "Kant", more specifically 
in the section entitled "Kant's Solution to the Crisis", I demonstrated and argued that Kant 
attempted to solve this crisis with the publication of his First Critique, the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Kant attempted to demonstrate how experience of reality was possible at all, and in so 
doing, he aimed at demonstrating how one could gain knowledge of reality, and thus enabling 
metaphysical and scientific enquiry. In that same chapter, in the section entitled "The Reception 
ofthe First Critique", I argued that Kant had failed to solve the crisis. Kant's failure was mainly 
due to some inconsistencies in his system; inconsistencies such as a lack of systematicity, i.e. the 
lack of a unifying princ.iple which rendered the system with a number of dichotomies, and it was 
difficult to see how these dichotomies could interact without a unifying principle, inconsistencies 
which Jacobi and Maimon quickly pointed out. Nevertheless, in untangling the Enlightenment 
crisis so well, Kant had made matters worse, he had opened Pandora's Box. It was thus left to 
the Post-Kantian Idealists to try to cut the Gordian knot and solve the crisis. 
In writing the Wissenschaftslehre project Fichte aimed at answering the same basic 
questions that Kant unsuccessfully proposed to answer with the First Critique. Fichte aimed to 
answer: how is knowledge possible at all? In answering this question Fichte aimed at providing 
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the foundation of all experience, a first principle which would ground all experience -this first 
principle, is the Absolute I. Fichte's concept of the Absolute I is the cornerstone of his 
Wissenschaftslehre project. That is, Fichte also understood that philosophy ought to be 
systematic, and as such he attempted to derive his system from this first principle. In other 
words, Philosophy, for Fichte (and for his contemporaries) was a science, just as physics and 
biology are sciences, and as such it required a first principle, which could serve as the foundation 
of all philosophical enquiry. By providing a foundational principle and a systematic system in 
the project Fichte aimed at demonstrating how knowledge could be gained from one's experience 
of reality - and thus, fencing off the threat that scepticism posed at the time, and moreover, by 
providing a foundational principle and a systematic principle in the project he would also be able 
to demonstrate the nature of reality. Note here the contrast between their understanding of 
philosophy, and the contemporary understanding. Their understanding was that philosophy is a 
science and that it ought to be able to explain everything. The contemporary understanding is 
much less ambitious, as it only aims at explaining or disentangling particular philosophical 
problems. Perhaps the modern understanding is a direct consequence of the impossibility of the 
mammoth task faced by Fichte and his contemporaries and of their failure to succeed in such a 
task. 
Fichte refers to the concept of the Absolute I in quite a few passages of his writings. One 
of such passages is the following. I quote Fichte ( 1970: I 09-11 0): 
The Absolute Ego of the first principle is not something (it has no predicate and 
cannot have any); it is absolutely what it is, and this cannot be further explained. 
But now, by means of this concept, consciousness contains the whole of reality; 
and to the not-self is allotted that part of it which does not attach to the self, and 
vice-versa. Both are something; the not-self is what the self is not, and vice-
versa. As opposed to the Absolute-self...the not-self is absolutely nothing; as 
opposed to the limitable self is a negative quantity ... 
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The obscurity of Fichte's language does not help his readers to make a complete sense of what he 
means by this concept. In fact Henrich ( 1982:23-24) notes this point when he says: 
Fichte's language steadfastly resists the implications of this model and therefore 
has to make use of many metaphors that are very difficult to understand .... This 
explains why Fichte's task was so difficult and why he never succeeded in 
elaborating his theory with complete clarity, even though this was his goal. 
Consequently, rather than communicating his discovery, he hid it in texts that are 
among the most opaque and refractory in the entire tradition. The interpreter has 
to expend the same effort Fichte applied to the issue itself if he wants to free this 
discovery from the thicket of incomplete manuscripts. 
And as Henrich says "the interpreter has to expend much effort" in trying to make sense of 
Fichte's terminology, and as such of Fichte's Absolute I. Despite the obscurity of the meaning of 
this concept Beiser (2002:284) notes that: 
for all the problems in admitting the existence of an absolute ego in his (Fichte) 
system, the fact still remains that Fichte writes of an absolute ego. The problem is 
then how to interpret such language. What does such language mean? And does 
it commit Fichte to the existence of the Absolute Ego? [my brackets] 
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My investigations on this concept have yield the surprising finding that there are three main 
interpretations of this concept, namely, what I call "the classical interpretation" of Schelling and 
Hegel, "the strong idealist interpretation" of Jacobi and Navalis, and "the modern interpretation" 
of commentators such as Breazeale, Pippin, Zoller, Neuhouser and Henrich. I shall now provide 
the reader with an outline of each of these interpretations and demonstrate the connection with 
Spinozism which each ofthese interpretations have. 
According to the classical reading of Schelling and Hegel, the main thesis of the project 
could be outlined as follows: There is an Absolute I that somehow continuously creates the 
whole of reality, including Nature as a not-! and individual consciousnesses as relative "I"s, as 
noted by Bowie (2003:72), Dusing (1999:211), and Copleston (1946:47). It is perhaps 
interesting to quote the following passage by Copleston (1946:4 7) who summarises the classical 
reading well: 
In Fichte's system, therefore, Kant's Transcendental Ego blossomed out as the 
Absolute Ego, the ultimate source of finite subjects and objects ... 
Support for this classical interpretation can be found in Schelling's writings, especially in his 
work On the I as a Principle of Philosophy, where Schelling (1980: 1 04) describes the Absolute I 
of Fichte's Wissenschafislehre project as: 
... the Absolute I is neither a merely formal principle, nor an idea, nor an object, 
but pure I determined by intellectual intuition as absolute reality. [my italics] 
And Schelling ( 1980: I 05): 
... one speaks commonly of the existence of God, as if God could really exist, that 
is, could be posited conditionally and empirically (that, of course, is what is 
desired by most people and, as it seems, even by many philosophers of all times 
and factions). Anyone who can say that the Absolute I exists knows nothing 
about it. 
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In the first passage Schelling says that the concept of Absolute I is to be understood as "absolute 
reality", and this is to be understood as the very source of all reality, as the underlying principle 
that holds everything together -the Absolute I is the point of origin of all reality. And in the 
second passage Schelling is saying that just as the existence of God could not be asserted 
conditionally and empirically, so it is with the Absolute I. That is, to condition or empirically 
assert an absolute is to turn the absolute into a relative. The absolute cannot be conditioned by 
anything or empirically asserted by its own nature. Only relatives are conditioned by other 
relatives and only relatives are empirically asserted. Schelling seems to be asserting that since 
the concept of God and the concept of the Absolute I share some particular characteristics, i.e. 
their absolute-ness and their unknowability, then it seems that the concept of Absolute I could be 
equated with the concept of God. 
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The following passage from Hegel's The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's 
System of Philosophy also corroborates the interpretation that the Absolute I is God. I quote 
Hegel (1977: 159): 
After all, as Fichte says somewhere (see Fichte, Werke I, 253), his own system 
would only be formally correct for God's self-consciousness - a consciousness in 
which everything would be posited through the Ego's being posited. 
It is worth here referring again to the letter dated 2nd of July 1795 of Fichte to Reinhold where he 
acknowledges that Schelling's interpretation was correct. I quote Fichte (1993:401): 
Judging by what I have read of it, Schelling's entire essay is a commentary on my 
writings. But he has grasped the matter splendidly, and several people who did 
not understand me have found his essay very clear. Why he does not say so [i.e. 
that his essay is a commentary on the Wissenschaftslehre project] I do not quite 
understand. He will not wish to deny this, nor could he do so ... ! am glad that he 
has appeared. I am particularly fond of his references to Spinoza, on the basis of 
whose system mine can most properly be explained. 
And in a letter dated 30th August 1795 to Jacobi, Fichte ( 1993:411) explicitly says that: 
the pure I (i.e. the Absolute I) is posited outside ourselves and is called God. 
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This statement clearly corroborates the classical reading that the 'Absolute I' is 'God'. In the 
classical reading, Fichte's Absolute I becomes virtually identical to the classical interpretation of 
Spinoza's substance, such as found in Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire Historique et Critique which 
was first published in 1695 and which was standard reading in European Universities (vide supra 
pp.l5-16), and as such Fichte must have been familiar with it. By following such interpretations 
of Spinoza's substance it could be said that both the Absolute I and Spinoza's substance are the 
primary principle of their philosophical systems. Both the Absolute I and Spinoza's substance 
continuously creates reality, i.e. these are the source of, the point of origin of reality. And both 
are to be equated to God as an immanent entity. That is, God is within everything in reality; God 
as the source of reality is present in all that encompasses reality; God underlies and joins the 
whole of reality together; and since God is present in everything, everything is a modification of 
God. Note here that the Absolute I and the substance as God are not the mere sum of all the 
entities of reality, this would be a strict form of pantheism. The Absolute I and the substance as 
God, are whales over and above the whole of reality, they create reality, but they are also present 
in what has been created. 
If the classical reading is correct I can identify a problem for Fichte. He must spell out 
what sort of relation the Absolute I has with all the relative "I"s and with nature as a not-1. 
Unfortunately he does not explicitly say so. The problem of the right kind of relation between 
the substance and its modes is well known and it has plagued Spinozism since the late 17th 
century, and I believe, if the classical reading is correct, that this problem is transferable to the 
relation that the Absolute I bears with the relative "I"s and nature as a not-1. 8 I, however, 
8 NB. There are three main readings regarding the substance-mode relation. Bayle reads 
Spinoza as a Cartesian and the relation between the substance and its modes as a relation 
analogous to the subject-predicate relation. Wolfson reads Spinoza as an Aristotelian and the 
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understand that if one is to make sense of Fichte's views here, and by what Schelling says in his 
interpretation, that the relation between the Absolute I and the relative "l"s and nature as a not-! 
is to be interpreted as a causal relation- i.e. the Absolute I continuously creates, i.e. causes to be, 
the relative "l"s and nature as a not-!. 
The classical reading also ties in well with one of the Kantian theses in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, i.e. the thesis that morality requires the postulation of a God, a God who is the 
guarantor that human action can be successfully enacted in the world. Kant, however, does not 
spell out how God, as a transcendent being, does this. In his first pub! ished work, the Attempt at 
a Critique of All Revelation, Fichte following Kant, held this same thesis as true. Fichte must 
have been aware of this problem, because, if the classical reading is correct then Fichte is 
transforming the transcendent God into an immanent entity. This move seems to solve the 
problem as an immanent God, a God that continuously creates the whole of reality, including 
subjective beings, is a God that can guarantee the congruency of all things, including subjective 
agency over objectivity. Thus, the Absolute I, now the immanent God, continuously creates 
nature and subjective consciousnesses, i.e. it is their source, and thus is able to guarantee their 
congruency. Bowie (2003:72) corroborates this: 
The difficulty always lies in how two sides can be connected if they are supposed 
to be of a different order from each other. If nature is merely objective and 
deterministic, then its relationship to subjectivity becomes problematic. Fichte's 
solution to this problem was the idea of an absolute I which includes both 
individual consciousnesses and nature within it, as relative I and not-1... 
relation as a genus-species relation. Curley reads Spinoza in the light of modern physics and the 
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Moreover, if the subjective can successfully act upon the objective, then, this implies that the 
subjective can successfully experience the objective. And, it is through this experiencing of the 
objective that we, as subjective beings, are able to gain knowledge of reality. If the classical 
reading is correct, then here is Fichte's answer to the Enlightenment crisis and to the threat of 
scepticism, i.e. the problem noted by Beiser (2000:20-21) that rational criticism when radicalised 
leads to scepticism for when one examines one's own beliefs one discovers that the evidence 
supporting these same beliefs can go either way. For the 18th century philosopher the only 
acceptable solution to this problem was to provide a proper foundation to one's beliefs so that 
one's beliefs are always properly grounded. Therefore, Fichte's answer to the problem is that the 
Absolute I, or the immanent God, continuously creates the whole of reality, i.e. nature as a not-! 
and the relative "I"s, and as such it acts as a connection that enables the relative "I"s to 
experience and gain knowledge of the not-!. The Absolute I is the foundation of our 
experiencing of reality. 
I note, however, that the textual evidence for this classical reading is scattered and it 
cannot be conclusive. In Fichte's writings one also finds evidence supporting the strong idealist 
and the modern reading of Fichte's concept of "Absolute!". 
The strong idealist reading was put forward by Jacobi and Novalis, and it has been noted 
by Di Giovanni ( 1994: I 06-116), Bowman (2002:290), Zoller ( 1998: 21 ), and Henrich ( 1982:29). 
According to this reading the concept of the Absolute I plays the same role, or it has the same 
function, in Fichte's project as the concept of substance plays in Spinoza's metaphysical system. 
That is, the concept of the Absolute I is to be equated to the concept of substance only insofar as 
relation as a causal relation. 
- - ------------
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these concepts are the cornerstones of these philosopher's projects, but this is not to say that 
Fichte's concept of the Absolute I is to be equated with Spinoza's concept of substance insofar as 
this concept is God or Nature. Di Giovanni (1994: ll 0-111) explains this well when he says: 
Fichte had indeed chosen to give the name of "I" to his first principle and had 
clothed his account in the language of the"!". But this choice had meaning only 
programmatically, i.e. only inasmuch as, in terms ofthe assumed principle, it was 
possible to explain the possibility of genuine "selves". On Fichte's own 
admission, any such self would require individuation and hence historical 
determination. The supposed original "I", however, was ex hypothesi an 
unlimited act, a sheer Agilitdt that in itself defied all determination ... There was 
nothing to distinguish it per se from Spinoza's substance, in other words, except 
perhaps, as mentioned, the systematic work that it performed. 
Thus, according to this strong idealist reading, Fichte's mam thesis in the project is to be 
understood as the following: the concept of the Absolute I is the primordial principle and it is to 
be understood as a metaphysical expression of the empirical I; it is sheer activity and 
spontaneity; it is the basis of consciousness. Note here that the Absolute I is not a mystical 
entity, it is not a God or Nature, it is merely the foundation for consciousness. The Absolute I is 
the very activity and spontaneity of rationality that gives rise to the I as an individual self. The 
individual selfwill, in turn, oppose itselfto that which is not-itself, a not-I. Knowledge requires 
this kind of interaction, the interaction between a self and a not-self, since knowledge requires a 
subject-object relation. Thus, according to this reading the Absolute I is not God, as the classical 
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reading interprets, but the foundation of rationality. This reading, however, also ties in well with 
the wider philosophical picture of the time. As I asserted previously, the enlightenment was 
threatened by scepticism over whether knowledge was possible at all. Kant tried to reaffirm the 
possibility of knowledge in his First Critique where he, in a broader sense, answered the 
question: What can I know? Kant, however, had left too many issues unanswered and a system 
based on dichotomies. These unresolved issues lead the German Idealists to search for a 
unifying principle, an absolute, i.e. a principle that cannot be explained in relation to anything 
else, so that those dichotomies were unified, even if only in principle. Now, this strong idealist 
reading seems to fit this scenario well, as it seeks to establish a proper foundation for 
consciousness, the Absolute I, and thus providing a system that was properly unified and that 
solved those inconsistencies of the Kantian system. The foundation here is the Absolute I as 
rationality's activity and spontaneity that enables human beings to experience and gain 
knowledge of reality. 
This interpretation of Fichte's Absolute I faces some criticisms. For Jacobi, who was a 
fierce critic of the Enlightenment's reliance on reason, such an unifying principle, the absolute 
principle, is the concept of God. And God has to be taken in faith and not in knowledge. Jacobi 
understands that the mere fact that we can affirm some knowledge about Fichte's Absolute I (i.e. 
that it posits itself as an individual I and that it then opposes itself to a not-1, and that it bends the 
not-I to its will) renders this concept not absolute but relative. That is, if Fichte's Absolute I is in 
fact an absolute principle, then we would have no knowledge of it- this is Jacobi's first problem 
with Fichte's system. According to this reading Fichte understood that reason was an absolute 
and first principle, and this fact puts Fichte in direct opposition to Jacobi. Bowie (1993:21) 
corroborates this when he says: 
Jacobi uses this notion of the inarticulable ground (i.e. of being in relation to 
anything else) to suggest that the only possible course for philosophy is to realise 
that it must transcend itself into revelation and belief in a personal God who is 
this Absolute. He thereby separates philosophy from theology, which becomes 
the realm of what cannot be explained but only revealed. 
And Millan-Zaibert (200: 145) explains Jacobi's position well when she says that for Jacobi: 
... knowledge does not begin with a first principle which can be demonstrated, but 
with an absolute first principle that we must accept by an act of faith ... 
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Thus Jacobi's position is that the proper foundation to any knowledge, the first principle, cannot 
be demonstrated but only taken by faith. As such Fichte's Absolute I cannot be the foundation of 
knowledge; rather, for Jacobi, God is. Whether or not Jacobi's reading is fair to the letter of 
Fichte's philosophy is not at stake here - in fact, there is much textual evidence that does not 
support Jacobi's reading as I will demonstrate below when I deal with the modern reading of 
Fichte's philosophy. It is noteworthy, however, that Jacobi's reading was very influential and it 
later helped to shape Schelling's philosophy. It helped shape Schelling's philosophy because in 
the light of Jacobi's criticism about the absolute Schelling, who at first was very sympathetic to 
Fichte's views, started to doubt that Fichte had really found the absolute principle, and this doubt 
prompted Schelling to enquire further into the nature ofthe absolute. 
91 
Jacobi ( 1994:502) openly criticised Fichte's position in a letter. He claimed that Fichte's 
position was nothing more than an inverted Spinozism. That is, the concept of the Absolute I 
played the same role in Fichte's system as the concept of substance played in Spinoza's; however, 
whilst in Spinoza, according to Jacobi's reading (and the reading of most commentators of the 
time), Spinozism starts and finishes in materialism, Fichte's system starts and finishes with 
thought. I quote from the letter: 
Little was lacking for this transfiguration of materialism into idealism to have 
already been realized through Spinoza. His substance, which underlies extended 
and thinking being, equally and inseparably binds them together; it is nothing but 
the invisible identity of object and subject (demonstrable only through inferences) 
upon which the system of the new philosophy is grounded, i.e. the system of the 
autonomous philosophy of intelligence. Strange, that the thought never occurred 
to Spinoza of inverting his philosophical cube; of making the upper side, the side 
of thought which he called objective, into the lower, which he called the 
subjective or formal; and then of investigating whether his cube still remained the 
same thing; still for him the one and only true philosophical shape of reality. 
Everything would have transformed itself without fail under his hands at the 
experiment. The cube that had hitherto been "substance" for him -the one matter 
of two entirely different beings - would have disappeared before his eyes, and in 
exchange a pure flame would have flared up, burning all by itself, with no need of 
place or material to nourish it: Transcendental Idealism! 
Jacobi's point here was well explained by Zoller ( 1998:21 ): 
For Jacobi, the transcendental idealism introduced by Kant and radicalized by 
Fichte dissolves reality into a mere figment of the mind. Rather than combating 
skepticism, Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre is seen as supporting doubt in everyday 
reality by replacing the realist worldview of ordinary consciousness with the 
idealist production of a world that is nothing but appearances and hence 
appearances of nothing. 
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Novalis noted the same complaint regarding the dangerous implications of Fichte's system, as he 
interpreted it. I quote Novalis (2003:166): 
When one speaks philosophically of that which is to come, for example, of the 
annihilation of the not-1, then one guards against the illusion that there would 
come a point in time where this would take place .. .ln every moment that we freely 
act there is such a triumph of the infinite I over the finite one; for this moment the 
not-1 is really annihilated. 
Henrich (1982:29) also notes Jacobi's complaint against Fichte's Absolute I as a phantom and 
further notes that if this interpretation is correct that it goes against the Kantian dictum that 
intuitions without concepts are blind since the I can never have an intuition of itself and as such 
it can never construct the concept of itself. I quote: 
F.H. Jacobi suspected that Fichte's Self is a phantom. The idea that the product of 
the Self is a mere concept would turn the Self into the absolute phantom, so to 
speak. This suggests that we should take the positing of the Self to be an intuition 
of itself. Nonetheless, this option faces difficulties of its own. Intuitions without 
concepts are blind. The present case shows once again how widely this Kantian 
principle can be applied. Were we to interpret self-knowledge only as a matter of 
the Selfs looking in upon itself, we would be locking it up in Auerbach's cellar. 
How can it ever come to understand that it catches sight of itself, if it cannot also 
have an understanding that it is a Self and, thus, possess the concept of itself? 
The second variant of the circularity in the reflection theory prohibits us from 
interpreting the Self solely as an intuition of itself. 
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Jacobi's second complaint about Fichte's system follows on from the points stated above. That 
is, Jacobi understands that the Fichtean system does not combat scepticism, rather it supports it. 
Jacobi's point is that if the basis of our knowledge is the Absolute I as sheer activity, an activity 
that gives raise to the empirical I and the not-!, then the material world is made redundant. In 
fact, one may take this to an extreme and say that since the Absolute I gives rise to my individual 
I and to the not-my-individual-! then I have no need of the material world, or for that matter, I 
have no need for other "l"s- I end up as an absolute solipsist. 
Agotnes and M oven (200 I :212-213) note that Schlegel took his criticism of Fichte even 
further than Jacobi. Schegel understands that the fact that Fichte's doctrine ends up in absolute 
solipsism has a related implication. Schegel understands that since the individual ends up on his 
own, this causes the individual to be unable to fulfil or construct his individual project, i.e. the 
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formation of his character and the pursuing of his plans for himself. This is so because the 
individual must interact with reality, the individual needs to bend out into the world, the 
individual needs to reach out for reality, and then bend back upon himself, back into his own 
reflexions, if he is to be able to complete the formation of his individual project. And according 
to the strong idealist reading this interaction with reality becomes an impossibility. 
Recently, both of the classical and the strong idealist readings have been discredited and 
have been, by and large, replaced by a modern reading after the works of commentators such as 
Breazeale (1993), Pippin (2000), Zoller ( 1998), Neuhouser (1990) and Henrich ( 1982, 2003), 
Beiser (2002). I understand that this modern reading is a variation of Jacobi's reading. 
According to this reading the Absolute I is the activity and spontaneity of the mind that enables 
the individual I to arise. This individual I in turn meets with a not-!, with reality, so that a 
subject-object relation is established and thus providing the foundations for knowledge. Note 
here that according to this reading the Absolute I does not create the not-1 as the strong idealist 
reading holds. In other words, according to this interpretation the mind is sheer activity and it is 
spontaneous, that is, one cannot switch off the activity and spontaneity of one's mind. This 
activity and spontaneity gives rise to one's particular self, that is, through this activity and 
spontaneity one comes to realise that one is always thinking. But in order for one to gain 
knowledge and achieve self-consciousness one needs contact with a not-!, with reality, so that 
the subject-object relation is established and the proper conditions for knowledge and self-
consciousness is well grounded. Let us put this issue in this way: If one were not to meet with a 
not-!, if one were to be put into some sort of cocoon and deprived from any and all sense-
perception then one would be just an active particular mind without the ability of gaining 
knowledge and of being self-conscious. Thus according to this reading, Fichte does not have any 
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ontological claim about the world, as the strong idealist holds, Fichte is not saying that the 
Absolute I actually creates the individual I and the not-I; rather, Fichte's Absolute I has only an 
epistemological function, that is, it provides the proper foundations for the individual I, i.e. the 
self-conscious I that accompanies all representations, to establish the subject-object relation with 
reality and thus gain knowledge. Zoller ( 1998:36) corroborates: 
The I is here portrayed as self-enclosed to the point of seeming totally self-
sufficient and a world unto its own. Yet the self-sufficiency in question is not the 
ontological independence or self-sufficiency of a divine mind, but the 
epistemological isolation of a finite intelligence that originally knows only itself, 
including its own states, and that derives all other knowledge from the experience 
of its own finitude. Viewed that way, Fichte's account of experience is an effort 
to derive the consciousness of external objects from the limitations that the I 
encounters in its original, intellectual intuition. [my italics] 
Note that the problem of solipsism does not arise here, as noted by Kol ias (2000: 131 ), that is, 
when the individual I finds its limits, when it encounters the not-individual-1, when it encounters 
reality, it becomes aware that it is not a sole entity as it encounters other human beings, i.e. 
entities that appear to behave in a rational manner, and things, i.e. entities that appear not to 
behave in a rational manner, in reality. Also note here that the problem of bridging the gap 
between the subject and the object does not arise. As previously mentioned, the Kantian system 
was plagued by this problem as it did not explain how the intuitions, the sense-perceptions of 
objects interacted with the categories, the structures of the mind. For Fichte this is not a problem 
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since the mind is always active and spontaneous and as such it is always encountering reality. 
This encountering is dependent on what Fichte calls the Anstoss, the check, the limitation, the 
challenge that reality impinges on the activity of the individual I. When the individual I 
encounters reality, the individual! perceives reality as an obstacle, it perceives reality impinging 
on its activities. And I quote Fichte ( 1970:212) defining the Anstoss as: 
The Anstoss (which is not posited by the positing I) occurs to the I insofar as it is 
active, and is thus an Anstoss only insofar as the I is active. Its possibility is 
conditioned by the activity of the 1: no activity of the I, no Am·toss. And vice 
versa: the l's activity of determining itself would, in turn, be conditioned by the 
Anstoss: no Anstoss, no self-determination. Moreover, no self-determination, 
nothing objective .... 
Thus, the activity of the individual I over reality, and reality's impinging on the individual I is 
what establishes the subject-object relation that gives rise to knowledge. I quote Breazeale 
(1993:99) who explains this rather nicely: 
The task of somehow bridging the gap between the consctous self and the 
objective world is simply not a problem that can arise within the context of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, which considers the synthetic link between self and world, 
freedom and Anstoss, to be a fundamental condition for the very possibility of 
se! [-consciousness. 
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I note that Fichte's position here, I mean the way he bridges the gap between subject and object, 
is very similar to Spinoza's. Lloyd ( 1994:28-30) notes that Spinoza holds: 
Bodies are more or less powerful according to their capacity to sustain and benefit 
from a variety of activities without surrendering their own distinctive ratios of 
motion and rest. The superiority of the human body over others resides in the fact 
that it is "affected in a great many ways by external bodies, and is disposed to 
affect external bodies in a great many ways" (Il Pl4 Dem). This makes it 
possible for the body to maintain its individuality throughout a wide variety of 
change ... Human life .. .is a struggle between activity and passivity, autonomy and 
dependence, freedom and bondage. 
Thus for Spinoza, the individual, the mind and body that forms an individual is always active and 
it is always interacting with the environment that it is inserted in. This interaction is what yields 
knowledge, all three kinds of knowledge, viz. opinion, reason and intuition (NB. see below 
pp.! 09-111 where I discuss these three kinds of knowledge in more detail). Without the 
interaction, without the encounter with reality, there could not be knowledge. The passage 
quoted describing Spinoza's position could have easily been mistaken for a passage describing 
Fichte's position. Therefore, both Spinoza and Fichte understand that knowledge can only be 
produced through the interaction of an individual's mind with reality. This fact places them apart 
from the usual pre-Kantian understanding that knowledge of reality can be gained through 
concepts alone (i.e. the rationalist conception) or through sense-perceptions alone (i.e. the 
empiricist conception). Certainly, Kant had realised that both the rationalist and empiricist 
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conception are not opposing, but complementary positions (vide supra chapter on Kant). Kant, 
however, failed to devise a unified system as Spinoza had done before him, and as Fichte did 
after him. 
Note also that this reading fits well with the wider picture of the time Uust as the strong 
idealist does). That is, it fits well with the fact that Kant was trying to solve the enlightenment 
crisis and that the Critique of Pure Reason was trying to lay down the foundations of knowledge 
-the modern reading seems to fit well in this scenario as it understands that Fichte is also laying 
down the foundations for knowledge. Fichte lays down the foundations of knowledge in a 
unified system, a system unified in the Absolute I, which is in direct contrast with Kant's 
dualistic system. Fichte offers us a monistic philosophy, just as Spinoza did. But by monistic 
here it is not meant a system based on one substance; rather, it is meant that there is an absolute 
principle, the Absolute I, which is sheer activity and spontaneity, and which is the basis for all 
rationality. Pippin (2000: 164) corroborates this when he says that "if there is a "monism" 
emerging in the post-Kantian philosophical world, the kind proposed by Fichte ... is what might be 
called a normative monism, a claim for the "absolute" or unconditioned status of the space of 
reasons". 
Following from what I have discussed thus far, I wish to propose that the classical 
reading of Schelling and Hegel and the modern reading of Breazeale, Pippin, Zoller and Henrich 
could be seen as complementary readings. That is, these readings capture different aspects ofthe 
Fichtean system: the classical reading focus on the relation between the finite entities with the 
infinite/Absolute, and the modern reading focuses on the relation between the finite entity with 
the other finite entities. This fact becomes very apparent if one reads Fichte as a Spinozist. In 
Spinoza we also find those two kinds of intercourse, the relation between the finite with the 
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infinite and between the finite with other finite things. Gatens and Lloyd ( 1999:4 7) have noted 
this fact rather well in the following passage: 
We have, on the one hand, the relation of dependence which binds each individual 
necessarily to Substance as one of its modes; and, on the other, the causality of 
external forces which binds the individual to other finite modes. But the two kind 
of dependence interlock. It is only through the meditating force of other finite 
modes which impinge on it that the individual has access to the sustaining power 
of Substance. It is only as a finite individual among other finite individuals -
made vulnerable but also sustained by their collective power - that the individual 
exists. The shift between the two stories enacts Spinoza's treatment of the 
interconnections between contingency and necessity bondage and freedom. 
Hence, if Fichte is read as a Spinozist, it is possible to make sense of both the classical and 
modem readings as complementary. In the classical reading, the Absolute I is indeed God who 
acts as the guarantor that the subjective can successfully enact in the objective. But this reading 
is just half of the picture. The question how a subjective entity is able to gain knowledge of 
objective reality has still to be answered. This question is answered by the modern reading. The 
Absolute I in this reading is sheer rational and spontaneous activity, an activity that gives rise to, 
that is the foundation of, individual "I"s. Through this sheer activity the individual "I"s are able 
to realise that they are always thinking, they become self-aware, and as such they become aware 
that there are limits to their self-awareness. They realise that they are able to interact with 
certain entities, i.e. other individual "l"s and objects, other than themselves and as such they are 
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able to establish a connection with these entities. This connection is what enables them to gain 
knowledge of reality. Support for my proposal here can be found in the fact that both readings 
are supported by different writings and passages within the Wissenschaftslehre project. The 
canon of the project encompasses some 17 writings or versions of these writings and as such it is 
possible to conceive that Fichte sometimes referred to the concept of the Absolute I as God and 
other times to the Absolute I as sheer rational and spontaneous activity. 
The last point I wish to make in this section concerns all three interpretations of the 
concept of the Absolute I. Generally speaking, commentators in philosophy encyclopaedias or in 
basic and introductory texts on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel understand these philosophers as 
being absolute idealists. In these introductory texts there is a common understanding that Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel hold the view that empirical objects do not exist independently of the 
human mind, and as such Fichte, Schelling and Hegel reject transcendental realism; rather, for 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel these objects are 'appearances' and therefore dependent, in some 
sense, on the human mind, and as such they are considered to be idealists. But these introductory 
texts on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel also hold that these philosophers assert that objects are not 
merely 'appearances' for us, rather objects are also appearances in some sort of absolute mind 
(e.g. Hegel's Geist, which is probably the most famous example here), and as such this common 
reading of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel understands that these philosophers are not transcendental 
or subjective idealists but absolute idealists. Now, to refer back to those three interpretations of 
the concept of the Absolute I. The classical interpretation falls well within this common 
understanding of Fichte being an absolute idealist as the Absolute I is God, who creates the 
whole of reality, relative "I"s and nature as a not-!. The strong-idealist and the modern 
interpretation (i.e. those interpretations in which the absolute I is the rationality and spontaneity 
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of the human mind), however, do not fall within this common understanding of Fichte as an 
absolute idealist. According to the strong-idealist and modern interpretations, I understand, 
Fichte should be read as a transcendental or subjective idealist, just as is Kant. In fact Beiser 
(2002:355) does ouvet11y interpret Fichte as a transcendental or subjective idealist, thus rejecting 
the view that Fichte was an absolute idealist; and Henrich (1982:42), who defends the modern 
reading, puts forward the view that when Fichte says that the concept of the self is a 
manifestation of God Fichte is trying to make the concept of the self intelligible through the 
concept of God, that is, both concepts are self-creating, are causa sui, and thus they are not 
dependent on anything else. I quote: 
Fichte ... was convinced that his theory can yield insight into the ground of the 
Self; according to him, the Self is a manifestation of God. It looks as though 
Fichte is now furnishing a cause for freedom in just the way Kant viewed it and 
which cannot really be brought into harmony with Fichte's basic insight. Yet he 
was not suffering a mental lapse when he offered this explanation. Fichte wants 
to make the essence of the Self precise and intelligible with the help of the 
concept of God. This takes place as follows: Self-consciousness is an intimate 
unity arising from an inconceivable ground which the Self does not control. At 
the same time, the Self makes itself manifest to itself. It possesses itself as Self, 
and must acquire additional knowledge of itself in the course of performing its 
characteristic activity. 
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Henrich explanation is very persuasive, and Beiser (2002:284-288) makes this same point 
agreeing with Henrich. However, I find it extremely puzzling the fact that Schelling and Hegel 
understood the Absolute I as being God, and thus not as an analogy of the concept of God. 
Therefore, I ask the question here: 'How could Schelling and Hegel have understood Fichte's 
system so wrong given that they were peers and communicate often?' Nevertheless, I understand 
that if further support for the strong-idealist or modem interpretation is gathered, then, perhaps, 
the common understanding of Fichte as an absolute idealist must be relinquished, and Fichte 
should then be placed side by side with Kant as a transcendental or subjective idealist, and 
leaving Schelling and Hegel as the sole absolute idealists of post-Kantian German philosophy. 
The debate here will be fought over by those who defend a metaphysical reading of Fichte and 
who read his philosophy as a direct development of Kant's Critical Philosophy, and who 
understand that Fichte, and the other absolute Idealists, have disregarded Kant's advice that we 
should not engage with concepts of which we can have no experience (instances of this are 
Fichte's Absolute I, Schelling's Absolute, and Hegel's Geist), and those who have a non-
metaphysical reading of Fichte and who interpret his philosophy as having some powerful 
insights into some of the problems which are still troublesome for contemporary philosophy (an 
instance of this is the modem reading of Fichte's Absolute I which deals with epistemological 
issues and which could be seen as an attempt to re-establish foundational ism). 
To conclude this section. I have demonstrated that the Enlightenment crisis posed a 
threat to metaphysical enquiry, to the attainment of knowledge and to morality. Kant attempted 
to solve this crisis with the publication of his First Critique which aimed at demonstrating how 
knowledge can be attained, what can be known, and how metaphysical enquiry is possible. 
Unfortunately, Kant's attempt was not successful, as his system was plagued by dichotomies and 
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inconsistencies. Fichte picked up where Kant had left off; in his Wissenschaftslehre project he 
attempted to answer those same questions that Kant had previously tackled. I have also argued 
that the Fichtean system is unified in the concept of the Absolute I, and thus, it could be said that 
Fichte offers us a system that is more systematic than the one Kant had previously presented us 
with. I believe that due to Fichte's difficult language and writing style commentators have 
diverged on their interpretations of the concept of Absolute I. I have also demonstrated that all 
three main interpretations are consistent with the fact that Fichte was trying to answer the same 
questions as Kant and solve the Enlightenment crisis, as well as demonstrating that all three 
interpretations are consistent with the fact the Fichte searched in Spinoza for the answers to the 
problems he faced. Lastly, I proposed that the classical reading and the modern reading could be 
seen as complementary readings, especially if Fichte is read as a Spinozist. 
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 
In this subsection I wish to deal with the issue of determinism and freedom since I understand 
that Fichte's and Spinoza's treatment of this issue are very similar. This may strike the reader as 
rather strange because prima facie the Kantian and general German Idealist conception of 
freedom as self-determination seems to be at odds with Spinoza's conception of freedom as 
connected with an insight into necessity. In the following paragraphs I shall demonstrate that 
this is not the case insofar as Fichte's treatment of the topic at hand is concerned. 
I have already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that Fichte, during his early 
academic years, devoted much time to the study of Spinoza's Ethics as he had become convinced 
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that determinism was a sound theory. It is worth at this point quoting again a passage from 
Green (1978:1-2): 
like both Schelling and Hegel, the other leading Idealist philosophers, ... began as a 
student of theology, though his subsequent career earned him a reputation 
primarily as a philosopher. He was eighteen years old when he enrolled as a 
theological student at the University of Jena in 1780. Neither there nor in his 
subsequent studies at Wittenberg and Leipzig did he devote himself to a study of 
Kant's philosophy, the crowning works of which were coming into print during 
these years. Rather, he seems to have become convinced of the truth of 
determinism, especially as articulated in Spinoza's Ethics. The struggle to free 
himself from a deterministic view of the world began during his student years and 
remained a major motive throughout his subsequent life and writings ... 
It was some ten years later, in 1790, that Fichte discovered Kant's critical philosophy. Fichte 
saw in the First Critique the solution to many philosophical problems, the problem of 
determinism included. The Kantian critical philosophy offered human beings rational freedom, 
i.e. the ability to rationally and freely choose a course of action, without giving up the idea that 
reality, i.e. the natural world, was somehow determined by necessary natural laws. It is worth 
quoting again a passage from a letter dated August-September 1790 of Fichte to his friend 
Weisshuhn. 1 quote Fichte (1993:357): 
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... ! have been living in a new world ever smce reading the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Propositions which I thought could never be overturned have been 
overturned for me. Things have been proven to me which I thought could never 
be proven, for example, the concept of absolute freedom, the concept of duty, etc. 
and I feel all the happier for it. It is unbelievable how much respect for mankind 
and how much strength this system gives us. 
Much of Fichte's talk on determinism is found in his first published book, the Attempt at a 
Critique of All Revelation - ACAR, and thus I shall sta11 by referring to his views in this work.9 
Fichte's argument in the ACAR is by and large very close to Kant's argument in the 
Critique of Practical Reason and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, although Fichte 
does work it out in some finer detail as he develops it further. According to Fichte's argument, 
the first step towards morality is taken when one recognises that one's will has a right over 
whatever is neither forbidden by nor against the moral law. But one has also to recognise that in 
some particular cases one has to forfeit such a right. For instance, all human beings have a right 
9 NB. The story of the publication of his work is perhaps better known than the work itself, 
since it was written as a sott of self-introductory note from Fichte to Kant. Kant thought the 
ACAR was a well written piece of work, and suggested that Fichte should sell it to Kant's own 
publisher. The first edition had very strange omissions: the title, publisher, city and date 
appeared as usual, but Fichte's name and signed preface were missing in this edition. Whether 
this was due to a true printing mistake, or a cunning device by the publisher, one will never 
know. The second, and subsequent editions corrected these errors and acknowledged Fichte's 
authorship. But by the time this was done, the ACAR, had already proven to be a huge success, 
partly because it was assumed by book reviewers and readers as yet another of Kant's works. 
The written style, the terminology (including the Critique on the title), the fact that it was 
published by Kant's own publisher, and especially the fact that it had been widely expected that 
Kant was soon to publish a Critique of religion, allied to the conclusion that Kant was the author 
of the ACAR. Thus, the ACAR put Fichte under the spotlight and launched his career as a 
prominent philosopher, which culminated with his appointment as professor of the chair of 
Critical Philosophy, a post previously held by Reinhold, at the University of Jena in 1794. 
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to life since one's life is neither forbidden by nor is it against the moral law. But a situation may 
arise where it will be morally required that a human being give up his life so that other human 
beings may live; in other words, it may be the case that one has to give up one's right for the 
benefit of some higher good. If we take the above instance at face value, it appears that the 
moral law is contradicting itself because it affirms that one has a right to whatever is neither 
forbidden by nor against the moral law, and yet it is open to cases where such rights may be 
forfeited for the benefit of a higher good and thus it may be rendered irrational. Fichte ( 1978:60) 
is aware of this problem as he maintains that: 
We deduce ... from the requirement of the moral law that it not contradict itself by 
abrogating its justifications of the sensuous impulse (will), an indirect lawfulness 
of this impulse itself and a perfect congruency of the fortunes of rational beings 
with their moral dispositions, ·which is thereby to be assumed. [my brackets, my 
italics] 
To paraphrase Fichte here: the moral dispositions of rational agents must have the chance of 
being implemented in the natural world, otherwise the moral law is only an empty promise. And 
following from this is the assumption "it must be possible to conceive of an ultimate goal in 
which there will be ... a situation in which the right to happiness of one who acts morally isfinally 
vindicated", as noted Green (1978:9). This ultimate goal is the highest good, which is a 
continuous and eternal striving towards happiness through a virtuous and morally law abiding 
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life. 10 And in order for this to be possible, one must postulate the existence of a God who 
ensures that the right to pursue the highest good is not a merely empty formality within the realm 
of practical reason, but also a possibility in the natural world. As Fichte (1978:60-61, 119-120) 
puts it: 
The existence of a God is thus to be assumed just as certainly as a moral law: 
there is a God ... God must...produce that complete congruency between the 
morality and the happiness of finite moral beings ... God is to be thought of, in 
accordance with the postulates of reason, as that being who determines nature in 
conformity with the moral law. 
It is thus left to God to "promote eternally the highest good in all rational natures, and to 
establish eternally the balance between morality and happiness". Note here that God is both the 
guarantor that the moral law, one's moral choices, can be effectively enacted in the natural world 
and that God is also the guarantor that the highest good will eventually be achieved. These are 
different, but connected issues. Thus far Fichte's argument is very akin to Kant's but there are 
some contrasting features between Kant's and Fichte's treatment of the topic which will be 
pointed out in the following paragraphs. It is worth re-stating here that both Kant and Fichte 
were concerned about the implications of determinism for morality. Kant's concern with 
determinism was mainly due to the enlightenment crisis and the emerging trend towards 
10 NB. In the ACAR Fichte is still under the spell of Kant and as such he holds that the summum 
bonum is happiness. Later, however, when he starts to mature his own philosophical system he 
holds that the summum bonum is a continuous striving towards perfection, and I shall come back 
to this point when I deal with Fichte's "Morality for Scholars" lectures in chapter 6 where I deal 
with ethical issues. 
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Spinozism during his lifetime as the pantheism controversy demonstrated. Fichte's concern 
about determinism is a direct result of his early Spinozism and the deterministic implications that 
come with it, and which later lead him to embrace Kantianism in an attempt to overturn 
determinism. 
It is at this point Fichte's argument takes a different direction form Kant's, and this causes 
Fichte to move closer to Spinoza. Let us now see how this is done. Fichte (1978:61) explains 
his views further by arguing that the existence of a God who ensures that one's pursuit of the 
highest good is a possibility in the natural world is necessary because: 
So long as finite beings remain finite, they will continue to stand ... under other 
laws than those of reason. Consequently, they will never be able to produce by 
themselves the complete congruency of happiness with morality. The moral law, 
however, requires this quite unconditionally. Therefore, this law can never cease 
to be valid, since it will never be achieved; its claim can never end, since it will 
never be fulfilled. It is valid for eternity. 
In the passage quoted above Fichte's concern over determinism is clearly demonstrated, as it 
implies that human beings, as finite beings, are under the influence of laws other than those of 
reason, i.e. natural laws. This premise is somehow in contrast to Kant's views, since Kant 
understood that human beings are completely self-determined entities because human reason 
operates within the noumenal realm and thus human reason is not constrained by the causality 
that operates in the phenomenal realm. Thus, Fichte agrees with Kant than human reason is self-
determined but he disagrees with Kant than human beings are completely shielded from the 
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forces that govern reality. The reader will recall that in the Wissenschaftslehre project Fichte 
develops this idea further since he argues that there is a constant interaction between the 
individual-! and the not-!, where the individual-! bends into reality and reality impinges one the 
individual-!. There is a constant 'tug-of-war' between the individual-l's and reality. And I shall 
come back to this point in chapter 6 where I discuss the topic of ethics. 
I emphasise here that Fichte understands that we are free beings because of two issues: i. 
because our cognitive capacities are autonomous, because we are able to make free informed 
decisions; and ii. because God guarantees that our moral choices can be enacted in the world. 
The claim about God will be dealt with below in the subsection entitled 'the concept of God' of 
chapter 5. For now let us concentrate on the issue concerning the claim that one is free because 
one is a rational self-determined being (i.e. one is able to make free choices through the use of 
reasoning, through making an informative decision using all knowledge available to one to reach 
a rational decision in a given situation) - and in this sense the agent is autonomous and Fichte 
agrees with Kant here; but that one is also under the influence of the natural laws that reign in the 
physical world - and in this sense the agent is in danger of being overwhelmed by external forces 
and Fichte here further develops Kant's critical philosophy, since Kant never contemplated this 
issue in this writings. It is clear thus that Fichte holds that i. human reason is automonous; ii. 
that determinism is true of reality; and iii. that human beings are in a constant interaction with 
reality, an interaction in which human reason tries to overcome reality and vice versa. This point 
about the interaction between human reason and interaction is crucial here since it implies that 
human beings are in a constant effort of trying to understand and make sense of reality. It is only 
by comprehending reality that human beings can try to overcome the forces of reality- although 
- - - - ---------
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this can never be entirely successful for a human being can never comprehend the whole of 
reality due to their finite composition. 
Fichte's position here is somehow akin to Spinoza's views as I shall demonstrate. 
Spinoza understands that one gains freedom through the use of reason (which is an autonomous 
capacity that human beings as individual modes possess) and through attaining knowledge ofthe 
natural world. That is, Spinoza holds the view that everything that happens, happens necessarily 
but that human beings can free themselves from the necessity that governs the natural world if 
they use their reasoning in the right manner, i.e. if they gain (more and more) proper knowledge 
of the natural world; that is, human beings can become free through understanding their place in 
the order of things, through understanding the forces of reality that act upon themselves as 
individual modes of the substance that they are. Let me explain Spinoza's view in some detail. 
Spinoza's conception of freedom is grounded on his epistemology. That is to say, Spinoza 
understands that there are three kinds of knowledge, (which, in Spinoza terms, is to be 
understood that there are three distinct ways that one can gain knowledge) viz. i. opinion or 
imagination (opinio sive imaginatio), ii. reason (ratio), and iii. intuition (scientia intuitiva). The 
lowest kind of knowledge, i.e. opinion or imagination, is the kind of knowledge which is gained 
from one's sense perception. Spinoza maintains that this kind of knowledge is the one that yields 
most errors, since the events that can affect one's body and mind do not follow a logical 
sequence, and therefore this kind of knowledge cannot provide us with a proper account of the 
external world since it is based on what Spinoza calls inadequate ideas, i.e. ideas that do not 
convey certainty. The second kind of knowledge, i.e. reason, is obtained through reasoning and 
adequate ideas, i.e. ideas that convey certainty because they guarantee their own truth, e.g. 
Mathematics. A mathematical proof is a paradigm of this kind of knowledge because if one 
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follows a mathematical proof step by step, if one understands these steps along the way, then at 
the end of the proof one will understand that the result necessarily follows from the steps taken 
along the proof; one is able to say that one grasps the reasoning, the adequate ideas, behind this 
proof. The third kind of knowledge, i.e. intuition, is achieved by a direct insight into the truth of 
an adequate idea, that is, intuitive knowledge occurs when one understands an adequate idea 
without the help of any argument or proposition. Spinoza puts this in term of being able to make 
a connection between the mode that is being understood and the substance, or in other words, 
intuitive knowledge occurs when one is able to make a connection between the parts to the whole 
or when one has an insight into the very essence of a thing. These three kinds of knowledge are 
perhaps better understood with the aid of an example. Let us imagine that one is given a series 
of numbers, e.g. 15, 30, X, 60, and asked to find the value ofthe X in the series. If one attempts 
to do this through the first kind of knowledge one only looks at the series, and without the aid of 
rational steps, tries to guess the value of X; guessing as we know is not a very reliable way of 
attaining knowledge and it often yields incorrect premises. But if one goes through the series 
trying to work out the value of X using a step by step procedure one is using the second kind of 
knowledge. This is a more reliable way of attaining knowledge because of the use of rational 
steps that guarantee that the conclusion will follow from the premises. In some circumstances, 
however, the series will be so easy that one has an spontaneous insight about the value of X and 
thus one does not have to do a step by step proof, one just knows the value of X, one makes the 
connection between X and the other numbers in the series automatically, and this is the third 
kind of knowledge. 
Spinoza understands that freedom arises when the mind uses the second and third kind of 
knowledge, viz., reason and intuition, that is, when one uses these kinds of knowledge it 
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comprehends that everything happens in reality happens out of necessity and that there is no 
room for contingency. The implication of this is that freedom is achieved through 
comprehending the forces that govern reality and by understanding and accepting the limitations 
of one's nature or essence. Corroborating this is the following passage from Spinoza's Letter 
LVIII to GH Schuller. I quote Spinoza ( 1928:295): 
Let us, however, descend to created things, which are all determined by external 
causes to exist, and so act in a definite and determined manner ... let us think of a 
very simple thing. For instance, a stone receives from external cause, which 
impels it, a certain quantity of motion, with which it will afterwards necessarily 
continue to move when the impact of the external cause has ceased. This 
continuance of the stone in its motion is compelled, not because it is necessary, 
but because it must be defined by the impact of an external cause. What is here 
said of the stone must be understood of each individual thing, however composite 
and however adapted to various ends it may be thought to be: that is, that each 
thing is necessarily determined by an external cause to exist and to act in a 
definite and determined manner. Next, conceive ... that the stone while it continues 
in motion thinks, and knows that is striving as much as possible to continue in 
motion. Surely, this stone, in as much as it is conscious only of its own effort, 
and is far from indifferent, will believe that it is completely free, and that it 
continues in motion for no other reason than because it wants to. And such is 
human freedom which all men boast that they possess, and which consists solely 
of this, that men are conscious of their desire, and ignorant of the causes by which 
they are determined. 
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This passage shows Spinoza's determinism. But as I mention previously Spinoza also says that 
one can reconcile a sense of freedom with these necessary forces that act upon one if one uses 
one's power of reasoning and gains knowledge of the second and third kind. Hence for Spinoza 
the more one sees things as necessary, the more one understands the world around us through the 
second and third kind of knowledge, the more one increases one's power over them, and so the 
more one is free - the free agent, for Spinoza, is one who is conscious of the external forces 
which necessarily act upon one. For instance, in the case of human beings, to understand that 
human beings are physically incapable of flying because it is not in a human being's nature to 
physically fly, is to understand the order of things and to become freer. Freedom, for Spinoza, 
comes from proper and adequate knowledge. 
Thus, both Spinoza and Fichte hold that determinism is true insofar as the natural world 
is concerned. But both philosophers also understand that one's cognitive powers, one's reasoning 
can make a difference in setting one free from those necessary forces acting in the natural world 
and that necessarily act upon one in one way or another. There is a sense of freedom in both 
Fichte and Spinoza where the agent is free to the extend that the agent is able to act upon reality 
rather than being acted upon by the forces in reality. For them human reason is an autonomous 
capacity but since human beings are inserted in reality human beings are constantly being acted 
upon by the forces that characterise reality. As such the more a human being understands reality 
and is able to act upon reality and minimilise the affects of reality upon his individual self, the 
more the individual is free. I understand that this view sets them apart from most philosophers, 
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since most philosophers tend to either subscribe to the view that determinism is true or to the 
view that human beings are free; most philosophers, however, do not subscribe to both views. 
The only philosophical school to subscribe to determinism and to reconcile it with some sort of 
freedom, a kind of freedom that is achieved through understanding the most that one possibly 
can of the world is the Stoic tradition. The similarities between Spinozism and Stoicism have 
already been noted by commentators such as Gatens and Lloyd (1999). In fact anyone who is 
familiar with both systems cannot help but to recognise the resemblance. The interesting fact 
here is that none of Fichte's commentators has inferred that Fichte falls in this same tradition. I 
would like to suggest here, following what has been said in this subsection, that Fichte, as does 
Spinoza, falls in this same philosophical tradition, namely Stoicism, even if only insofar as 
Fichte's views on determinism and freedom are concerned. I will come back to the issue of 
Stoicism below in chapter 6 when I discuss Fichte's and Spinoza's ethical views. 
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CHAPTER 5: THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 
TWO ISSUES: STRUCTURE AND TREATMENT OF THEOLOGY AND RELIGION 
In this subsection I wish to draw the reader's attention to two issues. The first issue concerns the 
structure of Fichte's and Spinoza's philosophical systems. Both philosophers start their 
philosophical systems with theological truths and from these truths they attempt to build their 
metaphysical views and these metaphysical views bring about some ethical implications (NB 
chapter 6 deals with the issue of ethics). The second issue concerns their treatment of theology 
and religion. Both philosophers draw a distinction between theology and religion, and then 
between natural and revealed religion. 11 In order to deal with these two issues here, I must carry 
on discussing Fichte's views on the ACAR, but I shall also refer to other works of Fichte when 
appropriate. 
After demonstrating his concern over the issue of determinism, Fichte takes Kant's views 
on morality even further through a detailed discussion on theology, natural religion and revealed 
religion, and the relation that these have with morality. This point has been noted by Green 
(1978: 12-18), Copleston ( 1999:76-77) and A damson ( 1881 :27 -28), and I shall draw on their 
writings to deal with this issue. Up to this point, Fichte (and Kant) had demonstrated that the 
possibility of the moral law implies the existence of a God, who acts as the guarantor of both the 
natural world and the moral law, and who also acts as the guarantor for the possibility of the 
11 NB. I know it is contentious whether Fichte had a metaphysical system or not. I, however, 
understand that it could be said that Fichte has a metaphysical system, at least insofar as the new 
Kantian metaphysics is concerned. That is to say that Fichte understood that metaphysics is an 
enquiry into the nature of reality, just as Spinoza did; Fichte however takes this as an enquiry 
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enactment of the moral law in the natural world. From this point on Fichte takes the argument 
further than did Kant. Fichte understood that morality revolves around the concept of God, the 
concept of soul and the concept of immortality; in the ACAR Fichte ( I978:63) characterises 
these concepts of God, soul and immortality as theological truths; Fichte characterises these 
concepts as being "these truths ... which we needed in order not to set our theoretical convictions 
and our practical determinations of the will in contradiction." Fichte holds that without this 
theology one's moral dispositions, i.e. one's theoretical convictions, would not be guaranteed as 
having a real possibility of enactment in the natural world, i.e. its practical determinations. 
Fichte's next move is to introduce the distinction between theology and religion. I quote Fichte 
(1978:63): 
How does then religion arise out of theology? Theology is mere science, dead 
information without practical influence; religion, however, according to the 
meaning of the word (religio ), is supposed to be something that binds us and 
binds even more strongly than we were without it. 
Copleston ( 1999:76-77) explains this point: 
... in his essay ... he attempted to develop Kant's point of view. In particular he 
made a distinction between theology and religion. The idea of the possibility of a 
moral law demands belief in God not only as the power which dominates Nature 
and is able to synthesise virtue and happiness but also as the complete 
into rationality, experience and morality, whilst Spinoza understood this as an enquiry into the 
embodiment of the moral ideal, as the all holy Being and supreme Good. But 
assent to propositions about God (such as God is holy and just) is not the same as 
religion which according to the meaning of the word [religio] should be 
something which binds us, and indeed binds us more strongly than we should 
otherwise be bound. And this binding is derived from the acceptance of the 
rational moral law as God's law, as the expression ofthe divine will. 
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The question one ought to ask here is: Why does Fichte think that one needs religion? Why isn't 
theology enough? In order to answer these questions I must recapitulate Fichte's argument this 
far. Fichte understands that the moral law is a self-imposed law that reason imposes on itself so 
that the freedom of the will is safeguarded, and thus the moral law cannot be answerable to any 
external law. Moreover, Fichte also notes that God acts as the guarantor that the moral law can 
be enacted in the natural world as well as being the guarantor that ultimately the summum 
bonum will be achieved. Following from this Fichte holds that insofar as the content of God's 
commandments are concerned (i.e. the divine law) it must be exactly the same as the content of 
the moral law that reason imposes on itself, because the moral law cannot be answerable to 
anything external to it. The implication of this is that it seems to follow that, from a moral 
perspective, it would make no difference whether one understands that one is acting according to 
the moral law that reason imposes on oneself or whether one is acting according to the divine 
law. Fichte ( 1978:70) describes this possibility as follows: 
nature of being. 
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Now if reason presents the will of God to us as completely identical with its own 
law, it certainly obligates us indirectly to obey it also; but this obligation is based 
on nothing but its agreement with its own law, and no obedience to God is 
possible except out of obedience to reason. Now from this it is clear in the first 
place that it does not matter at all even for the morality of our actions whether we 
consider ourselves obligated to something because our reason commands it or 
because God commands it. 
Green ( 1978: I 0) notes that "the concept of divine law then appears to be utterly superfluous. 
Religion which by definition must have a binding causal influence on our moral will, therefore 
seems to be impossible. How can religion introduce anything new into the situation without 
thereby threatening the autonomy of the moral law." Is theology enough then? Fichte answers in 
the negative. But why? The answer to the question "why is theology not enough?" and the 
reason why religion is necessary rests on Fichte's understanding of human nature. Fichte is a 
pessimist insofar as human nature is concerned. Fichte understands that evi I is ingrained within 
human nature, and thus, by and large, human beings are bound to stray away from the moral 
law. 12 Within this context, it becomes clear why Fichte understands that theology is not enough 
12 NB. I presume Fichte's views here have their foundation on the Christian belief of original sin. 
Contrasting with Fichte's views are the views of the later Schelling, who understood that evil has 
a metaphysical foundation in reality because both Satan (the force of chaos, or disharmony) and 
Jesus (the force of creation, or harmony) were begotten by God and as such these two forces, viz. 
chaos and creation, are always at play in reality; and as such evil is not ingrained in human 
nature and is not a condition bestowed on humanity because of Adam and Eve's original sin. It is 
worthy quoting the following two passages of Lawrence (2004: 173; 175), where he explains 
Schelling's views well: "Radical evil must ... be derivative. The evil self was not evil before it 
made itself so. For that reason 'its making itself so' cannot be thought of as a simple act of self 
constitution. !fit is derivative, however, it is not derivative ofanything in the field of experience 
and beyond the horizon within which the self constitutes itself as itse(f Its grounds is rooted in 
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and why Religion is necessary. That is to say, that since human beings are bound to stray away 
from the moral law, then they are in need of something that would ascertain that they would not 
stray away. This is religion. Religion is a way of binding human beings to the moral law. Any 
human being who strays away from the moral law can be re-connected to it through religion, or 
any human being who is about to stray away from the moral law can be prevented from breaking 
up the connection with the moral law through religion also. Note here that Fichte seems to be 
using the etymology of the word religion, the Latin re-ligare, which in its original sense means 
to re-connect. In Fichte, religion is what re-connects human beings to the moral law, or what 
prevents human beings from breaking up the connection with the moral law. I also note here that 
Fichte's move from theology and to religion leaves open the possibility that perhaps religion is 
not a necessary thing for all human beings. That is, Fichte's argument here leaves open the 
possibility that there are some human beings who are able to conquer or suppress evil solely 
through a strict understanding of the moral law so that religion is redundant for them. 
Fichte's next move is, following the Enlightenment's terminology, to make a distinction 
between natural and revealed religion. Fichte ( 1978:77-78) says "Theology becomes religion, in 
its most universal meaning, whenever the proposition assumed by the law of reason for 
determining our will operates upon us practically ... This can be conceived as possible in two 
nature, creeping up on us from behind, ... , a burden placed on us by nature, pre-conscious 
punishment for pre-conscious sin" and "Evil does not arise 'ex nihilo'. It is not the simple play of 
selfshness, but the self-deception and cruelty that surfaces when we blame suffering, originally a 
function of the limits imposed on us by nature, on something that we are able to 'control'. To 
attain my selfish desire, I work to frustrate the desire of other. It is a conception that clearly 
leaves rooms for d(fferent modalities of evil. From Schelling's point of view, evil already exists 
in the epistemological act whereby the knowing subject casts all nature outside of itse(f, 
transforming it into an object of scientific understanding and technological manipulation". For a 
detailed discussion on Schelling's and Kant's views on the issue of'evil' see JP Lawrence, 
"Schelling's Metaphysics of Evil", in The New Schelling, eds. Norman, J., and Welchman, A., 
London and New York, Continuum, 2004. 
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ways: namely, that it has taken place either in us as moral beings, in our rational nature, or 
outside it." Thus far, Fichte's argument only provides support to natural religion, as it only 
establishes religion as a rational event in us, an event by which one experiences reverence for the 
moral law, since one needs to postulate the existence of God, souls and immortality so that the 
moral law that reason imposes on itself can be enacted in the natural world. Hence, thus far, 
Fichte's argument does not deal with religion as an event outside us, and as such it does not deal 
with the possibility of revealed religion. Interesting to note here is the fact that Kant had left the 
argument at this point also, that is Kant had not enquired into the possibility of revealed religion 
in his three Critiques. Since the argument thus far does not in any way establish the foundations 
to revealed religion, it was only logical that Fichte would attempt to take the argument a bit 
further and enquire into the possibility of revealed religion using the critical philosophy method 
and terminology, just as Kant had done with the possibility of knowledge. Adamson (1881 :27-
28) corroborates this, when he says: 
The possibility, then, of a natural or rational religion, if we employ terms which 
have unquestionably a certain ambiguity had been sufficiently shown, and the 
place determined which such a religion holds in the series of philosophical 
notions. But, so far, no result had appeared bearing upon the possibility of a 
revealed religion; and those fundamental features of human nature which 
historically have always been connected with the belief of revelation, the 
consciousness of imperfection, of sin, of dependence on supreme powers, 
apparently found no place in the Kantian scheme. Here, then, was an opportunity 
for the application of the critical principles. The possibility of a revelation might 
be investigated in the same fashion as the possibility of cognition at all; the form 
and the content of any revelation might be determined by an analysis of the 
conditions of its possibility, just as the form and the content of knowledge had 
been determined by an analysis of its conditions. A lacuna in the Kantian system 
would thus be filled up. 
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Fichte ( 1978:96) defines revelation as "the concept of an appearance effected in the sensuous 
world by the causality of God, through which he proclaims himself as moral lawgiver". Starting 
from this definition Fichte sets out to enquire into the possibility of revelation. He first enquires 
whether a revelation can be known through its form or, as he says, the way in which revelation is 
made known. He concludes that a revelation cannot be known through the way it is presented, 
i.e. through its form, because this incurs two problems, one a posteriori, the other a priori. The 
first problem faced by an investigation of the possibility of revelation insofar as its form is 
concerned is that it would incur the problem of searching for something noumenal in the 
phenomenal world. This is so, because human beings can never go beyond the sense perceptions 
or appearances presented to them, and thus, there is no way for a human being to know if an 
appearance is being caused by God himself, or by the ordinary empirical causes. In other words, 
a posteriori, there is no way for human beings to determine whether any given appearance is 
merely a normal appearance caused by the ordinary empirical causes or if that same appearance 
is being caused by God's intervention in the natural world. The second problem faced by such 
an enquiry is that from an analysis of the concept of God, one would have to demonstrate that 
within this concept is present a particular sort of revelation and that God is willing to present it, 
or to make it known, to human beings. That is, the concept of God would have to encompass a 
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specific form of revelation as well as God's willingness to present this to human beings, so that 
human beings would know a priori how to identify a revelation. For instance, let us imagine that 
the concept of God encompasses a particular kind of revelation, namely that whenever God 
reveals himself he does so by changing one's sense perceptions to a gold colour, i.e. one would 
see everything in shades of gold, and that God is willing to make this known to human beings, 
then if one were to see everything in shades of gold, one would know a priori that that was a 
revelation from God. Needless to say the concept of God does not encompass those required 
features. 
By rejecting this alternative, Fichte is left with the possibility that a revelation can only 
be known by its content, or as he says, what is made known by revelation. As I mentioned 
above, Fichte understands that some human beings may stray away from the moral law because 
of the inherent evil present in human nature. Because of this inherent evil these human beings 
have their resolve to follmv the moral law weakened, and thus, they would be in need of being 
shown the way back to the moral law. These human beings become too ingrained in the 
phenomenal world through their desires and wants. It follows from this that their reconnection 
with the moral law can only be done through revelation. That is, it can only be done through an 
intervention of God in the natural world, since any attempt to do it through the moral law itself 
would fall on deaf ears. Given this situation, Fichte establishes that God's revelation of himself 
is a desirable thing if it is possible at all. Important to note here is that the concept of a 
revelation cannot claim to be anything like the postulates for the existence of God, the soul and 
immortality, which rational beings assume as a necessary condition to their freedom and 
morality. The concept of revelation, rather, can only claim to be a desirable possibility, which 
occurs when God wishes to intervene in the natural world so that human beings who had lost 
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their reverence for the moral Jaw can be guided back to it. Fichte's enquiry into the content of a 
revelation establishes that the criterion for determining the content of a possible revelation is that 
the content must neither contradict the moral law nor must it go beyond the moral law. If the 
content of an alleged revelation either contradicts or goes beyond the moral law, then it is to be 
rejected. But if it does not, then there is a possibility that it is a true revelation. 
Such an understanding of revelation places all the responsibility of moral guidance with 
the individual, and this is in direct contrast with the more common understanding that a 
revelation needs to be approved and confirmed by an institution, such as the Church. In Fichte 
there is a shift of power from the institution and to the individual insofar as morality is 
concerned. No one is to be told by an institution whether their morality is right or wrong, or 
whether their understanding of the moral law (and the divine commandments) is correct; rather, 
these are the responsibi I ity of the individual. Green ( 1978: 16) corroborates this: 
Fichte's concept of rei igion contains no doctrine of the church at all. The arena of 
the moral struggle is the individual will, what Fichte calls the faculty of desire. 
Nowhere in his Critique of All Revelation does he show any particular concern for 
the social dimensions of either sin or religion. He claims at the end of his treatise 
to have secured the rights of individuals to acknowledge a revelation or not as 
they please. Fichte's greater optimism about man's ability to act morally without 
external support apparently precludes any doctrine of the church. 
Following from my discussion thus far, it could be said that Fichte structures his philosophical 
system in the following manner: he makes a distinction between theology and religion, and then 
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he divides religion in natural religion and revealed religion. And I note that this is the same sort 
of taxonomy used by Spinoza. Spinozism also makes the distinction between theology and 
religion and between natural and revealed religion, which Spinoza calls purified and 
superstitious religion. Spinoza's theology is found in parts of the Tractatus, and in the Ethics. 
His theology is grounded in the understanding that there exists a sum of all existence, and as 
such it is absolutely infinite (for there is nothing outside itself to render it finite). This unique, 
highest form of Being Spinoza calls substance. Then, he identifies God as a substance, and later 
that God is Nature, the whole of nature, i.e. nature as the essence of all things, or the natura 
naturans, and nature as a physical system, or the natura naturata. It could be said that Spinoza's 
theology is a set of truths, which explain the nature, the form and the content of our reality and as 
such it is akin to Fichte's understanding that theology is a set of truths. Moreover, there is a 
crucial similarity between Spinoza's and Fichte's treatment of these theological truths; that is to 
say, that these truths are used to formulate their metaphysical systems, which in turn have ethical 
and political implications. 13 
Beginning from such an understanding of theology, Spinoza enquires into how religion 
arises from it (i.e. theology), and then he makes a distinction between purified and superstitious 
religion. Spinoza deals with the issue of purified religion in chapters 7 to 15 of the Tractatus. 
Spinoza understands that religion arises from theology, not because of human beings' inherent 
evil as Fichte holds, but because not all people can philosophise and achieve moral truths 
13 NB. Both Spinoza and Fichte, like many of their contemporaries, understood that philosophy 
had to be systematic, i.e. out of one single principle one must be able to derive a whole 
philosophical system. Thus one ofthose theological truths is a first principle for these 
philosophers. For Spinoza such a principle is the concept of substance, and God is a substance; 
for Fichte, such a concept is the Absolute I, and either God (in the classical reading) or the self 
(in the modern reading) is the Absolute I. I will deal with this issue again below in the section 
on 'the concept of God'. 
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through reasoning. In this sense, Spinoza is not a pessimist about human nature, but an elitist. I 
also mentioned above that Spinoza divides religion into revealed and natural religion or 
superstitious and purified religion, as he calls it. Spinoza understands that if one strips the 
scriptures bare of all historical detailed content, rituals, claims of supernatural knowledge and 
belief in miracles, all that one is left with is purified religion. Purified religion only encapsulates 
pure ethical claims, and nothing else. These pure ethical claims are perfectly consistent with 
rational morality, and as such they are a guide to action which ought to be followed out of pure 
reverence. For Spinoza, it does not really matter if one is a good moral agent because one is 
following purified or natural religion, or whether one is following rational morality through 
philosophy (although, in an ideal world, it would be desirable that all moral agents act following 
rational morality and philosophy); corroborating this is Gregory (1989:37) when he says: "What 
emerges in the Tractatus, as far as Spinoza is concerned, is the possibility of a worldly 
blessedness for both the rational person (through philosophy) and the common person (through 
purified religion .. .)." This is very akin to Fichte's treatment of this topic, since Fichte 
understands that the divine law coincides with the moral law, and thus it does not really matter if 
one considers that one is acting because one is following the moral law or the divine law. 
Spinoza denies the possibility of any revelation, claiming rather that revelations are the fanciful 
outcome ofthe imagination ofthe prophets. In the ACAR Fichte does not deny the possibility of 
revelation outright, rather he says that revelation is a desirable possibility if it is possible at all. 
But he does deny that should a revelation ever occur that it requires to be sanctioned by 
institutionalised religion, the burden of sanctioning is rather with the individual. Fichte is not as 
radical as Spinoza insofar as the issue of revelation is concerned; and thus it appears that Fichte 
has softened Spinoza's position. The point here is that both Fichte and Spinoza seem to place 
126 
power with the individual and away from institutionalised religion. Fichte does this by giving 
the power of sanctioning a revelation, if it ever occurs, with the individual, rather than 
institutionalised religion; whilst Spinoza does this by denying the very foundation of 
institutionalised religion, revelation, as well as by advocating in favour or reasoning (and to a 
certain extent, of natural religion). 
Spinoza treats superstitious or revealed religion with a great deal of suspicion. He 
understands that this form of religion is the source of fear, intolerant government and hatred 
among people, because of its claims to supernatural knowledge being the route to salvation, and 
specially its claim as the sole holder of the truth. In a historical context Spinoza has in mind the 
Roman Catholic Church, and the various Protestant denominations which, under those very 
claims I have just mentioned, vilified each other and fomented prejudice and hate among people. 
In the ACAR Fichte does not directly voice any concerns about revealed religion; I mean he does 
not directly criticise it, but he does voice his preference for natural religion. In a later work, 
however, namely The Way Towards the Blessed Life, Fichte seems to move closer to Spinoza by 
criticising 'religious fanaticism' and the consequences of it. Again, he does not mention revealed 
religion directly, but one cannot help associating the words 'religious fanaticism' in the following 
passage with 'revealed rei igion' - especially when he contrasts it with the true (or natural) 
religion. I quote Fichte ( 1949:32): 
All fanaticism, and all its angry exhibitions, from the beginning of the word down 
to the present day, have proceeded from the principle: 'if my opponent be right, 
then am I a miserable man'. Where this fanaticism can wield fire and sword, with 
fire and sword it assails its detested adversary; where these instruments are 
beyond its reach, it has still the tongue left ... 
And Fichte (1949:35-36): 
They (fanatics) violently appropriate and pervert the description of that from 
which danger may be feared, and they doubtless calculate quite securely that no 
one will be found to discover the change ... for .. .the true religion (natural 
religion) ... has never been known to persecute, to show intolerance, or to stir up 
civil commotion ... 
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For both Spinoza and Fichte, fear, hatred and intolerance, as well as any institution, ideology or 
government based on these, are restraining and limiting forces on the powers of reason. As such, 
these emotions and feelings and any thing based on them are also restraining and limiting forces 
to knowledge and consequently on all human freedom. 
On a related issue, I note that Yovel (1989:voi.II:l2) in his chapter entitled "Spinoza and 
Kant" makes an interesting point that is transferable to my argument here and is also related to 
what I have said previously. It could be said that both Fichte and Spinoza understand that there 
are three ways to salvation, where salvation means a rational purification of the individual by 
which the individual achieves a higher level of consciousness or understanding of reality. For 
both philosophers the first way to salvation is achieved through the third kind of knowledge and 
philosophy for Spinoza and through the moral law and philosophy for Fichte; needless to say that 
according to them only the very few, if any, can achieve salvation this way. The second way to 
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salvation is achieved through natural or purified religion and this is a more common and secular 
way to salvation; although it is not reached through the same means as the first, it is still 
acceptable as it yields the same results, such as justice, respect and social help. The third way to 
salvation is achieved through revealed religion; Spinoza, as I said, is particularly hostile to this 
kind of religion as it foments hatred and intolerant governments; the earlier Fichte is not as 
radical as Spinoza, he tones down his understanding of revealed religion by giving the 
individual, rather than the institution, the final say on revelation, and consequently on salvation; 
the later Fichte, however, is much closer to Spinoza's position as he voices his concerns against 
religious fanaticism, and through this, he voices his disapproval of revealed religion. 
I have thus demonstrated that both Fichte and Spinoza have similar views on theology 
and religion. That is, both philosophers understand that theology is a set of necessary truths that 
bear deep implications for morality, and that natural or purified religion is what re-connects 
human beings to the moral law, and that revealed or superstitious religion is to be approached 
with care because it often foments intolerance and fanaticism. And furthermore, both Fichte and 
Spinoza use this taxonomy to structure their respective philosophical systems. 
UNDERSTANDING OF REVELATION 
Another interesting issue concerns the subject of revelation. The term revelation usually covers 
any sort of intervention of God in reality. That is, God can intervene in reality through visions 
and dreams in subjects, or through a physical interference in the natural order of things which is 
presented or witnessed by subjects. In this section, I wish to focus on revelation as an 
intervention of God in the natural order of things, i.e. a miracle. Spinoza's treatment of this topic 
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in the Tractatus along with Hume's argument in his essay On Miracles are perhaps the best 
known works on this issue. 14 Fichte, however, has also written on this topic in the ACAR. 
Although he does not mention Spinoza by name in dealing with the issue of revelation, 
sometimes, it appears that in some particular passages of the ACAR , Fichte is giving a direct 
reply to Spinoza on his treatment of Revelation. The following seems to be one such passage, I 
quote Fichte (1978: 118-120): 
Is this (revelation) even possible in general? Is it conceivable in general that 
something outside nature (God) would have a causality within nature? ... Let us 
now apply these principles to that anticipated supernatural influence of God in the 
world of sense. God is to be thought of, in accordance with the postulates of 
reason, as that being who determines nature in conformity with the moral law. In 
him, therefore, is the union of both legislations, and that principle on which they 
mutually depend underlies his world view. For him, therefore, nothing is natural 
and nothing is supernatural, nothing is necessary and nothing contingent, nothing 
is possible and nothing is actual. Negatively we can assert this much for certain, 
obliged by the laws of our thought; but if we wanted to determine the modality of 
his understanding positively, we would become transcendent. So there can be no 
question at all concerning how God could conceive of a supernatural effect in the 
14 NB. I beg the reader to note that I shall not deal with Hume's understanding of miracles in 
detail here. I however find it necessary to provide the reader with a very brief characterisation of 
his views on miracles. Hume dismissed the occurrence of miracles on account that they relied on 
witnesses' accounts, and that these accounts are unreliable. Hume understood that the more 
likely explanation of such miraculous events is that they are merely natural events, which 
witnesses are unfamiliar with, e.g. a lunar eclipse. As such, such events are not God's 
intervention in the natural order of things. 
world of sense as possible and how he could actually do it; but rather how we are 
able to conceive of an appearance as effected by a supernatural causality of God. 
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Hence, Fichte understands that since God is the creator of, and guarantor of the congruency of 
the noumenal and phenomenal realms, it is not impossible to conceive of him interacting with the 
phenomenal realm in order to make his views known. This is so because in the ACAR Fichte 
understands God as a transcendent entity who wills the existence of the world (and its 
phenomenal and noumenal realms), and as such, he is not restrained in his actions in any way 
whatsoever, he formulates the rules and he bends these rules as he pleases. I understand this to 
be a possible reply to Spinoza. In the Tractatus Spinoza had asserted that a revelation could not 
happen. That is, Spinoza dismisses the possibility of revelation by arguing that such alleged 
events are nothing more than unfamiliar events to the subject reporting it (i.e. these events are 
natural events, i.e. events that fall under the laws of nature, rather than breaches of the natural 
laws, although being unknown by the subject reporting it as a revelation or miracle). Spinoza's 
views on this follow directly from his metaphysical system. As I mentioned above in this 
chapter, Spinoza's metaphysics advocates that i. only one substance exists, ii. this unique 
substance is God, and iii. God is Nature, the whole ofNature. Such views, imply that the whole 
of Nature is divine. Thus, Spinoza's metaphysics has no space for a transcendent entity, who 
wills the world, i.e. a transcendent God, as Fichte understands it; rather, Spinoza's metaphysics is 
a move towards pantheism since it divinises Nature, and this implies that God or Nature is 
immanent to all things in the world. Moreover, this implies that if Spinoza wants to be 
consistent he has to negate the possibility of revelations as miracles, since if a revelation or 
miracle were to occur this would imply that God or Nature is interfering with its own essence, 
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which is necessarily illogical, i.e. it is physically impossible for Nature to interfere with its own 
essence. According to Spinoza everything has an essence, 'everything is what it is', and it is 
impossible to contravene this essence, e.g. human beings' essence does not allow for physical 
flying. Thus it would be a breach of human beings' essence if one were able to physically fly -
perhaps, this human being would not be a human being anymore, but a different sort of being. In 
the same manner, Nature has to follow its own essence, and it would be illogical if it were able to 
modify its essence, its natural laws. The following passage of Spinoza's Tractatus is worth 
quoting here. I quote Spinoza (1862:83): 
Nothing, then, comes to pass in nature in contravention to her universal laws, nay, 
everything agrees with them and follows from them, for whatsoever comes to 
pass, comes to pass by the will and eternal decree of God; that is, as we have just 
pointed out, whatever comes to pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules 
which involve eternal necessity and truth; nature, therefore, always observes laws 
and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth, although they may not all be 
known to us, and therefore she keeps a fixed and immutable order. .. 15 
This is the reason why Spinoza, unlike Fichte, cannot allow the possibility of revelations. At any 
rate it seems that Fichte is, in some particular passages of the ACAR, giving a possible reply to 
Spinoza on this issue since he clearly mentions the physical possibility of revelation, and 
Spinoza negates revelation exactly on the grounds that it is a physical impossibility. That is, for 
Spinoza it is a physical impossibility because it is logically impossible for nature to change or 
15 Spinoza, Tractatus, p. 83. 
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interfere with its own essence, and for Fichte it is a physical possibility because a transcendent 
God, the creator, can change or bend the rules whenever he pleases. It is interesting to note, 
however, that one could infer that Fichte possibly became unhappy with his position in the 
ACAR because he abandoned the idea of a transcendent God altogether in his more mature 
writings, as I shall discuss in the next subsection. 
THE CONCEPT OF GOD 
In reading the canon on Fichte's writings one cannot help but notice that Fichte changed his 
conception of God during his academic life. In his early writings we find him holding that God 
is a transcendental entity; later, we find Fichte holding that God is an immanent entity; finally, in 
his last works, we find some evidence of Fichte giving up on the idea of God altogether, 
evidence which triggered the atheism controversy and Fichte's losing his chair at the University 
of Jena. In this section I aim at demonstrating Fichte's motivation for moving away from one 
idea of God to another. This demonstration will be done within the context of his philosophical 
development. 
In the ACAR, his first book, we find Fichte holding to the idea of God as a transcendent 
entity, an entity much like the Judaeo-Christian God who wills the world. In the ACAR we also 
find Fichte defending two other theses, namely, the thesis that reason is autonomous, and the 
thesis that revelation is a desirable possibility that occurs when God intervenes in the natural 
world so that human beings who had lost their reverence for the moral law can be guided back to 
it. Copleston ( 1999:78), however, noted an interesting objection to Fichte's argument in the 
ACAR, as follows: 
Obviously, it can be objected against Fichte's position that to decide whether 
revelation really is revelation or not we have first to know the moral law. Hence 
revelation adds nothing except the idea of fulfilling the moral law as true 
expression of the all-holy wi 11 of God. True, this additional element constitutes 
what is peculiar to religion. But it seems to follow, on Fichte's premises, that 
religion is, as it were, a concession to human weakness. For it is precisely human 
weakness, which needs strengthening through the concept of obedience to the 
divine legislator. Hence if Fichte is not prepared to abandon the Kantian idea of 
the autonomy of reason and if at the same time he wishes to retain and support the 
idea of religion, he must revise his concept of God 
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The point here is that if reason is an autonomous faculty, why does it need reassuring? If reason 
is really autonomous, then surely it does not need revealed religion, because reason would 
always be able to reconnect itself to, or never stray away from the moral law. This is a problem 
for Fichte, since he wants to retain both the autonomy of reason and revealed religion. In the 
way his argument stands it seems that it supports the view that reason is not really autonomous. 
For if reason strays away from the moral law, it requires God's interfering with the creation and 
revealing his wishes, so that reason can reconnect itself to the moral law. Without this 
interference of God, reason would not be able to reconnect itself to the moral law. Thus, if he 
wishes to retain the autonomy of reason and at the same time retain also the idea of a revealed 
religion, then Fichte must revise his argument so that support for both premises are in place. The 
autonomy of reason is unquestionable for Fichte, and hence, he must find a way of retaining the 
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idea of revealed religion. This can only be done through a new conception of God. As I 
understand Fichte, this is one of the things that he does in his Wissenschaftslehre project and in 
his subsequent writings. My understanding here is corroborated by commentators such as 
Bowman (2002) in his paper "Fichte, Jacobi and the Atheism Controversy" and Tal bot ( 1913) in 
his paper "Fichte's conception of God". Also, I understand that the reworking of the concept of 
God will lead Fichte closer to Spinoza's views as I shall demonstrate below. 
In the ACAR Fichte's conception of God is akin to the traditional understanding of that 
concept. That is, in the ACAR, by God is meant a transcendent all powerful Being, the creator, 
who wills the existence of the world and who reveals himself in the world when he wishes to 
reveal his wishes to humankind. In the Wissenschaftslehre project Fichte seems to depart from 
this previously held view of God. That is, according to the classical reading of the project, the 
reading of commentators such as Schelling and Hegel, the concept of God appears to have been 
reformulated. lt is worth re-stating this position here. According to this reading, there is an 
Absolute I, that somehow continuously creates the whole of reality, including Nature as a not-1 
and individual consciousnesses as relative "l"s. As I mentioned previously, according to this 
reading the Absolute I is to be equated with God because the Absolute I cannot be known but 
only taken on faith because the Absolute I is the source of all reality. The Absolute I is not, 
however, God as a transcendent entity, rather the Absolute I is a God who is immanent to all 
things. In short, the classical reading seems to defend the view that the Absolute I is an 
immanent God and that it is the source of all reality and that it cannot be known but only 
believed in faith or postulated. 
Thus, in the classical reading of the project the concept of God has been reformulated. 
God is no more a transcendent entity who creates the world and who only interferes with it when 
135 
he desires to reveal his wishes to humankind; rather, according to the classical reading, in the 
project, God is an entity who must continuously create nature and individual consciousnesses. 
Such a reading of Fichte's philosophy brings him very close to Spinoza. As I mentioned in the 
subsection on the Absolute I above, Fichte's Absolute I becomes virtually identical to Spinoza's 
substance (or God or Nature). Both the Absolute I and the substance create the world 
continuously, are identified with the whole of reality, and are equated to God as an immanent 
entity. This immanent entity is the source of all creation. 
Following from this, it could be said that Fichte is re-working the concept of God so that 
support for both of those theses, viz. the autonomy of reason and revealed religion, are in place. 
As I mentioned previously the concept of a transcendent God did not provide the right support 
for those theses. And since for Fichte giving up on the autonomy of reason is out of the 
question, he must find support for revealed religion, he must find a new conception of God that 
fits his views of revealed religion. Thus, the question here is: does the concept of God as an 
immanent entity provide the right kind of support for revealed religion? The answer to this 
question is: yes, it does. The idea of an immanent God does provide better support for Fichte's 
thesis of the necessity of revealed religion. This is so, because an immanent God does not need 
to interfere with the created world, as does a transcendent God. Rather, an immanent God is 
always creating reality, and as such he is always present within reality. An immanent God 
reveals himself in the whole of reality and thus there is no need for him to interfere with creation. 
Therefore, whilst the concept of a transcendent God appears to be a concession to human 
weakness since the transcendent God must interfere with creation by revealing his wishes to 
humankind so that humankind does not stray away from the moral law; the concept of an 
immanent God does not incur this problem since the immanent God is already revealed in 
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creation. The immanent God does not need to interfere with creation, he is already there and 
always present m creation. As such, humankind only needs to discover and understand the 
immanent God's will by looking around and understanding the world. The moral law is always 
already there in the world, and human beings, who have strayed away from it, need only to 
reconnect themselves to it. Given enough time, all human beings who strayed away from the 
moral law will reconnect themselves to it. Thus, the concept of an immanent God does not 
represent a concession to human weakness as does the concept of a transcendent God. This 
reading also ties well with the idea of a God who is the guarantor that human action can be 
successfully enacted in the world, since the Absolute I, now the immanent God, continuously 
creates nature and subjective consciousnesses, i.e. it is their source, and thus guaranteeing their 
congruency. I quote Bowie (2003:72): 
The difficulty always lies in how two sides can be connected if they are supposed 
to be of a different order from each other. If nature is merely objective and 
deterministic, then its relationship to subjectivity becomes problematic. Fichte's 
solution to this problem was the idea of an absolute I which includes both 
individual consciousnesses and nature within it, as relative I and not-1... 
Fichte's move from a transcendent God and to an immanent God provides his philosophical 
system with a more solid base, and as such it represents a vast improvement in his search for a 
systematic and coherent system. Talbot (1913:57), however, notes that conceiving God as an 
immanent entity does not solve all of Fichte's problems, and that Fichte was aware of this fact. 
quote: 
If you conceive of God as a substance, a being, a person, a consciousness, it is 
possible, he (Fichte) says, for you to raise the question: Is there any God such as I 
conceive? 
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Thus even if one conceives of God as an immanent entity rather than as a transcendent being, 
one can still raise the question: Is there such an entity which is the very source of all creation? 
Any answer to such a question has to be taken on faith as the existence of such an entity can 
never be proven a priori, because immanence is not part of the concept of God nor can it be 
proven a posteriori because one can never gather enough evidence for the existence of such an 
entity. A doubt will always remain. This is a problem for Fichte since many philosophers 
always demand to know the 'truth' definitively one way or another. Therefore, conceiving God 
as an immanent entity does not solve all of Fichte's problems, Fichte must try to find a new 
understanding of this concept. He must find a new conception that supports his theses of the 
autonomy of reason and revealed religion and that does not suffer the pitfalls suffered by these 
previous conceptions of God. 
In his later works, namely, The Way to the Blessed Life and On the Basis of Our Belief 
in a Divine Providence, Fichte seems to give up on the idea of an immanent God. That is, 
Fichte, who had previously given up on the idea of a transcendent God in favour of the idea of an 
immanent God, now gives up on this idea also. It appears that Fichte gives up on the idea of an 
immanent God that is found in the classical reading of Schelling and l-Iege! of the 
Wissenschaftslehre project. He seems to give up on the idea of an Absolute I who, according to 
the classical reading, continuously creates nature as a not-! and relative "l"s (and which is 
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virtually identical to the classical reading that many of Spinoza's contemporaries had of 
Spinoza's substance- vide supra subsection on "Absolute 1"). Furthermore, Fichte seems to give 
up on the idea of God as an entity altogether as he moves towards pantheism and atheism. This 
move towards pantheism and atheism brings Fichte very close to Spinoza and it seems to reflect 
a more accurate reading of Spinoza's philosophy, which is found in Jacobi's and Mendelssohn's 
writings, who were contemporaries of Fichte, and who wrote a great deal on Spinozism during 
the pantheism controversy. 16 This more accurate reading of Spinozism understands that Spinoza 
was both a pantheist and an atheist. That is to say, that this reading of Spinoza understands that 
the charge of pantheism leads to a charge of atheism also. Pantheism has as its central thesis the 
idea that everything is divine, everything is God, literally, the world is God. Such a thesis is 
completely removed from the common understanding of the concept of God. By this I mean that 
the pantheistic idea of God is quite different from the understanding that Christians, Muslims and 
Jews have of this concept. In their classical forms, these religious traditions hold the view that 
God is a transcendent entity. These traditions could even accept the idea that God is immanent 
to all things, that a spark of God is present in all entities of creation and that God is continuously 
creating everything, God has not withdrawn from creation, rather, God supports and maintains 
creation. These traditions, however, could never accept that the world is God, and that God is all 
16 NB. Vide FH Jacobi, "Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses 
Mendelssohn", in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, translated and 
introduction by George Di Giovanni, Montreal & Kingston, London and Buffalo, McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1994, pp. 339-378. Jacobi's and Mendelssohn's interpretations 
(Jacobi's especially) are generally considered by commentators as being more accurate to the 
letter of Spinoza's philosophy. These interpretations are very detailed and do not rely on 
previous misconceptions and misinterpretations of Spinoza's philosophy. More importantly here 
is the fact that these interpretations did not rely on previous commentaries on Spinoza's 
philosophy, such as the highly inaccurate commentary of Pierre Bayle, which, until the break up 
ofthe Pantheism Controversy, was the most famous and well-known commentary on Spinoza, 
and which was part of the canon of most universities. 
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that there is. It follows from this, that these traditions understand that pantheism represents a 
form of atheism, since there is a negation of their understanding of God. Let us now look at 
those two later works of Fichte, since I understand that Fichte holds both atheistic and pantheistic 
views there, and these are very similar to the just described understanding of Spinoza as a 
pantheist and atheist. 
In On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Providence, Fichte voices very pantheistic and 
atheistic views. Such views triggered the Atheismusstreit, the atheism controversy and resulted 
in the loss of his chair at Jena. There Fichte said: 
The world is, simply because it is; and it is what it is, simply because it is what it 
is. From this point of view we start with an absolute being, and this absolute 
being is the world, the two concepts are identical. 17 
Here he states that "the world is, simply because it is; and it is what it is, simply because it is 
what it is". This statement asserts that the world is causa sui, it has not been created, it exists of 
its own accord. Then Fichte identifies the world as being the absolute being, a characterisation 
which is usually ascribed to God. These assertions are clearly pantheistic in content and as such 
are also atheistic as they conflict with the common understanding that theists have of the concept 
of God. 
In The Way to the Blessed Life, a text that encompasses a number of public lectures that 
Fichte gave on religion and which was written just after the On the Basis of Our Belief in a 
Divine Providence, whilst referring to God, Fichte ( 1949:4) says: 
17 NB. Passage quoted by Copleston (1963:80). 
... Being is throughout simple, not manifold; there are not many beings, but only 
One Being. 
And Fichte (1949:5-6): 
This Being is simple, homogeneous, and immutable; there is in it neither 
beginning nor ending, no variation nor change of form, but it is always and for 
ever the same, unalterable, and continuing Being. The truth of this proposition 
may be briefly shown thus: Whatever is, in and through itself, that indeed is, and 
is perfect - once for all existing, without interruption, and without the possibility 
of addition. 
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Thus, in these two passages Fichte reasserts the view that there is only One Being (there are not 
many beings but only One Being), that this Being is infinite (there is in it neither beginning nor 
ending), has always existed (once for all existing, without interruption) and is causa sui and is 
perfect (whatever is, in and through itself, that indeed is and is perfect). This thesis is exactly the 
same as Spinoza's. In the Ethics Spinoza says: 
106 - God I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance 
consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite 
essence. 
And 
I P 17 corollary 2 - ... God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists from the 
mere necessity of his own nature and by the mere necessity of his nature he acts. 
And therefore he is the only free cause. 
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These passages of the Ethics, and there are others, demonstrate that Spinoza understood that the 
substance (and God is a substance), is a Being absolutely infinite, a Being who possesses an 
infinite number of attributes (and thus it is perfect), and a Being who is its own cause (and thus a 
Being who is absolutely free). Fichte's and Spinoza's descriptions of God are extremely similar, 
and hence, it could be said that in these later works, Fichte is echoing Spinoza's position. Fichte 
identifies his absolute being, his one Being, with the world; Spinoza identifies his unique and 
infinite substance as being the whole of reality. Both philosophers are defending pantheism by 
characterising the world in terminology which is usually used with reference to God and in doing 
so both philosophers are also defending atheistic views, since theists would not accept such a 
position. 
The question here is thus: Does this new understanding of the concept of God as being 
the world or reality provide better support for the thesis that revealed religion is necessary? The 
answer to this question is: yes. By thinking of God as being the world, by thinking in such 
pantheistic terms, Fichte is able to provide better support to the thesis that revealed religion is 
necessary. If God is the world then God is always already there for us. There is no need for God 
to interfere with creation because God is always already revealed in creation. And thus, this 
avoids the problem of God having to interfere with creation, and this, as I noted at the beginning 
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of this subsection, conflicted with the thesis that reason is autonomous. Human beings, as 
autonomous and rational beings, are always connected to God/the world. And thus, even if 
human beings may stray away from the moral law because of the inherent evil that is present in 
human beings, human beings can always, potentially, reconnect themselves to the moral law. 
The moral law is always there revealed in reality, human beings have only to establish a 
connection with it. Given enough time, all human beings, who have strayed away from the 
moral law, will eventually all reconnect themselves to the moral law. Conceiving of God as the 
world has also an advantage over the idea of a transcendent God and of an immanent God. By 
conceiving of God as the world, Fichte also avoids the question: Is there such a God as I 
conceive? A question which posed a problem for the ideas of a transcendent God and of an 
immanent God. That is, by seeing the world as God, it is difficult for one to doubt the existence 
of God because the reality of God is always there, present, to one. 
I have thus demonstrated that in Fichte's early academic life he conceived of God as a 
transcendent entity. Such a conception posed problems for his philosophical system. During his 
mature academic years Fichte moved to a conception of God as an immanent entity. This new 
understanding represented an improvement to his system, but it did not represent an ultimate 
solution to his problems as the idea of an immanent God could still be doubted. In his later 
academic years Fichte moved to a more pantheistic conception of God, a conception that leads to 
the charge of atheism and that does not incur the pitfalls of previous conceptions. There appears 
to be a sort of full circle in Fichte's philosophical development here as Fichte enthusiastically 
returns to his youthful Spinozism in search for answers and solutions to the philosophical 
problems he encounters. 
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CHAPTER 6: ETHICS 
THE NATURE OF MORALITY AND ETHICAL VIEWS 
In this section I will attempt to expound Fichte's answer to the following two questions: i. How is 
morality possible? and ii. What should I do? The answer to the first question is found in Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre project and the answer to the second question is found in Fichte's "Morality 
for Scholars" lectures. I shall deal with these questions in turn and demonstrate that Fichte's 
ethical views are very close to Spinoza's. 
In the writings of the Wissenschaftslehre project Fichte deals mainly with the questions: 
How is experience possible? And how is knowledge possible at all? His answer to these 
questions is given in his doctrine of the Absolute I, and I have already dealt with the three 
interpretations of the Absolute I in a subsection above. This thesis, the thesis of the Absolute I, 
however, has some implications for morality, as I shall demonstrate below. 
If one follows the classical reading of the project and its interpretation of the Absolute I 
as God, then the Absolute I, God, ensures that individual "l"s are able to experience and gain 
knowledge of reality. From this it follows that the Absolute I, God, also insures that individual 
"l"s are able to act upon reality, are able to impose their will upon reality. And this is how 
morality is possible, that is, morality is possible because God ensures, God guarantees that 
human beings can successfully act upon reality. This reading seems to follow on the shadow of 
Kant's first and second Critiques as it understands that God acts as the guarantor that human 
beings can successfully experience, and act upon, reality. 
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If one follows the strong idealist reading of the project and its interpretation that the 
Absolute I is the rationality and spontaneity of the mind, and accepts its criticism that Fichte's 
views end up in solipsism, then the possibility of morality becomes problematic. It becomes 
problematic because one could say if I am alone in the world, if all that 1 experience is the 
product of my own mind, then what need do I have for morality? Strictly speaking, I can claim 
possession of whatever I want, I can behave in whatever manner I see fit, there are no constraints 
to my behaviour, there are no reprisals to a bad action of mine. Therefore, one could say that 
morality would have no place if I am alone in world and if reality is the product of my own 
imagination. A possible reply to this is perhaps to advocate that morality does not require an 
interaction between human beings and between human beings and reality. According to this 
view a human being is a moral being whether or not he is interacting with other human beings, 
and with reality. For this, one would have to advocate that human beings possess some sort of 
moral sense, perhaps in the Humean lines, where a human being knows what is wrong because 
what is wrong disgusts him, and knows what is right because what is right pleases him. The 
problem with this reply is that it is difficult to prove, since human beings are always living 
within society, human beings are in constant interaction with other human beings, and human 
beings are always connected to reality. As such this view suffers from the fact that if my mind is 
creating all that I experience, then where is the content for such experiencing coming from? And 
following from this problem, one could ask: Didn't Kant and Fichte establish that we require a 
contact with reality, that we require this contact for content, if we are to have the experiences 
that we have, and if we are to become self-conscious of ourselves through differentiating 
ourselves from what is not-ourselves? It follows from what I have maintained here that the 
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strong idealist reading proves to be very problematic for morality, and it is perhaps inconsistent 
per se. 
More interesting here, however, is the modern interpretation of the project, and as such I 
want to concentrate much of my efforts here dealing with that interpretation. The modern 
interpretation of the project understands that the Absolute I is the basis of all human 
experiencing and of the possibility of attaining knowledge, that is, this interpretation understands 
the Absolute I as being the sheer activity and spontaneity of the mind. It is this sheer activity and 
spontaneity of the mind that grounds all human experience and that enables one to gain 
knowledge. This Absolute I, this activity and spontaneity of the mind, gives rise to the 
individual and pure I, the self that will accompany all ofthe mind's representations- the selfthat 
will be able to lay claim to a representation, the self that will be able to say: this is my 
representation. But experiencing and knowledge require more than this. When the individual 
and pure I first arises it feels limitless, it feels infinite. This feeling of infinity is grounded in the 
Absolute I, the sheer activity and spontaneity of the mind, that has no limits per se, i.e. to set a 
limit for the activity and spontaneity of the mind would be arbitrary. The pure I, however, comes 
to understand that there are limits to its activity as it encounters the not-!, i.e. reality. At first the 
pure I is overwhelmed by the not-! to the extent that the pure I loses itself in the activity of the 
not-!. After being overwhelmed by the not-! the pure I continuously tries to re-establish itself 
and to strike a balance between its own activity and the not-l's activity. In this way, reality, the 
not-! poses a limit and a challenge to the infinitude of the pure I. The pure I is always checked 
(Anstoss) by the not-1. That is, reality limits the actions of the pure-! and reality also challenges 
the not-I to overcome this limitation. Reality acts as both a hindering force and as a motivation 
to the pure I. Fichte understands that there is a continuous struggle between the pure I and not-I 
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and this is how human beings achieve self-consciousness; this is how human beings experience 
and gain knowledge of reality; and this is how human beings act upon reality. 
Fichte understands that this account of consciousness provides a solid basis for 
theoretical and practical reason. Let us look at theoretical reason first. At first the pure I posits a 
check (Anstoss) caused by the activity of the not-! every time it tries to think and act. Fichte 
understands that through reflection the pure I comes to develop this check into sensations (i.e. as 
impinging on me), intuitions (i.e. as being related to me), and concepts (i.e. as being grouped 
together by me) which are all united in its experiencing of reality, i.e. a spatia-temporal world 
governed by causal laws. This is how theoretical reason arises and works for Fichte. That is, 
theoretical reason is possible for Fichte because we can successfully experience and reflect upon 
the world. Practical reason arises within the same foundations. As the pure I is checked by the 
not-1 the pure I tries to change the not-1, the pure I tries to impose its will upon reality. As the 
pure I tries to do this it perceives that the not-! encompasses things and entities. In other words: 
The pure I comes to recognise that there are physical objects in the world, it experience these 
objects, and it tries to control these same objects; and the pure I also comes to recognise that 
there are other pure "l"s in the world, pure "I"s who seem to demonstrate that they also 
experience the world and who demonstrate that they have a will as they try to change things in 
reality. Practical reason is possible for Fichte because we can successfully try to impose our will 
on reality. By demonstrating the possibility of practical reason Fichte also demonstrates the 
possibility of morality as it is a necessary requirement of morality that I can successfully enact 
my will in the world - if I cannot successfully enact my will in the world then I cannot be held 
responsible for any actions which may be ascribed to me. In fact, as Beiser (2002:232-233) 
notes the relation between theoretical and practical reason goes beyond their common 
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foundations. Practical reason takes precedent over theoretical reason, and this implies that I can 
infer that I experience reality because I can interact with reality, and this is in contrast to Kant 
who understood that theoretical reason is prior to practical reason. I quote Beiser (2002:232-
233): 
Fichte's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason was crucial to his break with 
the subjectivist tradition ... practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason 
because it explains the fundamental presupposition of theoretical reason: that 
there exists an external world. Fichte defined the primacy of practical reason in 
just this sense in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaflslehre when he wrote 
that the proof that reason is practical is that it could not be theoretical if it were 
not practical. He explained that the central assumption of theoretical reason - that 
there exists some object outside myself- is demonstrable only as the condition for 
the possibility of moral action, or of my striving to change and improve the 
world... this means that we can assume there is an external world - the 
fundamental presupposition of our experience - only as a condition for moral 
action. In other words, what justifies belief in the external world is that it is the 
medium and means for the execution of moral duty. 
It is noteworthy here to re-state that I understand that Fichte tried to improve on the Kantian 
understanding of how morality is possible. Kant understood that morality is possible because 
human beings are rational and autonomous beings, beings that can rationally and autonomously 
choose or deliberate over an action. For Kant, the autonomy of reason implies freedom to 
148 
choose without external interference. If I am to be a moral agent I ought to be able to freely 
choose what action to take without any sort of interference from outside causes. I can only act 
autonomously when my actions are completely self-imposed. I can only act autonomously when 
my actions are initiated by reason and when these same actions are universalisable. According to 
Kant, if my actions are initiated by feelings, desires and emotions, then my actions are not 
autonomous as these types of actions have been initiated by outside forces, and as such non-
autonomous actions are not desirable moral actions. Therefore, Kant advocates a picture of 
morality where willing and feeling are separated. Kant severs the connection between what I 
will as a moral agent and what I feel as a human being. 18 In Fichte this connection is re-
established. Fichte provides us with an holistic understanding of human beings as moral agents. 
In Fichte we do not f111d the moral action as the outcome of a completely self-imposed 
legislation. The pure-1 is in a constant intercourse with the not-1. The pure-l's willing and 
feeling are interconnected. The pure-1 feels the not-I impinging on it (pure-1) and as such the 
pure-I tries to enact in the not-I so that the not-1 conforms with its (pure-I's) willing. In Fichte 
we find that there is a constant interaction between the pure I and the not-!. The pure-1 feels the 
action of the not-! and the pure-! tries to change the not-1 so that the not-! conforms with the 
pure-l's will. Fichte is aware that this interaction will never be truly and well balanced. 
18 NB. This is the classical interpretation of Kant's views. More recently, however, some 
commentators have put forward a more sympathetic interpretation of Kant. For instance, 
Barbara Herman (in her paper "On the Value of Acting from Motive of Duty", in Philosophical 
Review, 90, 1981) and Richard Henson (in his paper "What Kant might have said: Moral Worth 
and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action", in Philosophical Review, 88, 1979) put forward 
the view that Kant did not break the connection between what the individual will and what the 
individual feel. They argue that Kant was only arguing that the primary motivator for a moral 
action ought to be self-imposed, that I ought to act on those duties, those maxims given to me by 
the categorical imperative; but does not mean that other motivators, such as emotions and 
inclinations, may not accompany or match the primary motivator. As I said this is a much more 
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Nevertheless, Fichte does understand that we should strive to bring this interaction to a harmonic 
balance. In the following passage of Fichte's "Morality for Scholars" lectures, Fichte puts his 
views quite explicitly. I quote Fichte (1993: 149-150): 
The will is of course free within its own domain, that is, in the realm of objects to 
which, once man has become acquainted with them, it can be related ... But feeling, 
as well as representation, ... is not something free, but depends instead upon things 
external to the I... If the I nevertheless ought to be at one with itself...then it must 
strive to act directly upon those very things upon which human feeling and 
representation depend. Man must try to modify these things. He must attempt to 
bring them into harmony with the pure form of the !. .. And since this bent [the 
external action on the pure I] is derived from outside of us, it is impossible for it 
to be in harmony with the form of our pure I. [my brackets] 
It is also worth quoting here the following passage from Lumsden (2004: 136) whose work gives 
an insight into this aspect of Fichte's system: 
In the Kantian story, autonomy is only possible under the condition where I 
legislate myself to act in light of a norm that is authoritative because it is 
universalizable. I act autonomously when my action is completely self-imposed. 
If my action is initiated by feelings, desires, drives and so on then the action is 
characterised as heteronomy [limitation]. The role constraint plays in the 
sympathetic reading of Kant, but it is a modern reading, and as such it was never considered by 
Wissenschaftslehre, as the condition of action and freedom is very similar to 
Kant's account of autonomy, but Fichte's account of moral action could not be 
described as fully self-imposed rational legislation. In Fichte's case genuinely 
moral actions arise to a unity of feeling and willing ... Even though Fichte argues 
that the unity of feeling and reason can't be achieved, we should aspire to achieve 
such harmony. [my brackets] 
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Spinoza had already answered the question over the possibility of morality along the same lines 
as being proposed by Fichte. For Spinoza, human beings are modes of the substance, modes 
which have access to the extension and mental attributes of the substance. As such, human 
beings are rational and physical beings. The possibility of morality is not only based on human 
beings' rationality, but also on human beings' feelings and emotions, which are a response to the 
interaction between human beings as modes with other modes (human beings or not). Human 
beings are always trying to modify the world around themselves so that the world complies with 
their will, and at the same time the world (which is composed of other human beings and other 
kinds of modes) is interfacing with human beings. This interfacing produces all sorts of feelings 
and emotions in human beings. There is no way of dissociating these two movements of willing 
and feeling. Human beings will always try to bend the world to their will, and the world will 
always impinge on human beings. Willing and feeling are interconnected. The human being is 
this whole of willing and feeling. Spinoza however understands that willing must try to conquer 
feeling, and this is done through understanding the world around us. If I understand the world 
around myself, then I will search for those things that are good for me, those things which will 
Kant's contemporaries. 
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help me endure for as long as I possibly can. And at the same time I will avoid those things that 
are not good for me, those things which will hinder my existence. Spinoza understands that 
everything seeks to endure for as long as it possibly can. As such Spinoza followed the Stoic 
dictum that everything seeks its survival, survival takes priority over everything; and as such 
Spinoza rejected the Epicurean tradition (and he would also reject its revival in Utilitarian 
philosophy) which held that everything seeks pleasure and avoids pain. All that said, let us sum 
up Spinoza's position on the possibility of morality. Morality is possible for Spinoza because 
human beings can successfully interact with, and impose their will upon, the world. And thus, 
Spinoza would reject Kant's idea that morality is to be based only on rationality. For Spinoza, 
such a claim is the negation of the naturalistic fact that human beings are willing and feeling 
entities. 
Now that I have demonstrated how Fichte and Spinoza understand that morality is 
possible, that we are moral beings, I can demonstrate how Fichte answers the question: What 
should I do? The answer to this question, as previously mentioned, is found in his "Morality for 
Scholars" lectures, and I shall scrutinise some of these lectures in order to expound his ethical 
vtews. But before doing this, a few words regarding this work. 
Fichte arrived in Jena in May 1784 just before the start of the summer semester. He had 
spent the previous months perfecting his new philosophical system, the Wissenschaftslehre 
project, and preparing his private lectures on this. Fichte, however, did not want to use his newly 
appointed position to solely teach his system to a handful of students - he wished to have a 
deeper influence on the whole ofthe university community. It is because ofthis wish that Fichte 
devised a series of public lectures, in addition to his private lectures, which were entitled 
"Morality for Scholars". His public lectures did not use the technical jargon of his systematic 
- ------- ---------------
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philosophical system, as his private lectures did, and thus they were more accessible to the wider, 
learned community. Fichte's motivation for choosing this topic for his public lectures is clearly 
explained in the following passage of his Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre. 
quote Fichte (1993:138): 
The sciences, as you all undoubtedly realize, were not invented as an idle mental 
occupation to meet the demand for a refined type of luxury. Were they no more 
than this, then the scholar would belong to that class to which all those belong 
who are living tools of a luxury which is nothing but luxury; indeed, he would be 
a contender for first place in this class. All our inquiries must aim at mankind's 
supreme goal, which is the improvement of the species to which we belong, and 
students of the sciences must, as it were, constitute that centre from which 
humanity in the highest sense of the word radiates. Every addition to the sciences 
adds to the duties of its servants. It thus becomes increasingly necessary to bear 
the following questions seriously in mind: What is the scholar's proper vocation? 
What is his place in the scheme of things? What relation do scholars have to each 
other and to other men in general, especially to the various classes of men? How 
and by what means can scholars most expeditiously fulfil the duties which they 
incur through these relationships? And how do they have to develop the skills 
which this requires? These are the questions which I shall be trying to answer in 
the series of public lectures which I have announced under the title "Morality for 
Scholars" 
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It is clear from this passage that the "Morality for Scholars" Lectures are concerned with ethical 
1ssues. Fichte wanted to demonstrate in these lectures that the vocation of man is self-
improvement, that is to say that self-improvement is the summum bonum of humankind. 
Moreover, self-improvement IS the ultimate goal of all human social intercourse, and the 
vocation of the scholar is to supervise, promote and guide humanity in this process of continuous 
self-improvement. 
It is also noteworthy here that the word Gelehrter in the original title of the "Morality for 
Scholars" lectures (the original title reads "Die Lehre van den Pflichten der Gelehrten''), which is 
usually translated as Scholar needs some explaining, as Breazeale ( 1993: 140-141) noted. By 
scholar it is not meant only in its narrow sense of an academic professional, a researcher or 
teacher, but also in its wider sense of someone who is educated, who spends his life pursuing 
knowledge and who is concerned with sharing any gained knowledge with the rest of 
humankind, since he understands that knowledge is the central pillar in humanity's continuous 
pursuit of self-improvement. On commenting on Fichte's understanding of Gelehrter Breazeale 
( 1993:141) notes that: "thus it is the special responsibility of the scholar to supervise and to 
regulate human progress toward perfection, and in order to do this he must at least strive to be 
'the ethically best man of his time'. 
Let me now scrutinise some of these lectures and I will then tie Fichte's views with 
Spinoza's. In the first lecture Fichte aims to answer the question: 'What is the Vocation of Man 
as Such?'. Fichte understands that he needs to answer this question first, before dealing with the 
higher question: 'What is the Scholar's Vocation?'. The answer to this question is given by 
Fichte (1993: 152) at the end of the lecture, where he establishes that: 
Man's final end is to subordinate to himself all that is irrational, to master it freely 
and according to his own laws. This is a final end which is completely 
unachievable and must always remain so - so long, that is, as man is to remain 
man and is not supposed to become God. It is part of the concept of man that his 
ultimate goal be unobtainable and that his path thereto be infinitely long. Thus it 
is not man's vocation to reach this goal. But he can and he shou Id draw nearer to 
it, and his true vocation qua man, that is, insofar as he is rational but finite, a 
sensuous but free being, lies in endless approximation to his final goal. Now if, as 
we surely can, we call this total harmony with oneself "perfection", in the highest 
sense of the word, then perfection is man's highest and unattainable goal. His 
vocation, however, is to perfect himself without end. He exists in order to 
become constantly better in an ethical sense, in order to make all that surrounds 
him better sensuously and - insofar as we consider him in relation to society -
ethically as well, and thereby to make himself ever happier. 
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Thus, human nature, or the vocation of man qua man, implies, according to Fichte, that human 
beings are in a constant pursuit of self-improvement, self-improvement towards perfection. 
Presumably Fichte understands that by perfecting oneself, by improving oneself, one becomes a 
better and well-rounded individual and as such one becomes a better moral agent. This pursuit 
involves understanding, and perhaps controlling the world around us. The pursuit of self-
knowledge and of knowledge of the world around us is a virtuous thing for Fichte, since such 
knowledge enables one to improve oneself as well as the world as a whole. Moreover, Fichte 
understands that the path towards self-improvement is endless and eternal, and this is so, because 
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human beings are finite, although rational beings, that is to say, that Fichte understands that 
because human beings are finite, human beings can never achieve perfection, since perfection 
requires infinity, and only God is infinite and thus perfect. This later issue can be explained 
further as: Fichte understands that the predicate perfection is not part of the concept of human 
being, but it is part of the concept of God; if human beings were to become perfect human beings 
would cease to be human beings and would become Gods. Note here the contrast between 
Fichte and Kant on the issue of the summum bonum. Both, Kant and Fichte, postulate God, 
souls and immortality, but whilst Kant understands that happiness is the summum bonum, Fichte 
understands that self-improvement is the summum bonum, and this shift from happiness to self-
improvement has implications for Fichte's system. Whilst Kant understands that human 
happiness is eventually achievable, Fichte understands that the path of self-improvement towards 
perfection can never be achieved because it is endless and infinite. Thus human beings can 
never achieve perfection, human beings can only get closer and closer to it through a process of 
improvement. A question could be raised here: If the summum bonum is unattainable, then 
where is the motivation to pursue it? Fichte could provide us with two answers here. Both 
answers are related to Fichte's philosophical development. The first possible answer considers 
Fichte as a theist or a deist within his own philosophical development. Support for this possible 
answer is found on the fact that the "Morality for Scholars" lectures were written around the 
same time as the Wissenschaftslehre project. And as I established in the subsection on the 
'Concept of God' in the project Fichte held the view of God as an immanent entity. So it could 
be said that Fichte held this same view in the lectures. As such, if we read him as a theist or a 
deist, then Fichte would say that human beings have a role to play in creation. Their role in 
God's master plan is to develop themselves and try to achieve perfection. Human beings must 
I_ 
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try to fulfil this role, since God has planned it. The second answer however takes a different 
form in Fichte's development. That is, if we read Fichte as already stat1ing to move away from 
the theism or deism of his earlier philosophical development, and into the atheism and pantheism 
of his later philosophical development, then Fichte would say that human beings cannot help but 
to try to develop themselves and learn as much as they can about themselves and about the world 
around them. It is in human nature to do so, that is what human beings are. This second answer 
would be very agreeable to Spinoza, who would answer along the same lines as he aimed at 
providing a naturalistic account of everything, including human nature. I note that Hegel would 
take issue with Fichte's replies here by directly criticising the human situation in such a scenario. 
Harris (1977: 17) describes Hegel's possible reply to Fichte here, when he says: 
The "infinite progress" in morality which Fichte accepted as the destiny of 
humanity, was for Hegel an endless treadmill of internalised slavery; it placed 
man in the situation of Sisyphus or Tantalus, it deprived him even of the rational 
possibility of a real self-fulfilment that could be known and enjoyed. 
I understand that Hegel's criticism here demonstrates that he probably did not fully grasped 
Fichte's views. Fichte could provide two possible relies to Hegel, replies which are, again, 
connected to his philosophical development. In the first reply we take Fichte as a theist or deist. 
That is, if we read Fichte as a deist or a theist, then it would be reasonable to hold that he 
believed that God has a plan for humanity. God is benevolent, and as such, God would unsure 
that human beings would feel some sense of self-fulfilment and enjoyment in their lives. Fichte 
could even ask l-Iege!: What sort of benevolent God would take such a feeling from us? The 
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second possible reply is connected to reading Fichte as a pantheist and atheist. Fichte would say: 
If it is in human being's nature to pursue knowledge and better themselves endlessly, then would 
it not be very odd if they did not feel some sort of self-fulfilment? If one fulfils one's nature, 
then one must feel some sort of self-fulfilment. It would be paradoxical if one followed one's 
nature and at the same time did not enjoy it and did not achieve some sort of self-fulfilment. The 
important issue here is the process, not the final goal. 
In the second lecture Fichte poses the question: What is the vocation of man within 
society? Thus, in this lecture, Fichte sets to put forward an account of human being's social 
nature, their drive towards society and the betterment of society. The following quote 
summarises Fichte's conclusion in this second lecture. I quote Fichte ( 1993: 160): 
The true vocation of man within society is, ... ,unification, a unification which 
constantly gains in internal strength and expands its perimeter. But since the only 
things on which men are or can be in agreement is their ultimate vocation, this 
unification is possible only through the search for perfection. We could, 
therefore, just as well say that our social vocation consists in the process of 
communal perfection, that is, perfecting ourselves by freely making use of the 
effect which others have on us and perfecting others by acting in turn upon them 
as upon free beings. 
In this lecture, Fichte sets out from the premise that human beings are rational and thus free 
beings - here one can see the influence of Kant, since Kant understood that it is a requirement 
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that moral beings must be rational and free. 19 His second premise in this lecture is that the 'I' of a 
human being contrasts itself with the 'not-I', i.e. the individual se! f needs to set its boundaries by 
perceiving what is outside itself. But by contrasting itself with the 'not-1', the '1' perceives that 
there are some entities in the 'not-1' that do not act following the necessary laws of nature, but in 
a free manner. Therefore, human beings can assume that there are other human beings out there 
in the world; I quote Fichte (1993:156): 
One of man's fundamental drives is to be permitted to assume that rational beings 
like himself exist outside of him. He can assume this only on the condition that 
he enter into society (in the sense just specified, i.e. society is the relation where 
rational beings stand to each other) with these beings. Consequently, the social 
drive is one of man's fundamental drives. It is man's destiny to live in society; he 
ought to live in society. One who lives in isolation is not a complete human 
being. He contradicts his own self. 
And thus, Fichte establishes that human beings are also social beings because they require the 
encounter with other rational and free beings, and hence it is only natural that human beings 
form societies, where society means an intercourse between rational beings. After establishing 
this, Fichte is able to conclude that human beings do not only aim at their personal constant self-
19 NB. Note here that Fichte's ethical views encompasses elements of virtue ethics (insofar as 
the pursuit of self-knowledge and knowledge of the world around one is a virtuous thing to do), 
consequential ism (insofar as that one must aim at promoting the summum bonum, or self-
improvement and the improvement ofthe world as a whole) and deontology (insofar as that it is 
a requirement that moral agents must be rational and free agents, and that Fichte also subscribes 
to the categorical imperative, as I demonstrated in the section on the ACAR, and which I will 
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improvement towards perfection, but that they also, as social beings, aim at the constant self-
improvement towards perfection of their social spheres. 
Now that Fichte has dealt with the issues of the vocation of man, and of the vocation of 
man within society, he is in a position to deal with his central topic in the fourth lecture, and 
thus, Fichte addresses the question: What is the scholar's vocation? His answer to this question 
is found in the following passage. I quote Fichte (1993: 172): 
We have already shown that the purpose of all human knowledge is to see to the 
equal, continuous, and progressive development of human talents. It follows from 
this that the true vocation of the scholarly class is the supreme supervision of the 
actual progress of the human race in general and the unceasing promotion of this 
progress. 
Thus, since the role of the scholarly class within society is to supervise, direct and promote the 
development of human beings' talents, the scholarly class has a pivotal stance within 
humankind's aim at continuous self-improvement towards perfection. lt is the vocation of the 
scholar to foment and to facilitate human progress in the eternal and endless road to perfection. 
Moreover, every scholar must strive to promote and facilitate progress within his own class. 
Thus, according to Fichte, the scholar bears a heavy weight on his shoulders since he must 
promote and facilitate progress within his own class, as all other classes do, but he must also 
supervise, direct and promote progress in the other classes as well. I quote Fichte (1993: 173-
174): 
again mention below). I will come back to this point when I demonstrate Fichte's Spinozism in 
--- -------
The scholar is especially destined for society. More than any other class, his 
class, insofar as he is a scholar, properly exists only through and for society .. .The 
scholar should now actually apply for the benefit of society that knowledge which 
he has acquired for society. He should awaken in men a feeling for their needs 
and should acquaint them with the means for satisfying these needs. This does 
not imply that all men have to be made acquainted with those profound inquiries 
which the scholar himself has to undertake in order to find something certain and 
true. For that would mean he would have to make all men scholars to the same 
extent that he himself is a scholar, and this is neither possible nor appropriate. 
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The last relevant lecture to this thesis is the eleventh lecture. In this lecture Fichte presupposes 
that the search for truth is a human drive, a pure drive, as he calls it. Other kinds of pure drive 
are the practical or ethical drive and the aesthetic drive. These pure drives are to be contrasted to 
the animal drives, or the animal sensuousness as Fichte calls these, e.g. sex and eating-drinking. 
Fichte gives animal drives a lower status to the pure drives, because the pleasure gained through 
the animal drives are self-destructive (and thus must be controlled), and the pleasure gained 
through the pure drives is cumulative. I quote Fichte ( 1993:224 ): 
the kind of pleasure which has its foundation solely in the gratification of animal 
sensuousness spoils and destroys itself through its very gratification and is not the 
these lectures, since I understand that Spinoza's ethical doctrines follow the same pattern. 
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kind of pleasure that we are speaking here. Intellectual or spiritual pleasure such 
as, ... aesthetic pleasure, increases as it is gratified. 
Moreover, each pure drive is supposed to yield a particular imperative. Thus the practical or 
ethical drive yields the categorical imperative or Act in such a way that you always treat all 
human beings not as means but as ends in themselves; and the drive for truth yields the 
imperative. Fichte ( 1993 :225) says: "Judge so that you can consider the manner in which you 
are now judging to be an eternal law for all your judgements. Judge this particular case in a 
manner in which you could rationally wish to judge in every case." Fichte considers the drive 
for truth a pivotal stance in the human's pursuit of self-improvement towards perfection, exactly 
because this drive pushes human beings in a search to truly understand themselves and the world 
around; and the more a human being knows about himself and the world around him, the more 
he can reconcile his sense of freedom with the necessary physical laws around him.20 
20 NB. In the Science of Rights Fichte provide us with a very similar argument to the ones he 
presents in lectures 2 and 11. In the Science of Rights, however, he presents his argument in 
more detail, and it is worthy here to summarise his position there. There, his argument is 
presented in three stages and each stage is argued to a finer detail. In the first stage he argues 
that rights are a necessary condition of self-consciousness because a rational entity cannot posit 
itself without at the same time positing itself as an individual or as one of other rational beings. 
In the second stage he establishes that when I posit myself as rational I also posit myself as a free 
entity and in the same act I also infer other free beings. Freedom is something that is shared by 
all of us, all rational and free entities. The consequence of this is that the conception of rights is 
a necessary relation between free beings. The third and final stage of his argument in the 
Science of Rights is that originally the conception of freedom encompassed only a power, only 
rational spontaneity, and it is only this power that rational entities ascribed to each other. But 
freedom requires more than that; it requires that an outcome of the thinking activity be perceived 
in the external world, i.e. freedom requires that one's will be effective in the world. If all 
rational entities are at work in the same world, and thus interfering, checking, and opposing each 
other, then the latter conception of freedom is only possible if rational beings restrict their 
causality in the world by setting up some limits to their causality, and as such divide the world 
amongst them. This limitation must not be imposed on rational beings, to do so would be to 
cancel their freedom, and not to limit it. Rather, all rational beings must freely posit this 
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Let me sum up Fichte's argument here. Fichte understands that: 
i. human beings aim at perfecting themselves; 
ii. human beings aim at perfecting their societies; 
iii. that the scholar should act as a guide to human beings and society as a whole; 
iv. the human drive to search for truth pushes human beings towards self-improvement and 
perfection. 
Let me now tie Fichte's views with Spinoza's. Spinoza's ethical views have been, by and large, 
neglected by his commentators in the Anglo-American tradition, who tend to focus on his 
metaphysics; and these views have also been neglected by commentators in the Continental 
tradition who have focused their efforts in studying Spinoza's socio-political doctrines. 
Spinoza's ethical views have their foundations in his metaphysical system, which are 
found in parts I to 3 of the Ethics. The central element in this metaphysical system is its 
monism, that is, the theory that only one substance exists and that God or Nature (Deus sive 
Natura) is a substance. Spinoza argues that everything is part of the substance, i.e. the substance 
is the totality of all forms of Being as well as being the highest form of Being. Nature, for 
Spinoza, fits this conception of substance. And since the substance, now Nature, is the very 
cornerstone of his philosophical system, he understands that he must provide a naturalistic 
account of and a foundation for all his philosophical views, from ethics to human psychology. 
limitation, they must make it as a rule not to disturb the freedom of those other entities with 
whom they share a reciprocal relation. Note here that this last point implies that rational beings 
should respect the freedom and rationality of other rational beings- which lead us to the 
categorical imperative. For the purposes of this thesis, Fichte's argument in the "Lectures" will 
suffice. cf. JG Fichte, The Science of Rights, trans. AE Kroeger, London: Trubner & Co., 1889. 
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That is to say, for Spinoza everything has a naturalistic foundation. That said, let us now look at 
Spinoza's ethical views in some detail. Garrett ( 1997:267-314) describes Spinoza's ethical views 
as being a composite of virtue ethics, consequential ism and, to a small extent, deontology - and 
that much of his views on this topic are to be found in parts 4 and 5 of the Ethics, and I have 
already mentioned previously that Fichte's views follow this same pattern. Let me now 
elaborate these claims by demonstrating each of those elements which form Spinoza's and 
Fichte's ethical doctrines. I shall first look at the virtue ethics element of Spinoza's theory. 
Spinoza defines virtue as: 
4D8 - By VIRTUE (virtus) and POWER (potentia) I understand the same thing, 
that is, virtue, in so far as it has reference to man, is his essence or nature in so far 
as he has the power of effecting something which can only be understood by the 
laws of that nature. 
Prima facie, this seems to be a rather peculiar definition of virtue, since virtues have, and 
continue to be, commonly defined as character traits, which are good or useful for an agent to 
have. At a closer inspection, however, one can see that Spinoza's definition is a naturalistic 
development of the common understanding of virtues. Spinoza does not talk about character 
traits, such as the Aristotelian's honesty and courage. To do so, would imply some sort of 
humanism, that is, it would imply a definition of virtue from a human being's perspective of what 
is good or useful in one way or another to human beings or to human communities. Spinoza 
defines virtue as a power. Such an understanding of virtue is now archaic and out of use, as it 
was replaced by the understanding that virtue is a character trait. In this archaic sense a virtue is 
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a power that things have to affect other things, e.g. water has the virtue of dissolving salts or 
water has the power to dissolve salts. By defining virtue as a power, Spinoza is able to give a 
'bird's eye' perspective on the matter. That is, Spinoza is providing a definition from Nature's 
perspective (i.e. from the substance's perspective). Thus, insofar as human beings are concerned, 
from Nature's perspective, virtue is a power that human beings possess to bring about certain 
things that conform with the very nature or essence of human beings, e.g. it is part of the essence 
of human beings that human beings are rational beings, so to make a rational decision is a virtue, 
it is a power that human beings possess. 
Spinoza's understanding that virtue 1s a power 1s directly connected to his thesis of 
conatus. Spinoza defines conatus as: 
3P7 - The endeavour (conatus) wherewith a thing endeavours to persist 111 its 
being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing. 
Spinoza is asserting here is that the very essence of everything, the identity of everything, is 
dependent on its self-preservation. Everything aims to endure for as long as it possibly can, and 
will strive towards this self-preservation goal - self-preservation is the summum bonum for 
Spinoza. Moreover, Spinoza understands that everything aims to increase its power of self-
preservation in order to be able to face other things in the world and make the achievement of its 
goal easier, i.e. to endure for as long as it can. Now, let us link these two afore-mentioned quotes 
together. I 08 says that virtue is a power to bring about certain things according to human 
beings' essence and 3P7 says that everything aims to endure for as long as it can, it is part of a 
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thing's essence to strive for self-preservation. lt follows from these that virtue is a power to 
strive in self-preservation. The following passage corroborates this: 
4P20 - The more each one seeks what is useful to him, that is, the more he 
endeavours and can preserve his being, the more he is endowed with virtue; and, 
on the contrary, the more one neglects to preserve what is useful, or his being, he 
is thus far impotent or powerless. 
The question here is thus how does one increase one's powers and increases one's chances of 
endeavouring for as long as one possibly could? The answer to this question lies in the 
following passages: 
4P24 - To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing else in us than to act under 
the guidance of reason, to live so, and to preserve one's being (these three have 
the same meaning) on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself 
4P28 - The greatest good of the mind is the knowledge of God (or Nature), and 
the greatest virtue of the mind is to know God (or Nature). [my brackets] 
Thus for Spinoza 'to act virtuously' and 'to act following reason' are one and the same thing. 
When one acts virtuously one is acting by the guide of one's reason; and it is by acting in such a 
manner that one can increase one's chances of enduring for as long as one possibly can. 
Moreover, 4P28 also demonstrates that Spinoza understands that knowledge is the origin of the 
--------
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summum bonum, i.e. self-preservation. I mean, Spinoza holds the view that self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the world around us increase one's chances, one's power, of self-preservation. This 
claim makes a lot of sense if one understands that the more one knows about one's powers, 
strengths, weaknesses, limits, as well as about the environment in which one lives, the more one 
increases one's chances of self-preservation. Such a claim is difficult to dispute if one takes the 
naturalistic approach taken by Spinoza. Noteworthy here is that knowledge here needs some 
qualifying. That is, Spinoza does not mean just any knowledge, as some knowledge may be 
unfounded or based on inadequate ideas, i.e. the kind of knowledge given to us through sense-
perception, and as such, this kind of knowledge does not provide the individual with Spinoza's 
conception ofnecessary freedom. I quote Scruton (1998:39-40) who describes this well: 
The one who lives by the dictates of reason is the 'free man' - the person who is 
active rather than passive in all that involves him. The illusory idea of free will 
stems from inadequate and confused perceptions; rightly understood, however, 
freedom is not the release from necessity but the consciousness of necessity that 
comes when we see the world sub specie aeternitatis and ourselves as bound by 
its immutable laws. 
Spinoza prioritises that kind of knowledge that is attained through reasoning, i.e. the second and 
third kind of knowledge or reason and intuition (vide supra p. 11 0), and he does consider these 
kinds of knowledge as instrumental in the pursuit of self-preservation. These kinds of 
knowledge are solely formed by adequate ideas, and thus, they can guarantee their truth and 
enable one to comprehend oneself and the world around oneself. Also noteworthy here is that 
167 
the third kind of knowledge in particular is held to be supreme by Spinoza, as it provides a clear 
and direct relation ofthe parts to the whole, between the individual and the rest ofthe world; this 
kind of knowledge, Spinoza understands, is attained only by the few who philosophise correctly 
because, as Yovel ( 1989:vol.l: 168) notes: 
It is the third kind of knowledge, a rational-intuitive procedure bound by no 
historical cult, revelation, election, covenant, and the like, that philosophers are 
eventually supposed to attain what the great mystics and religious aspirants have 
always been seeking and inevitably failed to find, because they relied on 
superstitious beliefs and practices. As in their conception of God, they were 
aiming at something true and real but missing the actual reference of their 
concepts. 
Here one can see that Spinoza favours attaining knowledge through philosophy as a 
philosophical enquiry is directly connected with the third kind of knowledge. By holding such a 
view, Spinoza places philosophers in a privileged position, since only philosophers have a proper 
and correct understanding of the answers to those questions which greatly trouble humankind. 
At this point, one can see that Fichte's and Spinoza's views are very akin. Both 
philosophers maintain that there is a summum bonum (i.e. a summum bonum which is self-
preservation that is achieved through knowledge in the case of Spinoza and self-perfection which 
is attained through knowledge in the case of Fichte), and that the virtuous agent is the agent who 
follows his reason in attaining self-knowledge and knowledge of the world in his pursuit of the 
summum bonum, i.e. wisdom could be said to be the chief virtue. What Spinoza and Fichte are 
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asking us to do is: know thyself and know the world around you. Know your nature and know 
Nature as a whole. This view emanates from the old Stoic tradition. This tradition understands 
that one must know oneself and the world around oneself well, that one must reflect on one's 
own nature, that one must reflect on one's place in the world, and that one must reflect on the 
very nature of the world, and that such knowledge provides the agent with an effective guide to 
proper acting. I understand that this aspect of Spinoza's and Fichte's falls within the Stoic 
tradition, and as such it could be said that they are providing us with a philosophy for life, a 
practical philosophy for living, which has its foundations in knowledge and contemplation, but 
which also provides the agent with an effective guidance for proper acting. Schofield 
(2003:244-245) in writing about Stoic ethics notes an interesting point that is related to what I 
have just commented on and which is transferable to Spinoza's and Fichte's position. I quote: 
... it will not do simply to refer to human nature, or at any rate to human nature 
understood in too limited a fashion. For although ordinarily the appropriate thing 
will be to look after one's health and one's possessions and so, in some 
circumstances it will not be. If the alternative to military service with a tyrant in 
an unjust cause is self-mutilation, or if the alternative to letting the boat capsize is 
throwing the cargo overboard, in these cases reason will enjoin self-mutilation 
and the jettisoning of one's possessions as the appropriate behaviour. What 
prompts these actions is not natural human impulse at all but experience of the 
course of natural events; that is, of nature at large, as we might say. In these 
cases, reasonable people act contrary to natural impulse on the experiential 
knowledge that waterlogged vessels overburdened with cargo usually capsize, and 
that persons with mutilated limbs are mostly unfit for military service ... On this 
view it is not merely that we have to respond to the way things happen in nature at 
large if we are to act rationally and do the right thing. Stoicism offers a deep 
explanation for why this should be so; we achieve our true identity only when we 
function as parts of a whole - that is, of the providentially ordered universe ... we 
are programmed to live consistently with the nature of the universe, not just 
human nature. 
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Thus, following from Schofield's comments on Stoic ethics, it becomes quite clear that both 
Spinoza and Fichte fall within this philosophical tradition, since both philosophers advocate that 
we should know ourselves and the world around us. That is, we should know our nature or 
essence, we should also know the place that this nature or essence has in the order of things or 
within the whole of reality, and we should know the nature of reality itself. Such knowledge 
provides us with a guiding hand for acting because such knowledge enables us to act and to 
accept the constraints of our own nature within the natural order of things. Such knowledge 
enables us to pursue the summum bonum more effectively because our efforts will not go to 
waste in misconceived and misadvised challenges, efforts and ventures. For instance, just to take 
a previously used example, if I know that it is not part of the human nature the capacity for 
physical flight, then I shall not pursue such a venture. I can however study birds and insects that 
possess this capacity in an attempt to understand their nature, and in doing so I can envisage 
ways of mimicking their nature, in doing so I can design devices that would enable me to fly. 
More interesting here is the fact that the Stoics, Spinoza and Fichte, appear to be advocating that 
we should act within the constraints of our own nature, within the constraints of the place that 
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our own nature has within the natural order of things, and within the constraints of reality. They 
do not appear to be advocating that we should effectively try to change these constraints. 
Rather, they appear to be advocating for a more holistic and harmonious standing as they seem to 
be advocating for an understanding of our nature, of our nature's place within reality and of the 
nature of the world and that we should act the best we possibly can within those necessary 
constraints which are imposed on us by our nature, by the place of our nature within the natural 
order of things and by the nature of the world. 
There are however further similarities between Stoicism and Spinoza's and Fichte's 
ethical views. On commenting on Spinoza's ethical views James ( 1995:300) has noted an 
interesting point regarding a particular Stoic aspect of Spinoza's ethics. She argues that Spinoza 
shares with the Stoics the view that there is a difference between the virtuous agent and the 
morally experienced agent. I understand that James' point is transferable to Fichte's position. 
quote from her paper "Spinoza the Stoic": 
It is, I think, clear that Spinoza shares with his Stoic forerunners the fundamental 
belief that a distinction must be made between virtue and what one might call 
'moral conscientiousness'. A morally conscientious man will pursue such ends as 
friendship and security because he knows from experience and education that 
these are likely to yield and increase in Laeiticia. Spinoza would regard such a 
man as having made a good deal of moral progress, and in this his attitude is the 
same as that of stoics towards someone who fulfils their proper function. But 
Spinoza nevertheless insists that the morally conscientious man has not attained 
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virtue, because he has not realised that in order to lead a moral life one must 
pursue only what is good in itself- understanding 
The virtuous agent for Spinoza, is the agent that naturally pursues knowledge so that he can 
achieve self-preservation. The agent that pursues knowledge because experience has taught him 
that knowledge will be helpful in his pursuit of self-preservation is an agent who has achieved 
some moral progress. This is an agent that, by and large, is on the right path. But, this is not an 
agent that ought to be equated with the virtuous agent. There is a distinction between the 
virtuous agent and the experienced agent. The former acts because he understands, because he 
has reflected on it; the latter acts merely through experience. 21 Fichte's position is very similar. 
Fichte understands that the virtuous agent will pursue knowledge whilst trying to perfect himself. 
But Fichte would also draw a distinction between the virtuous agent and those agents who pursue 
knowledge because experience has taught them that knowledge is overall useful in life. For 
Fichte the virtuous agent understands that attaining knowledge is the way to self-perfecting 
oneself and one's society. The experienced agent, for Fichte, realises that knowledge is useful, 
but he does not understand the greater picture. Therefore, both philosophers hold that there is a 
distinction between the virtuous and the experienced agent. Since Fichte shares much the same 
views as Spinoza here, it could be said that Fichte also falls in that Stoic philosophical tradition 
because he distinguishes the virtuous agents from the experienced agent. 
Let us now go back to Spinoza's ethical views. Thus far it would appear to the reader that 
Spinoza is putting forward some sort of Ethical Egoism theory. That is, since the agent aims at 
21 NB. John McDowell has recently put forward a very similar sort of proposition by arguing 
that in the case of the virtuous agent there is no inner strunggle. cf. John McDowell, "Vi11ue and 
Reason", in Virtue Ethics, Crisp, R., and Slate, M., Oxford: Claredon Press, 1996, pp. 141-162. 
172 
extending his existence for as long as he possibly could through the use of knowledge, and he 
does everything taking into account only the possible good consequences to himself, and 
disregarding any possible consequences to other agents, then Spinoza's agent is an ethical egoist. 
In such a view, an agent would tally the good and bad consequences and then take the action 
which would increase the good consequences over the bad ones to himself. It seems that 
Spinoza holds this view since he says that everything, every individual, wants to preserve itself 
for as long as it can and it will do anything to continue to exist. Thus, here one sees another 
feature of Spinoza's ethical views, namely, consequentialism, i.e. the good has to be maximised. 
Two questions arise here. First: how does Spinoza reconcile the virtue ethics element with the 
consequentialist element of his Philosophy? The answer to this question rests on Spinoza's 
understanding of virtues. Virtue or power or knowledge is just instrumental for Spinoza, that is, 
virtue is the means by which one achieves self-preservation, it is the means by which one 
maximises the good. This understanding of virtue as being instrumental is very similar to 
Fichte's understanding, since Fichte understands that knowledge is what enables one's pursuit of 
perfection. That is, wisdom as a virtue is the very enabling force that maximises the summum 
bonum, it is the instrument through which the summum bonum is reached. 22 The second 
question is directly related to Spinoza's ethical egoism thesis. How can we reconcile Spinoza's 
22 NB Jonathan Barnes ( 1976: 19-26) suggests that virtue ethics, as Aristotle presents it in the 
Nichomachean Ethics may be a meta-ethical theory, i.e a theory of what is important in ethics, 
rather than an ethical theory, i.e. a theory which aims at guiding action. It is my understanding 
that Spinoza and Fichte may have viewed "virtue ethics" in such a way. That is, virtue ethics as 
an agent centred theory, a theory in which one is always concerned in judging the agent's 
character, may provide the basic element, the foundations in which an ethical theory may be built 
upon. Thus, for Spinoza and Fichte, the good agent is the agent who pursues knowledge, the 
good agent is the agent whose character craves self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. 
Then the good agent must apply this knowledge in moral action. Jonathan Barnes, 
"Introduction", in Aristotle, Ethics, trans. JAK Thompson, London: Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 
19-26. 
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ethical egoism with Fichte's approach where the individual has an important and central role in 
helping his community to develop and perfect itself? The divergence between Fichte and 
Spinoza regarding this point is merely apparent, as I shall demonstrate below. The following 
passage is crucial in clarifying Spinoza's views here: 
4P37- The good which each one who follows virtue (reason) desires for himself, 
he also desires for other men, and the more so the more knowledge he has of God 
(Nature). [my brackets] 
Thus, prima facie, Spinoza is an ethical egoist, as I mentioned above. However, when one looks 
into the details of his philosophical system one finds a more complex scenario. That is, human 
beings are primarily egoists since each individual human being wants to preserve his own life for 
as long as he possibly could (and to do so he must consider the consequences of every action to 
himself). But in doing so, human beings realise that all other human beings are pursuing the 
same goal and in the same manner. This very fact demonstrates that the best thing for a human 
being to do is to team up with other human beings. To do otherwise would result in wars, 
violence and disputes, which would threaten, and not-enhance, one's existence. It would be 
counter productive to act in a negative manner. By working as a group, human beings are able to 
help each other to endure for as long as they possibly could; by taking a positive approach one 
enhances one's chances of continuing to exist. Therefore, Spinoza's individualism leads him to a 
communitarianism. The following passages of Spinoza corroborate my views: 
4P31 -In so far as anything agrees with our nature, thus far it is necessarily good. 
-------- --- -
4P35 - In so far as men live under the guidance of reason, thus far only they 
always necessarily agree in nature. 
4P36 - The greatest good of those who follow virtue (reason) is common to all, 
and all can equally enjoy it. [my brackets] 
4P37 - The good which each one who follows virtue (reason) desires for himself, 
he also desires for other men, and the more so the more knowledge he has of God 
(Nature). [my brackets] 
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These four propositions are concerned with the relations between human beings and the 
conditions for a mutually beneficial and sustained intercourse in community life. Garrett 
(1997:277) explains these passages well when he says: 
Spinoza holds, as a general metaphysical thesis, that whenever two things "agree 
in nature" they will, to that extent, be mutually beneficial, since the nature that 
each strives to benefit is the same (E4P3 1). Human beings necessarily ''agree in 
nature" to the extent that they are guided by reason (E4P35). For human reason, 
as reason, is the same in all, and it aims at the same thing- namely, knowledge or 
understanding. Understanding, moreover, is a good that can be shared by all 
without diminishing anyone's enjoyment of it (E4P36). In fact, Spinoza holds, 
nothing is more useful to a human being than another human being who is guided 
by reason (E4P35c I). Hence, individuals who are virtuous, or guided by reason, 
will all seek, from their own self-interest, the same goods for others that they seek 
for themselves (E4P37). Indeed to the extent that a community of human beings 
is guided by reason, its members can "compose, as it were, one Mind and one 
Body" (E4P I Ss) -that is, a complex individual, composed of like-minded human 
beings, that has its own endeavour of self-preservation. 
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Thus, according to Spinoza, it is in a human being's interest to associate himself with other 
human beings, since they are all pursuing the same goal, that is, they are all pursuing self-
knowledge and knowledge of the world around themselves in their attempt to live for as long as 
they possibly can - here one can see Spinoza's communitarianism, i.e. it is in the human beings' 
interest to live in a community, and egalitarianism, i.e. all human beings are equal insofar as they 
are guided by reason, insofar as they have the same nature. Fichte's position is very similar. As 
I mentioned previously, Fichte understands that each human being is on an endless pursuit of 
self-improvement and towards perfection. Such a fact requires that human beings live in society, 
because it is only within society that knowledge can be stored, shared, analysed and improved. 
Therefore, the individualist premise of Fichte's system also leads his system to a communitarian 
outlook, since he understands that human beings are naturally social beings, i.e. it is only within 
society that human beings can pursue the summum bonum. Fichte is also an egalitarian, since he 
also understands that all human beings insofar as they are rational beings are equal to each other. 
At the beginning of this section I asserted that Spinoza's and Fichte ethical views 
encompassed elements of virtue ethics, consequentialism, and to a lesser extend, deontology. 
Thus far, I have dealt with the virtue ethics and consequentialist elements of their theories. It is 
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appropriate for me now to deal with the deontological aspect of their theories. It is my 
understanding that there is also a small deontological element in these philosopher's theories as 
both Fichte and Spinoza hold that some actions are right or wrong per se. In the case of Fichte 
this element manifests itself as the categorical imperative, as I noted above, in my account ofthe 
last lecture of the "Morality for Scholars" lectures. Thus, for Fichte reason (through the use of 
the principle of universability of actions and through the principle of treating human beings as 
ends in themselves) will determine which actions are right and which are wrong, and thus, which 
actions must be performed and which must not. In the case of Spinoza this is not as clear-cut as 
in the case of Fichte, since Spinoza does not make "use of such concepts as 'duty', 'obligation', 
and 'right"'. However "his description of reason as providing 'counsels', 'rules', 'precepts' and 
'dictates' may be seen as also aligning him to some extent with the deontological approach to 
ethics", as noted by Garrett (I 997:3 I 3). The following passage from the Ethics corroborates 
this: 
In these few propositions ( 4P I 0-18) I have explained the causes of human 
impotence and inconstancy, and why men do not follow the precepts of reason. It 
remains ... that I should show what is that which reason prescribes for us ... firstly, 
that the basis of virtue is to preserve one's being ... secondly, that virtue should be 
desired by us on its own account, and that there is nothing more excellent or 
useful to us ... thirdly, that those who commit suicide are powerless souls, and 
allow themselves to be conquered by external causes repugnant to their nature. 
(4P 18 note) [my brackets and emphasis] 
----- ---------
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This passage shows Spinoza demonstrating that under the guidance of reason one could only 
attempt to pursue knowledge because knowledge is the origin of se I [-preservation as well as 
being instrumental in self-preservation. Reason prescribes, or provides the guidance, to achieve 
self-preservation. By referring to the case of suicide, Spinoza, provides us with an example of a 
case in which human beings fail to act rationally, a case in which human beings fail to act in 
accord with their own rational nature. To commit suicide is to fall prey to external forces. 
External forces which undermine one's nature. According to Spinoza, only one who fails to 
pursue knowledge of oneself and of the world around oneself, only one who fails to understand 
one's own nature, one's own situation in the world, and the world itself can fall prey to these 
external forces. Being a rational being, acting rationally, and following the guidance and 
precepts that reason gives us, is what enables us, human beings, to attain knowledge in our 
pursuit of self-preservation, and achieve it. 
Therefore, Spinoza's and Fichte's ethical theories can be said to encompass elements of 
virtue ethics, consequentialism and deontology. Virtue is important for both philosophers, virtue 
is instrumental for both philosophers, virtue is what enables the agent to maximise the summum 
bonum, and reason provides guidance for which actions are right and which are wrong. Both 
philosophers also understand that the individual must exist within a community if he is to 
achieve some sort of fulfilment. The individual is not prior to the community, and the 
community is not prior to the individual. Individual and community are interdependent. Also 
interesting regarding the ethical views of both philosophers is the fact that they both fall within 
many aspects of the Stoic tradition, as I have demonstrated above. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this part of my thesis I set out to investigate Fichte's Spinozism. 1 proposed to do three things. 
I proposed to investigate the importance of Fichte's Spinozism for a proper understanding of his 
philosophical system. I also proposed to demonstrate that Fichte searched in Spinoza for 
answers whilst trying to resolve the problems of the Kantian system. Finally, I proposed to 
demonstrate the similarities between Fichte's and Spinoza's philosophical systems. 
In the various subsections of this chapter I have demonstrated that Fichte's and Spinoza's 
philosophical systems are very similar. Their ethical views, their standing over the issue of 
determinism, their understanding that knowledge leads to freedom, their treatment of religion 
and theology, all these issues demonstrate the similarity between Fichte's and Spinoza's 
philosophy. 
I have also demonstrated that Fichte searched in Spinoza for answers to the problems of 
the Critical Philosophy of Kant. Fichte's Absolute I as the foundation of Fichte's system is an 
instance of this. Fichte's Absolute I could be equated with Spinoza's substance at least insofar as 
this concept is a first principle. That is, the Absolute I is the foundational principle of Fichte's 
system, it is the very concept that unifies it, and as such, it attempts to solve the Jack of 
unification of Kant's philosophical system, which was plagued by dichotomies. Another 
instance that could be mentioned here regarding Fichte's trying to solve the problems of the 
Kantian philosophy concerns Fichte's views on the human being. Kant had split human beings in 
two halves. One half wills, the other half feels. Fichte merged these two halves back together in 
much the same way as Spinoza had done previously. 
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Finally, at various points in this chapter I had touched upon the issue of the importance of 
Fichte's Spinozism for a proper understanding of his philosophical system. By having a more 
holistic approach to Fichte's philosophy, by understanding the age when Fichte was writing and 
the problems faced by academia at the time, by understanding what Fichte was trying to do and 
answer, by understanding where he searched for answers, the reader can achieve a better 
understanding of his philosophical views. This is an extremely important issue, and it is often 
forgotten in the study of the History of Philosophy within the Anglo-American tradition, where 
particular philosophical systems are not unusually taught as independent of, or with very few 
references to, its historical context. I have now finished my investigation on Fichte and I shall 
now move on and enquire into Schelling's Spinozism. 
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PART Ill 
SCHELLING AND SPINOZA 
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SCHELLING 
In this chapter I shall investigate Schelling's Spinozism. Various commentators such as Bowie 
(1993, 2003), Copleston (1963), Esposito (1977), White (1983), Lawrence (2003), Hegel (1995), 
and Beiser (2002) have acknowledged the fact that Schelling was influenced by Spinoza's 
philosophical views. It is worth mentioning here that just as it had previously occurred with 
Fichte's Spinozism, Schelling's Spinozism has been acknowledged but not researched in detail. 
Commentators on Schelling acknowledge that he was influenced by Spinoza's views, but they 
neither investigate the extent of this influence in detail nor do they give much weight to the 
implications of Spinoza's influence on Schelling for a proper understanding of Schelling's 
philosophy. Thus, in this chapter I propose to do three things. Firstly, I propose to investigate 
the importance of Schelling's Spinozism for a proper understanding of his philosophy. Secondly, 
I shall demonstrate Schelling's aims in devising his philosophical system. That is, I shall 
demonstrate that Schelling became dissatisfied with Fichte's attempt to solve the problems of the 
Critical Philosophy of Kant, and that he searched in Spinoza for answers to those problems, just 
as Fichte had done previously. And lastly, I shall demonstrate the various similarities between 
Schelling's and Spinoza's philosophical views. 
SCHELLING, KANT, FICHTE, AND SPINOZA 
The first point to be established in this chapter concerns my claim that Schelling subscribed to 
certain aspects of Spinoza's thought. In order to establish this let us look at what commentators, 
and Schelling himself, say about the influences in Schelling's works. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
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Von Schelling (1775-1854), German Philosopher, is the second of the great Post-Kantian 
Idealists, and a friend and disciple of Fichte. It has been acknowledged by virtually all of 
Schelling's commentators that his great influences are: Kant (via Fichte), Fichte and Spinoza (cf. 
for instance Richards (2002: 145). The young Schelling was a theology student at the University 
ofTiibingen where he befriended figures such as Hegel, Holderlin, Schlegel and Navalis. Later 
in life Schelling moved to Berlin where his lectures were initially attended by prominent 
academic figures such as Kierkegaard, Engels, Bakunin, and von Humboldt, but soon these 
lectures became largely ignored by the leading thinkers of his day probably due to Schelling's 
later and somewhat erratic philosophical development. Around the time when Schelling was still 
at Tiibingen he became very influenced by Fichte's views, a fact which is made clear in the title 
of a work published in I 795, On the I as a Principle of Philosophy. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this work aimed at explaining Fichte's views in the Wissenschaftslehre project. 
Interesting to note also that in the same year, Schelling published another work entitled 
Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. The term dogmatism in the title refers to 
Spinoza's materialism, and the term criticism to Fichte's idealism. Thus, even at this early stage 
of Schelling's philosophical development one can see Schelling's interest in both Fichte's and 
Spinoza's philosophy. 
Copleston ( 1963:94) sheds more light on this issue when he says that "though Fichte's 
thought formed a point of departure for his reflections, Schelling very soon showed the 
independence of his mind. In particular, he was dissatisfied with Fichte's view of Nature as 
being simply an instrument for moral action". Thus, one could say that Schelling was indeed 
very much influenced by Fichte's views, the publication of the On the I as a Principle of 
Philosophy is irrefutable evidence of this fact. For Schelling, however, Fichte represented a 
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point of departure, just as Kant had represented a point of departure for Fichte. Through 
studying and commenting on Fichte's thought, Schelling understood that Kant's Critical 
Philosophy was heading in the right direction, Fichte himself had already given the first steps in 
solving some of its inherent problems, but there were still unanswered questions and unresolved 
problems left. As such Schelling decided to drink from the same source that Fichte had already 
done, that is, Schelling sought the solution to these unanswered questions and unsolved problems 
in Spinoza's philosophy. It is worth referring to a letter Schelling wrote to Hegel on the 4th of 
February 1795, the same year when he published On the I as a Principle of Philosophy and the 
Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, where he explicitly states in a letter to Hegel 
that "I have become a Spinozist/". 23 And two years later, in 1797, with the publication of the 
23 FJW V on Schelling, Letter dated 4th February 1795 to Hegel, quote by Hans Michael 
Baumgartner in "The Unconditioned in Knowing", in The Emergence of German Idealism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 244; (cf also Briefe von und an Hegel, Vol 4, 
ed. J Hoffmeister, Hamburg: 1969, 1.22). NB. This quote needs qualifying here so to avoid 
misquoting. Schelling says in the letter to Hegel: "In the meanwhile, I have become a Spinozist 
-Don't be amazed: you are about to hear in what way. For Spinoza, the world (the object pure 
and simple, as opposed to the subject) was all; for me, it is the I. It seems to me that the real 
difference between critical philosophy and dogmatic philosophy lies in the fact that the critical 
philosophy begins with the absolute I (the I which is as yet unconditioned by any object), and 
dogmatic philosophy begins with the absolute object, or the not-!. The ultimate consequence of 
the latter is Spinoza 's system; of the former, the Kantian system. Philosophy must begin with the 
unconditioned. Now the question is where this unconditioned lies: in the I or in the not-!. When 
this question is decided, everything is decided. For me, the supreme principle of all philosophy 
is the pure, absolute!.. .. The absolute I comprises an infinite sphere of absolute being; within this 
sphere, finite spheres take shape, which arise through the restriction ofthe absolute sphere ... ". 
It is clear from this letter that at this particular early stage of Schelling's philosophical 
development Schelling's subscribing to Spinozism is to be understood as that Schelling agreed 
with Spinoza that philosophy requires a first principle, an absolute, which serves as the most 
basic and simple principle out of which all philosophy must be derived. Schelling, however, at 
this early stage of his career, disagrees with Spinoza about the nature of the absolute, which 
Schelling deems to be an I and Spinoza the world. Such an understanding of the absolute, I 
understand, still places Schelling under the influence of Fichte, and Fichte's thesis of the 
Absolute I. That said, Richards (2002: 176) notes that a few years later Schelling's understanding 
of the absolute changed dramatically. Richards (2002: 176) writes: "Schelling eJ..pressed it in 
January I 80 I, casting a mirror image of his earlier position: There is an idealism of nature and 
-------
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Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature Schelling unashamedly pays tribute to Spinoza's thought, states 
that Spinoza's though had not been fully understood previously, and that it had now been 
revived. I quote Schelling ( 1988:53-54): 
Spinoza has lain unrecognized for over a hundred years (I presume Schelling 
means here that Spinoza's though had been dormant and that it had now been 
revived through the pantheism controversy). The view of his philosophy as a 
mere theory of objectivity did not allow the true absolute to be perceived in it 
(Schelling refers here to the classical reading of Spinoza as a materialist and 
atheist). The definiteness with which he recognized subject-object as the 
necessary and eternal character of absoluteness shows the high destiny implicit in 
his philosophy, whose full development was reserved for a later age (1 presume 
Schelling means here his own age). [my brackets] 
Thus, as I mentioned above, it is fair to say that even at the time of Schelling's early 
philosophical development Fichte represented for Schelling a departure point and Spinoza 
provided the answers Schelling so much sought in trying to solve the problems faced by the 
Fichtean philosophy. The following passage of Bowie (2003:74) corroborates my views here: 
"Se he !ling's philosophy in the 1790s wavers between an attachment to Fichte and to Spinoza ". 
an idealism of the ego. The former is for me the original, the latter derived" (The Romantic 
Conception of Life, Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). I understand that 
this passage of Richards confirms that later Schelling changed his mind and held that the 
absolute is an indentity of thought and extension in nature, and that the form of idealism which 
had been previously advocated by philosophers such as Kant is a derivation or a particularisation 
of that earlier form of idealism. That is, without an idealism of nature, there would not be 
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That is, to paraphrase Bowie here, Schelling wavers between defending the critical philosophy of 
Kant as already developed by Fichte and Spinoza's philosophy and the answers it provided to the 
problems faced by Fichte's system. 
A related issue that concerns us at this stage is the development of Schelling's 
philosophical views. Commentators have usually divided Schelling's philosophy into three 
distinct stages. The early stage of Schelling's philosophy can be referred to as his critical 
philosophy stage. Schelling soon became dissatisfied with it because he understood it 
represented only 'half-of-the-picture'. The critical philosophy only tries to account for the 
subject-object relation. That is, it only tries to explain how subjective entities experience and 
gain knowledge of objects in reality. Moreover, the critical philosophy turns reality, and nature, 
into a mechanical environment, just there, for the use and experiencing of subjective entities. 
The critical philosophy does not explain how, we, human beings, as part and parcel of nature, 
come to be; it does not explain how the subjective comes to be out of the objective. As such, 
Schelling thought that the critical philosophy had not explained 'the absolute' in a satisfactory 
manner. Schelling understood that the "absolute", that concept, that foundation to philosophy 
had not been fully or correctly explained by Fichte. Schelling understood that Fichte's system 
had failed to solve this problem as it had not explained the whole story, that is, Fichte's system 
still referred to nature as just there for human use and experiencing, and it did not understand 
human beings as being part and parcel of nature. Fichte had not broken away from this aspect of 
the Kantian philosophy. Schelling's unhappiness with the critical philosophy prompts him into 
his second philosophical phase, it prompts him to write his Naturphilosophie. The 
Naturphilosophie attempts to answer those questions left unanswered by the critical philosophy, 
possible an idealism of the ego. I shall explain this further in the main body of the text as the 
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it attempts to provide the other "half-of-the-picture". This new project brought fame to Schelling 
and influenced many romantics, such as Goethe. Whilst reading the writings which are part of 
this second phase of Schelling's philosophical development one cannot help but associate his 
ideas there with Spinoza's philosophical views. In his third and last phase Schelling was 
concerned with merging both philosophies together. He was concerned with merging the critical 
philosophy and the Naturphilosophie. He was concerned with explaining the subject-object 
relation as well as the object-subject relation. He was after the ultimate absolute, the ultimate 
foundation of all reality, and this fact pushed Schelling further towards Spinozism. The 
following passage of Bowie ( 1993 :77) corroborates this as he writes that "in the philosophy 
Schelling writes between 1801 and circa 1807, which is referred to as the 'identity philosophy', 
he moves more in the direction of Spinoza than of Fichte". In this thesis I shall focus on the 
second and third phase of Schelling's philosophy, since Schelling's Spinozism is more prominent 
in these stages of Schelling's philosophical development. Let me now demonstrate my strategy 
in dealing with Schelling's Spinozism in this chapter. 
SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY USED IN 
DEALING WITH SCHELLING'S SPINOZISM 
It is commonly agreed by Schelling's commentators that his philosophical development is 
somehow erratic. Most commentators, such as Esposito ( 1977), White ( \983) and Snow (1996) 
agree that Schelling's philosophical development can be described into three phases: the Fichtean 
phase - which includes his early essay On the I as a Principle of Philosophy or on the 
chapter progresses. 
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Unconditioned in Human Knowledge (1795); the Spinozist phase- which includes all writings in 
the Naturphilosophie project; and the later Schelling - which includes the Philosophy of 
Mythology and Philosophy of Revelation, which were published in 1854, and which is 
considered by commentators a more theological and less philosophical phase of Schelling, 
despite Schelling claiming otherwise. However, Norman (2004) identifies four phases in 
Schelling's philosophical development and as such I have decided to follow her views here for 
the sake of being more precise. According to Norman (2004) the first phase of Schelling's 
development is his Fichtean phase and it includes the On the I ( 1795). His second phase is his 
Spinozist phase and it includes all the writings in the Naturphilosophie project, such as the Ideas 
for a Philosophy of Nature ( 1797, 1803) and On the World Soul ( 1798). The third phase begins 
when Schelling start turning his attention to the inplication of his Naturphilosophie project for 
God and for human freedom and it includes the On Human Freedom ( 1809) and the Ages of the 
World (1811, 1813, and 1815). This phase represents a departure from his views that ideal and 
real have a symmetrical relation, and thus it is a departure from Spinozism; and it is where 
Schelling started to theorise that reality requires a ground- the real. The last phase of Schelling's 
development encompasses all the writings of his late career and it includes his Philosophy of 
Mythology and Philosophy of Revelation ( 1854) and which are meant to provide experiential 
instances describing the metaphysical speculations of his earlier thought; and as I mentioned 
before this last phase of Schelling's development is commonly regarded as more theological than 
philosophical by commentators despite the fact that Schelling claimed otherwise. I wish here to 
draw the reader's attention to the fact that I shall concentrate my efforts in dealing with the 
writings of Schelling's second phase since this is agreed to be Schelling's Spinozist phase, but I 
shall refer to writings in his later phase when appropriate. 
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My strategy in dealing with Schelling's Spinozism will be similar to my strategy in 
dealing with Fichte's Spinozism. That is, I shall divide this chapter into thematic subsections 
dealing with topics such as the similarities between Schelling's and Spinoza's metaphysical 
systems, I shall consider if Schelling and Spinoza were advocating pantheism and or hylozoism, 
and I shall enquire into the ethical implications of Schelling's and Spinoza's metaphysical views 
in a chapter on Deep Ecology. 
Another important issue here concerns my choice of commentators on Schelling. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Fichte's philosophy has recently been revived, gaining even a 
fashionable status, due to the publication of a number of articles and books by commentators 
such as Henrich, Breazeale, Pippin and Zoller. Unfortunately, the same has not yet happened 
with Schelling's philosophy. Very few articles and books have been published on Schelling 
recently in English or by English speaking commentators, and thus, I must rely mainly on old 
commentators, and the few English translations of German commentators' papers on Schelling, 
for an understanding and account of Schelling's philosophy. Hopefully, this situation of a lack of 
literature on Schelling will change in the near future as I understand that Schelling's philosophy 
offers us the proper and natural progression from the Kantian and Fichtean philosophy and into 
Hegel's philosophical views. 
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CHAPTER 7: FROM KANT TO FICHTE TO SCHELLING: SPINOZA'S 
CONTRIBUTION TO ABSOLUTE IDEALISM 
SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND SPINOZA'S SUBSTANCE 
The first aspect of Schelling's philosophy which strikes me as being related to his debt to 
Spinoza's views concerns Schelling's views on nature, and as such, I shall deal with this issue 
first. Schelling's Philosophy of Nature project, his Naturphilosophie project, was born out of his 
dissatisfaction concerning certain aspects ofthe Kantian philosophy, and it was also a reaction to 
Fichte's attempt to resolve the problems posed by this same aspect. The first aspect of the 
Kantian philosophy that Schelling found so problematic concerned the Kantian understanding of 
nature. That is, in the Critical Philosophy of Kant nature plays a particular and secondary role to 
human beings, or better said, nature's role is relative to the role that human beings play within 
the Critical Philosophy. It is worth briefly reminding the reader of Kant's views on nature here. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant understands nature as that which is subject to 
necessary laws, whilst human beings are not subjected to these necessary laws; rather, human 
beings are free rational beings. Human beings, however, are able to gain access to these 
necessary laws, Kant understands, because human cognition relies on the fact that there are 
certain forms of thought, i.e. those categories which are integral to the human understanding, 
which structure what is given to human intuition, i.e. those sense perceptions which are given to 
the human understanding through human sensibility. For instance, I am able to infer that event A 
has been caused by event B because the categ01y of causation that is present in my 
understanding decodes the association between these two events which are being presented to me 
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through my sensibility. In other words, one of the points that Kant is trying to make in the First 
Critique, a point that serves as a reply to Hume's scepticism and his argument on causality, is that 
we should not direct our attention to making claims about nature itself, we should rather focus on 
what could be said with certitude about the way we attain knowledge and our knowledge of 
nature as it is presented to us. Bowie (1993 :31) corroborates this when he says: 
The point of Kant's theoretical philosophy, prompted by Hume's arguments on 
causality, was not to make claims about nature itself, and to concentrate on what 
could be said with certainty about the subject's knowledge of nature. Nature was 
therefore considered as that which is subsumed under the laws of the 
understand in g. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant conceives nature and human beings in much the same 
way. That is, nature is that which is subjected to deterministic laws and human beings are the 
bearers of free rational wills. This time, however, nature is characterised as being just there, so 
that human beings can impose their will on nature, so that human beings can modify nature to fit 
their wantings and needs. In the Second Critique human beings view nature as an objective 
entity to be modified by human subjectivity, or better said, nature is that which is to be changed 
and acted upon so that it fits humans' wills. For instance, I will, I desire, I want somewhere to 
sit, so I will chop a tree up, and use the wood to build a chair for me to sit on. To sum up, I 
impose my will on nature. 
Schelling saw two problems with the Critical Philosophy of Kant. Schelling first takes 
issue with the First and Second Critique portrayal of nature as being set apart from human beings 
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or Vice versa. That is, Schelling saw a problem with viewing nature as being a completely 
different entity to human beings, or to put it the other way round, Schelling saw a problem with 
viewing human beings as not part and parcel of nature. Schelling understood that by viewing 
human beings and nature in such light Kant's philosophy was open to be questioned about the 
problem of interaction between human beings and nature. This problem can be formalised as 
follows: how can the subjective successfully interact with and act upon the objective? That is, 
since subjective and objective have different natures, since human beings and nature are 
essentially different, how can they establish a successful relation of the kind required for human 
experience and the attaining of knowledge of reality, and of the kind required by human beings 
to impose their will upon reality? It could be said that this problem is akin to the mind body 
problem faced by Cartesian philosophy, the problem of two different natures or essences 
interacting with each other. And parasitic on the problem of the interaction between the 
subjective and the objective is the following problem: if human beings are part and parcel of 
nature, how can human subjectivity arise from something that is entirely objective? Schelling 
understood that Kant did not provide an account for the existence of subjective beings, such as 
us, in his philosophical system. Kant simply assumed subjectivity and he did not attempt to 
explain the coming to be of subjectivity, and of subjective beings. 
The second aspect that Schelling found to be a problem with the Critical Philosophy of 
Kant concerns its reliance on dichotomies, and as a consequence of this, Schelling found it to be 
a serious problem with the Critical Philosophy that it did not provide a first and simple principle, 
it did not provide an absolute. That is, Schelling, as did Fichte and their contemporaries, 
understood philosophy to be a science and as such it required a first principle, a basic and simple 
principle, out of which a whole philosophical system could be derived - this first principle is the 
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'absolute'. For Schelling and his contemporaries philosophy had to find its first principle just as 
other sciences, like Physics and Biology, had done within their fields of study. Moreover, 
Schelling and his contemporaries also understood that the nature of philosophy is to explain the 
whole of reality, and not particular aspects of it, and as such, the search for this absolute 
principle was not an easy one. Needless to say that Schelling, as did Fichte and their peers, 
understood that Kant's philosophical system had failed on this account also. It is interesting to 
note here the following passage from White ( 1983:7) where he comments on Schelling's 
Spinozism and where he explains Schelling's and his contemporaries' understanding that 
philosophy is a science, that it concerns the whole of reality, and that it requires an absolute 
principle. 
Schelling shares Spinoza's understanding both of what philosophy is and of what 
kind of principle philosophy needs. The two agree that philosophy is concerned 
with all of reality and not with a specific part of it; whereas the herpetologist 
studies snakes and frogs, the philosopher studies the whole. One consequence of 
this difference is that the principle ... of philosophy must be of a different sort from 
the principles of the special sciences. The principles of the herpetologist - the 
starting point for his investigations - include methods shared by all biologists and 
the scheme of classification according to which reptiles and amphibians are in a 
different category from birds and insects. Since philosophy is the study of the 
whole, it lacks a clearly defined subject matter; it also lacks a presupposed 
method, for it is not a part of a more comprehensive science whose method it 
could adopt. One way of expressing this difference between herpetology and 
philosophy is to say that the former is a relative science, the latter an absolute one. 
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It is also impottant to acknowledge at this point that Fichte tried to improve on the Critical 
Philosophy of Kant in his Wissenschaftslehre project. As such, it is appropriate here to refer 
back to the classical reading of the project, the reading of Schelling and Hegel, as criticised and 
analysed in the previous chapter. According to the classical reading, the main thesis of the 
project could be described as follows: there is an entity, an Absolute I, that somehow 
continuously creates the whole of reality, including nature as a not-1 and individual 
consciousnesses as relative "I"s. The reader will recall that the Absolute I, according to the 
classical reading, according to Schelling and Hegel, is to be identified with an immanent God. 
An immanent God that continuously creates reality, including Nature as a not-! and individual 
consciousnesses as relative "I"s. The young Schelling, Schell ing at his first stage of 
philosophical development, was sympathetic to Fichte's views here as the publication of On the I 
as a Principle of Philosophy and of the Philosophical Letters demonstrates. The more mature 
Schelling, Schelling at his subsequent stages of philosophical development, however, understood 
that Fichte had not been completely successful in improving on the Critical Philosophy of Kant. 
According to Schelling the Fichtean system had accomplished a few improvements on 
the Critical Philosophy, but it was still not entirely successful in dealing with those two problems 
raised by Schelling himself. The Fichtean system had given the first steps towards a first 
principle for all philosophy, and Schelling understood that the main improvement that Fichte had 
furnished the Critical Philosophy with is that it had tried to establish and characterise the 
absolute as a first principle in the figure of the Absolute I. Schelling, however, had two 
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problems with the Fichtean system. The first problem that Schelling has with Fichte's views is 
that in trying to establish the Absolute I as a first principle to all philosophy the Fichtean system 
argued that the Absolute I would ensure that the subjective could experience and enact his will in 
the objective. Schelling, however, understood that the Fichtean system had only established that 
the subjective could experience and enact his will in the objective, the Fichtean system had not 
demonstrated that this experiencing and enacting was successful. That is, the subjective could 
experience and enact in the objective, but this is not to say for instance that my experiencing of 
what happens in reality corresponds to what truly happens in reality or that there is a real 
correspondence between what I try to impose upon reality and what really occurs in reality. 
This could be described as a problem of synchronicity or tuning between what happens in reality 
and what I experience, between what I try to impose upon reality and what happens in reality. 
This problem is well explained by Zizek (1997:65) when he refers to the case of enacting in a 
virtual reality. I quote: 
When I raise my hand in order to push an object in the virtual space, this object 
effectively moves - my illusion, of course, is that it was the movement of my hand 
that directly cause the dislocation of the object; that is, in my immersion, I 
overlook the intricate mechanism of computerized coordination, homologous to 
the role of God guaranteeing the coordination between the two series in 
occasionalism. 
Schelling did not conceive that Fichte's Absolute I could act as the guarantor that I can 
experience reality and that I can impose my will upon reality, and that the Absolute I could also 
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act as the guarantor of the synchronicity between what I experience and what happens in reality 
and what I try to impose upon reality and what happens in reality. 1 understand that Schelling 
would consider this answer an unsatisfactory ad hoc manoeuvre on the side of Fichte. The 
problem identified by Schelling here is how the finite interacts with other finites, a problem that 
is not dealt with by Fichte within his thesis of the Absolute I, at least insofar as the classical 
interpretation of Schelling and Hegel is concerned, since this thesis only deals with the 
interaction between the infinite and the finites. This is a problem I have dealt with in the 
previous chapter when I suggested that the classical and the modern interpretation of the concept 
of the Absolute I could be seen as complementary; that is, the classical interpretation deals with 
the interaction between the infinite and the finites and the modern interpretation deals with the 
interaction between finites (vide supra pp. 98-99). 
But let me now go back to Schelling's first complaint against the Fichtean philosophy. 
Following from the problem identified by Schelling in the Fichtean system, Schelling understood 
that Fichte's conception of the absolute, of the first principle of philosophy had to be 
characterised differently if it were to succeed in establishing itself as the first principle of all 
philosophy. In this light, Schelling considered that Fichte's Absolute I was not the absolute, the 
first principle of philosophy, and this pushed Schelling to search for the absolute principle of all 
philosophy, and this in turn, enabled Schelling to propose a new characterisation for the absolute, 
and I shall deal with this during the unfolding of this section. 
Schelling's second complaint against the Fichtean philosophy lies in the fact that Fichte 
still regarded nature in much the same terms as Kant had previously done. That is, nature is that 
which is subjected to deterministic laws, nature is that which is objective, nature is that which 
provides human beings with content for their experiences, nature is that which is subjected to 
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change by human beings' wills. In the Fichtean philosophy human beings are still completely 
divorced from nature. Human beings and nature are seen as two different kinds. In a letter to 
Fichte in 180 I, Schelling explicitly voices his discontent with Fichte's views on nature: 
I am thoroughly aware how small an area of consciousness nature must fall into, 
according to your conception of it. For you, nature has no speculative 
significance, only a teleological one. But are you really of the opinion, for 
example, that light is only there so that rational beings can also see each other 
when they talk to each other, and that air is there so that when they hear each 
other they can talk to each other?24 
And in 1806, Schelling is even more aggressive in his rebuking of Fichte's views: 
... in the last analysis what is the essence of his (Fichte's) whole opinion of nature? 
It is this: that nature should be used ... and that it is there for nothing more than to 
be used; his principle, according to which he looks at nature, is the economic 
teleological principle. 25 
24 NB. Waiter Schulz, ed., Fichte-Schelling Briefwechsel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, I 968, p. 140. 
The quoted passage was cited and translated by Andrew Bowie, in his Schelling and Modern 
European Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 58. 
25 NB. Passage cited and translated by Andrew Bowie in his Schelling and Modern European 
Philosophy, p. 58. 
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To say that Schelling showed dissatisfaction with such a VIew of nature would be an 
understatement. In fact White (1983:47) comments that Schelling takes issue with Fichte on this 
issue when he writes: 
Schelling ... is convinced ... that Fichte's theories were crippled by his defective 
understanding of nature. For Fichte, whatever his true practical teaching may be, 
nature remains merely a means for man to use to his own ends, dead matter with 
which man can work. This conception is, Schelling insists, inadequate as a 
theoretical explanation of nature. 
The crux of the problem with Kant's and Fichte's views on nature and human beings for 
Schelling lies in the fact that in their philosophical systems human beings are not part and parcel 
of nature, human beings and nature are essentially different. That is to say that within their 
systems nature is rather out there for the experiencing (as in Kant's first Critique and Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre project), use and change (as in Kant's second Critique), and enjoyment (as in 
Kant's third Critique) of human beings. 
It could be said here that Kant's and Fichte's views on nature have strong echoes of the 
'Dominion' reading of Genesis, and it is important to state here that the 'Dominion' reading of 
Genesis is a classical interpretation of the first book of the scriptures. Such a reading must have 
been familiar to Kant since he was influenced by pietism, and it must have been familiar to 
Fichte also since the young Fichte was a theology student and a theist or a deist. This reading 
has its foundations in Genesis I :29 where it is written that God says: "Have many children, so 
that your descendants will live all over the earth and bring it under their control. I am putting 
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you in charge of the fish, the birds and all the wild animals". According to this reading human 
beings are other than nature, human beings must control nature, nature is there for human beings 
to experience, use and enjoy. Some might raise the question here regarding the 'Stewardship' 
reading of that same passage of the Genesis. The 'Stewardship' reading is a modern reading of 
Genesis and it understands that human beings have only been made stewards of creation, and if 
human beings wreck creation they must answer for it. Kant and Fichte could not have been 
familiar with this reading since this is a modern interpretation of that passage of Genesis. This 
reading, however, is of little help in solving the problems raised by Schelling since this reading 
also understands that human beings are set apart from nature, that human beings are other than 
nature. 
I note that Schelling seems to be moving away from this Judaeo-Christian perspective 
and influence. Schelling seems to be moving away to what was perceived as an individualist 
conception of religion and philosophy for life in the figure of Christianity and towards a more 
holistic approach to religion and life as a whole in the figure of Ancient Civilisations. This was 
well explained by Plant (1998:11-29) who maintained that at the time when Hegel was writing 
his philosophical system there was a feeling of nostalgia in Germany, a feeling of nostalgia 
towards Ancient Greece. In Ancient Greece life was more holistic, that is, religion, family, 
work, nature, etc. were all inter-linked via a religious system. Moreover, the performance of 
religious duties in those ancient societies involved emotions, imagination and the intellect, and 
there was also a sense of common purpose and community, and as such, there was a more 
harmonic social ethos. Hegel, and his contemporaries, Schelling included, understood that 
Christianity had destroyed this holistic approach to life through its fragmentation of society. The 
Judaeo-Christian God is completely divorced from human beings, and human beings are 
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completely divorced from the rest of creation. Hegel, and his contemporaries, Schelling 
included, understood that it was impossible to import Ancient Greek religious practices into 
Germany, and thus, their attempt to resist the fragmentation of reality and societies and to bring 
reality and societies to a more holistic mode was to re-create and re-interpret Christianity and its 
doctrines. Schelling seems to fit extremely well within this scenario painted by Plant, as 
Schelling rejects dichotomies such as the human being-nature dichotomy and the creator-creation 
dichotomy as his philosophical writings show. In rejecting the creator-creation and human 
being-nature dichotomies Schelling seems to be rejecting those Judaeo-Christian doctrines, and 
advocating a more holistic view of reality. 
Following from what I have argued and maintained thus far another point must be 
asserted here. That is to say that following from Schelling's understanding that Fichte had failed 
in establishing the nature of the absolute, and following from the fact that Schelling considered 
Kant's and Fichte's understanding of nature as unsatisfactory, following from these two issues, 
Schelling is prompted to find solutions as he was convinced that the absolute could be 
successfully established and that a more satisfactory account of nature reached. In his search for 
answers Schelling, in a stroke of inspiration, foresaw that an account of nature where nature is 
characterised as the absolute could provide him with a satisfactory answer to those two questions 
that so much troubled him. This point will become clearer during the unfolding of this section as 
I deal with some important texts of the Naturphilosophie project, such as the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, On the World Soul, First Outline of a System of Philosophy, and 
Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, which I shall do forthwith. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the Naturphilosophie project emerged m 1797 with 
the publication of the Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature and was further developed in the 
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subsequent years with the publication of On the World Soul in 1798 and First Outline of a 
System of Philosophy in 1799. These works brought fame to Schelling and the support of 
figures such as Goethe, and it also helped Schelling secure an appointment for a professorship at 
the University of Jena in 1789. 
The publication of the Ideas by Schelling in 1797 marks his break with the Fichtean 
philosophy and as such it represents a new phase in Schelling's philosophical development. Two 
years prior to the publication of the Ideas Schelling had left the TUbingen Theological Seminar, 
where he had befriended Hegel and Holder! in, and had taken up a position as a private tutor to an 
aristocratic family; a family which in 1796, the year prior to the publication of the Ideas in 1797, 
moved to Leipzig. Whilst in Leipzig, Schelling immersed himself in the study of medicine, 
physics, mathematics and chemistry, where he arrived at a new concept of nature, a concept of a 
polarised and dynamic nature, which went against the Fichtean, Kantian and Newtonian 
characterisation of nature as purely mechanical or as governed purely by necessary laws. On the 
World Soul and the First Outline of a System of Philosophy were published a few years later and 
are an attempt by Schelling to expand and explain further his views on the issue of a philosophy 
of nature. It is noteworthy here that Schelling's Naturphilosophie project represents an 
interesting contribution to the history of the philosophy of sciences as Schelling sought to 
explain his philosophical vtews on nature by seeking support of scientific observations, 
experiments and theories, and the project is also interesting per se since it defends the kind of 
holistic approach to the natural sciences that has become influential in recent years in the works 
of complexity theorists, such as Fritjof Capra, Stuart Kauffman and Brian Goodwin, i.e. those 
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theorists who hold the view that everything is involved in a web of relations and where every 
thing bears a relation to every other thing. 26 
The central thesis of the Ideas is that nature as a whole must be viewed as an organism. It 
is perhaps useful here to quote the following passage of Copleston ( 1946:48-49) on nature before 
progressing into a more detailed assessment: 
As he moved away from the position of Fichte, Schelling came to conceive of 
nature as a meaningful organism, a totality, striving upwards towards 
consciousness under the impulse of the World-Soul or principle of organisation of 
the cosmos ... nature is not the dead material of our duty, but is a dynamic process 
in which things are but becoming. There is one stream of life in Nature, but 
Nature, which is always striving after the perfect representation of the Absolute, 
differentiates herself on various levels into those individuals, the succession and 
transitory character of which betray the fact that they are unsuccessful attempts to 
manifest the absolute. In its highest production, however, human consciousness, 
nature is enabled to turn back on herself and to realise her unity in reflection. 
The following passage from Snow ( 1996:68-69) is also appropriate here as it acknowledges that 
Schelling in the Ideas is moving away from Fichte and closer to Spinoza, and also that Schelling 
develops the view that nature is to be regarded as an organic and living system. I quote: 
26 NB. For more on complexity theories see Fritjof Capra, Tao of Physics, London: Flamingo, 
1992 and The Turning Point, London: Flamingo, 1997; Stuart Kauffman, The Origin of Order: 
Self Organisation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993 and At Home in the Universe: The 
Search for Laws of Self-Organisation and Complexity, New York: Viking Press, I 995; and Brian 
We almost see Schelling thinking aloud as he accomplishes three very important 
things: he declares the philosophy of nature to be an essential part of philosophy, 
without which philosophy could not achieve systematic unity; he distances 
himself from Fichte and moves closer to Spinoza, who was especially influential 
on his concept of the absolute; and there is further development of the view of the 
world of nature as an organic, living system, and idea which first appeared in the 
"Treatises". 
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In order to demonstrate that nature is better understood as an organism Schelling puts forward 
various arguments that rely on physics and chemistry to demonstrate that the Newtonian, Kantian 
and Fichtean systems are mistaken in their views that nature and human beings are essentially 
different, that nature is that which is objective and the human being is that which is subjective. 
This reliance on physics and chemistry, and in other sciences remains a feature of Schelling's 
writings throughout his Naturphilosophie project, and as such it is perhaps appropriate here to 
quote a couple of passages as examples. In the Ideas Schelling (I 988:250) writes: 
How absolutely one and the same matter gives birth to the multiplicity of forms 
has been sufficiently discoursed on in the foregoing. Just as, in the individual, its 
unity forms into difference only in the shape of magnetism, so it also does in the 
whole. The inner and essential identity is not thereby abolished, and remains the 
same under all the forms or potencies that it takes on in the metamorphosis. Just 
Goodwin, How the Leopard Changed its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity, London: Phoenix, 
as the leaves, blossoms and collective organs of the plant are related to the 
identity of the plant, so the collective differences of bodies are related to the one 
substance, from which they proceeded by graduated change. 
And On the History of Modern Philosophy Schelling ( 1994: 123) writes: 
... this subordination can also only be reached in stages, thus via a process. For 
matter always seeks to maintain its independence, as, e.g., in those inorganic 
deposits of animals with shells, which testify to their dependence on life via the 
form which is externally impressed on them, but which are internally inanimate; 
the inorganic, i.e. matter which lays claim to a being-itself, has here already 
entered the service of the organism, but without being completely conquered by it. 
The skeletal system of the higher animals is just this inorganic matter which has 
now been forced back inside and taken up into the inner life process, which in 
animals of lower order (the molluscs) is still external and appears as shell and 
casing. Even the animal of the higher classes still contains in the differentiation 
of its organs hints or reminiscences of the steps which the whole organic process 
of nature has climbed. 
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Schelling's views on nature are the outcome of his dissatisfaction with the Kantian, Fichtean and 
Newtonian understanding of nature. As such it is appropriate for me now to refer back to 
Schelling's rejection of the dualism between subjective and objective. On commenting on 
1994. 
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Schelling's dissatisfaction with the Kantian dualism of subjectivity and objectivity Bowie 
( 1993:31) writes: 
The vital factor which had sustained the actuality of Schelling's Naturphilosophie 
is its refusal to see the thinking subject as simply opposed to nature as a world of 
objects, because the subject is itself part of nature. The Naturphilosophie ts 
another product of Schelling's dissatisfaction with Kantian dualism; 
As I mentioned above one of the aspects of the Kantian philosophy Schelling took issue with is 
its separation of human beings as subjective entities and nature as an object for human beings. 
This separation leads to the problem of interaction between entities of different natures; that is, if 
human beings are subjective and nature is objective, human beings and nature are entities with 
different essences, then how can these entities possibly interact? Schelling needs to provide a 
metaphysical system in which such a dichotomy does not occur, and this is what he does in the 
introduction to the Ideas. There he questions the Kantian system as a philosophical system 
which quite rightly reflects upon itself and on the nature of philosophy, but which becomes 
trapped into this philosophical self-reflection and forgets that the human condition is part of a 
greater totality. In the introduction to the Ideas Schelling also asserts that the Kantian system is a 
system obsessed with dichotomies and that as a consequence of this obsession it severs the 
human being from the reality it is part of. For Schelling the Kantian philosophy has forgotten 
that prior to philosophical reflection, human beings viewed themselves as integral parts of 
nature, human beings did not question the fact that they were part of a greater whole. The 
following passages are enlightening. I quote Schelling (1988: I 0-11 ): 
As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external world, the first step to 
philosophy has been taken. With that separation, reflections first begin; he 
separates from now on what Nature has always united, separates the object from 
the intuition, the concept from the image, finally (in that he becomes his own 
object) himself from himself. But this separation is only means not end .... Man is 
not born to waste his mental power in conflict against the fantasy of an imaginary 
world, but to exert all his powers upon a world which has influence upon him, lets 
him feel its forces, and upon which he can react. Between him and the world, 
therefore, no rift must be established; contact and reciprocal action must be 
possible between the two, for only so does man become man ... But its 
preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so 
far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world 
with chimeras, against which, because they lie beyond all reason, it is not even 
possible to fight. It makes the separation between man and the world permanent, 
because it treats the latter as a thing in itself, which neither intuition, nor 
imagination, neither understanding nor reason, can reach. 
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The attack on the Kantian system is implicit at this stage of the Ideas, but it does become explicit 
later as the text develops. It is clear, however, at this stage that Schelling understands that the 
Kantian philosophy has lost its way in seeing the activity of reflection as its ultimate goal 
because when reflection or philosophising is seen in such light it turns upon itself and divorces 
itself from reality. I understand that Schelling has probably in mind here the First Critique of 
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Kant, a text where reason reflects on reason, where the limits of knowledge are set, and where 
Kant establishes that we cannot know reality in-itself but only as it appears to us. It is this 
dichotomy between reality in-itself and reality as it appears to us, the dichotomy between the real 
and the ideal, the dichotomy between the subjective and the objective that is so problematic for 
Schelling. And Schelling understands that the roots of these dichotomies lay in the fact that 
reflection or philosophising have made reflection or philosophising its object, and as such it has 
turned itself into a subject and an object for itself at the same time, and lastly, it has also 
divorced itself from reality as a whole. Schelling rather understands that the activity of reflection 
and philosophising should be the means to understand reality and the human condition, and once 
this understanding is lost all those dichotomies and problems arise. More important here is the 
fact that Schelling asserts that we must conceive of a time prior to reflection or philosophising 
turning upon itself, a time when the real and the ideal, a time when the objective and the 
subjective, a time when reality in-itself and reality as it appears to us, a time when reality was 
united, a time when reality was a whole. It is important for me here to quote the following 
passage of the Ideas where Schelling maintains this thesis, and where he acknowledges that 
Spinoza was the first to try to deal with the philosophical problem of interaction between the 
objective and subjective, between the real and the ideal; I quote Schelling ( 1988:27): 
Spinoza, as it seems, was worried at a very early stage about the connection of our 
ideas with things outside us, and could not tolerate the separation which had been 
set up between them. He saw that ideal and real (thought and object) are most 
intimately united in our nature. That we have ideas of things outside us, that our 
ideas even reach out beyond the things, he could explain to himself only in terms 
of our ideal nature; but that these ideas correspond to actual things, he had to 
explain in terms of the affections and determinations of the ideal in us. Therefore 
we could not become aware of the real, save in contrast to the ideal, or of the 
ideal, save in contrast to the real. Accordingly, no separation could occur 
between the actual things and our ideas of them. Concepts and things, thought 
and extension, were, for this reason, one and the same for him, both only 
modifications of the one and the same ideal nature. 
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Thus, for Schelling, the dichotomy between the subjective and the objective can only be 
overcome if the subjective and the objective, if the ideal and the real, if human beings and nature, 
are only ill founded dichotomies, only if these have an identity in the absolute. These 
dichotomies emerge from human preoccupation with labelling and categorising things in nature, 
a preoccupation that leads human beings to lose sight that human beings, themselves, are part of 
this same nature that is being labelled and categorised. As such, human beings lose sight that 
everything, human beings and nature, are unified in an absolute principle. It is only if the 
subjective and the objective are envisaged as being united in an absolute principle that the 
problem between the interaction between the subjective and the objective, between the ideal and 
the real, between human beings and nature can be solved. And during the development of his 
Naturphilosophie, during his attempt to uncover the subjective in the objective, the ideal in the 
real, during his attempt to demonstrate that human beings cannot be abstracted from nature, 
Schelling asserts that Nature as a whole, i.e. as essence and as physical system, is this absolute 
and unifying principle. 
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Schelling's On the World Soul is an attempt of his to further develop the 
Naturphilosophie project, which he had originally portrayed in his Ideas. Whilst in the Ideas he 
moves from the ideal to the real by diffusing the dichotomy between ideal and real, in the On the 
World Soul he moves from the real to the ideal by demonstrating that that which is commonly 
considered objective, i.e. nature, is in fact also subjective. His argument here is also based on 
scientific observations and experiments and on theoretical scientific paradigms. Schelling 
understands that if one observes the natural world as a whole, if one observes organic and 
inorganic nature, one perceives that nature as a whole is extremely dynamic, rather than merely 
mechanical as Kant, Fichte and Newton would have it. This dynamism in organic and inorganic 
nature leads one to reach the conclusion that organic and inorganic nature share a common 
principle, a common principle that is responsible for all changes in nature as a whole. Beiser 
(2002:515-519) notes that since nature as a whole cannot be described, according to Schelling, as 
a great mechanical apparatus, nature is better described as an organism, then dynamism in nature 
as a whole must be described as some sort of 'live force', a life force that underlies the whole of 
reality, a life force which ancient civilisations referred to as the 'world soul'. Schelling's point is 
that the world, i.e. nature as a whole, which is commonly seen as objective, is in fact already 
subjective; that is, there is already subjectivity in the world, there is already subjectivity in the 
objective. Note here that this view of reality does not share the problem faced by Kant and 
Fichte of how to account for the rise of subjectivity out of the objective if both are of different 
natures - in Schelling's case the subjective and the objective are united in a common principle, 
they are features of the absolute, and more importantly that which is commonly considered 
objective is already subjective. The following passages from White's ( 1983:52) comment On the 
World Soul corroborates my depiction of Schelling's views: 
He (Schelling) seeks to establish that observing the natural world as a whole 
"leads to a common principle that, fluctuating between inorganic and organic 
nature, contains the first cause of all alterations in the former and the ultimate 
ground of all activity in the latter" ... If the organic and inorganic share a common 
principle, then they must be homogeneous; they are ... both dynamic rather than 
mechanical...Schelling reasons, the natural world cannot be adequately conceived 
of as a great machine; it must rather be understood as the manifestation of the 
primal animate force known to the ancients as the "world soul". [my brackets] 
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In the First Outline of a System of Philosophy Schelling attempts to achieve the same 
conclusions of the On the World Soul through a priori argumentation. He understands he has to 
do this because On the World Soul only demonstrated his thesis through inductive arguments 
based on a posteriori scientific observations and experiments, and as such, he is attempting to 
make his argument more convincing. In order to do so Schelling asks: What is the source of 
dynamism in nature? The following passage of Schelling depicts this fully: 
The most universal problem, which encompasses all of nature and is thus the 
highest problem ... is this: What is the universal source of activity in nature? What 
cause brought forth in nature the first dynamic separation (of which the 
mechanical is a mere consequence)? Or what cause first cast into the universal 
tranquillity of nature the seed of movement, into the universal identity duplicity, 
into the universal homogeneity of nature the first sparks of heterogeneity?27 
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By asking this question he means: What is the very source of reality? And why is reality so 
diverse? Why is reality so heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous mass of being? For 
Schelling the answer to all these questions lies in the assumption that reality in its original and 
homogenous form started to reflect upon itself so that it became an object for itself. For 
Schelling this is the first division of reality and this is the first event, which serves as the source 
for all those subsequent divisions of reality, subdivisions such as magnetism, electric charges, 
chemical reactions and organic matter itself, which, for Schelling, are empirical evidence of a 
dynamic, and not merely mechanical, nature. If nature cannot be depicted as a mechanical 
apparatus, and as it is dynamic then nature can only be assumed to be like a self-reflecting 
organism according to Schelling. It is worth quoting the following passage of White (1983:54) 
since it corroborates my views here: 
Schelling remams convinced that only a reflective structure can explain the 
introduction of difference into absolute identity: "It is impossible that [the primal 
unity], unlimited by anything external, transform itself into something finite for 
intuition save by becoming object for itself, that is, becoming finite in its 
infinitude". Magnetism, and thus all of nature, must have its origin in the primal 
self-reflection of the absolute, its primordial involution ... 
27 NB. FWJ Schel1ing, First Outline of a System ofPhi1osophy, (3:220), quote in White 
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It seems to be quite clear that in the On the World Soul and in the First Outline of a System of 
Philosophy Schelling is attempting to convince the Kantian, the Fichtean and the natural 
scientists that there must be more to reality, to nature, than they had previously assumed; he tries 
to demonstrate that their assumption of reality, of nature, being merely objective, being merely a 
mechanistic whole is incoherent, and as such it must be rejected. Two points could be made 
here. Firstly, in rejecting the mechanical view of the world Schelling seems to be joining the 
German Romantic tradition, a tradition which understood that the whole of reality is 
interconnected and that it relies on a 'world soul'; where Schelling differs from his fellow 
German Romantics, such as Goethe, is that he does not write a poetry of nature, but philosophy 
of nature, as White (1983:54) notes. And secondly, it is clear that Schelling is rejecting the 
Kantian, Fichtean and Newtonian dualism between objectivity and subjectivity in favour of a 
duality within an absolute. That is, Schelling rejects the doctrine of dualism, that view of the 
world which understands that there are two different substances or forms of Being in reality and 
that sharply separates these two substances or forms of Being, and whilst doing so, Schelling 
proposes that what has been previously seen as a dualism by scholars such as Kant, Fichte and 
Newton is in fact a form of duality of aspects within monism, within the same substance or form 
of Being. Reality, for Schelling, is one, is united and is complex, and the duality of aspects, the 
duality of objectivity and subjectivity, represents aspects of this one, united and complex reality. 
Objectivity and subjectivity for Schelling are not entities with different essences, rather they are 
aspects or features of the one reality; objectivity and subjectivity are, to use an analogy, the two 
sides of the same coin, rather than two different coins as dualism would have. Or to put this in 
more Schelling-like terms: the absolute is the identity of ideal and real, or vice versa. 
(1983:53-54). 
--------
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This latter point is extremely similar to the reading that some commentators have of 
Spinoza's philosophy, that is to say that Spinoza defends monism but he also asserts that the 
substance has two attributes, namely thought and extension, which are aspects of the substance, 
which are different characterisations of the essence ofthe substance. This dualistic notion within 
monism is extremely important ontologically and epistemologically because it implies that I, as a 
human being, as an objective and subjective being, can describe the world using concepts, which 
is linked to the thought attribute, and I can also describe the world by pointing at things, which is 
linked to the extension attribute; moreover, my concepts perfectly match whatever they are 
related to in the world since the ideal is real and vice versa, there is no difference or gap between 
my concept p and the entity p in the world. In Schelling we find the same sort of notion because 
he also holds that the ideal is real and vice versa, and as such the implications are the same as in 
the case of Spinoza. I shall touch back on this point towards the end of this section when I deal 
with the similarity between Schelling's objectivity and subjectivity and Spinoza's thought and 
extension attribute. 
Let me now sum up what has been said so far regarding Schelling's Naturphilosophie 
project: Schelling considers the ideal to be real, and vice versa, and he also understands that both 
the ideal and the real are united in an absolute principle, which he then asserts to be nature as a 
whole, a dynamic nature which can be better depicted as an organism rather than as a mechanical 
apparatus. 
At this point in my discussion on Schelling's Naturphilosophie project it is important for 
me to refer to some of Esposito's comments on Schelling's project since his comments are very 
pertinent to my thesis that Schelling subscribed to some aspects of Spinozism. On commenting 
on Schelling's views on the Naturphilosophie project Esposito (1977:83-88) notes that Schelling 
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suggests another six secondary principles as being necessary if his project is to be successful, and 
if philosophy is to reach the status of a science, of a Wissenschaft. These principles are listed 
below, and I shall draw heavily from Esposito here: 
i. Nature constitutes a .system: that is, all phenomena must be presumed interconnected if the idea 
of the systematic unity of nature is to make sense. This is a straightforward proposition for the 
time, Hegel being probably the last philosopher to subscribe to such systematicity. The 
interesting thing about this proposition however is that Schelling and Spinoza are probably the 
only two prominent philosophers (if we do not consider the Romantics here) in the history of 
philosophy to propose that nature, as the whole of reality, as a system of interconnected relations 
which includes us, subjective entities that we are. Certainly, Kant, Fichte, Newton also saw 
nature as systematic and as a web of relations, they did not however include subjectivity within 
it, and they did not consider nature to be the absolute principle either. 
ii. Nature involves both process and product: that is, if nature were simply product, then nature 
would be at rest, there would be no changes in reality. The idea of changes in reality requires 
nature to be seen also as a process, that is, it requires the status quo to be a momentous hindrance 
or challenge to a status quo which is still to come, and this future status quo to come will then be 
a momentous hindrance or challenge to another status quo to come, and this will occur ad 
infinitum. For Schelling the idea of process and product in nature are intertwined, there would 
not be one without the other. There would be no change in reality without process and product. 
If there were no process then reality would be completely still, and there would be no change in 
reality either without a product already there that presented a hindrance to the process ad 
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infinitum. To borrow an analogy from Schelling, nature is like a magnet and process and 
produce are like the negative and positive poles of the magnet; without one pole there is no 
magnet. As such, Schelling understands that nature must encompass both process and product, 
just as it does in Spinoza's system, and I shall come back to this point below. 
iii. The relation between product (natura naturata) and productivity (natura naturans) is 
ultimately one of identity: that is, nature is a system, and as such, it is a unity within which 
process and product are intertwined in communion - there is an interplay between nature as 
process and nature as product. If process and product were not intertwined in communion, and 
were rather separated from each other, then nature's capacity for absolute productivity and self-
creation would be limited. Schelling is arguing here in favour of the idea that nature is a self-
creating, self-explanatory, and self-contained system, an idea that goes against the theist or deist 
views that nature has been willed to exist by a transcendent God. Also note the use of natura 
naturans and natura naturata by Schelling. Both concepts are classically linked to Spinoza's 
Ethics, who to my knowledge, coined the terms, and who described those terms in exactly the 
same way as Schelling describes here. I quote from Spinoza's Ethics: "Before proceeding, I 
would wish to explain, or rather to remind you, what we must understand by active and passive 
nature (natura naturans and natura naturata), for I think that from the past propositions we shall 
be agreed that by nature active we must understand that which is in itself and through itself is 
conceived, or such attributes of substance as express eternal and infinite essence ... By nature 
passive I understand all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God ... " (El Proposition 
XXIX, Note). That is, for Spinoza natura naturans is the creative force of the substance and 
natura naturata is the result, the produce, of this creative force. It is interesting here to refer to 
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the work of Chaui ( 1999), the prominent Brazilian philosopher and expert on Spinoza. Chaui 
(1999:56-57) shows an interesting insight concerning Spinoza's views on natura naturans and 
natura naturata which mutati mutantis, apply to Schelling also. Her insight is, more specifically, 
concerned with the connection between natura naturans and natura naturata and she connects 
Spinoza's understanding of these concepts to the revolution on optics that was happening at the 
time of Spinoza. Spinoza was certainly familiar with the revolution in optics since he was a lens 
grinder and microscope maker by profession, and since he also conduct experiments in optics 
himself, as we come to know through his private correspondence and as we also can assert 
through the lost and found Treatise on the Rainbow which has been attributed to Spinoza and 
which is the only known work by Spinoza written in Dutch. Chaui (1999:56-57) argues that in 
Latin there is difference between Lux, i.e. the source of the light, and Lumen, i.e. light which 
illuminates all that which is around the source of light. Moreover, light, as opposed to sound for 
instance, propagates itself uniformly and without loss. The difference between Lux and Lumen 
has been long forgotten by modern languages, however, it is most certain that Spinoza was 
familiar with both terms since he was fluent in Latin, and since he wrote all his writings in Latin 
(apart from the Treatise on the Rainbow). The point Chaui is trying to make is that just as in 
optics there is a difference between the source of light and the light itself, in the Universe, in 
Reality, in Nature, there is also a difference between creator and creation, process and produce, 
active and passive nature, and that this differentiation is not always as clear cut as it seems. In 
other words, the source of light illuminates itself and its light illuminates its surroundings 
uniformly, just as the substance, Deus sive Natura, manifests itself as natura naturans, i.e. active 
nature or creator or process, and natura naturata, i.e. passive nature or creation or produce. Lux 
and Lumen, natura naturans and natura naturata, or as Schelling would say, objectivity and 
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subjectivity, are interdependent. One cannot exist or occur without the other, they are like the 
poles of a magnet, without both the positive and the negative pole there is no magnet, without 
creator and creation there is no reality for Spinoza, without objective and subjective there is no 
absolute for Schelling. 
iv. The activity of nature results from the interplay of opposing forces: that is, if all the forces at 
work in nature were in complete harmony, then there would be nothing to stop the process from 
coming to an end, an end in which nature is in absolute harmony and at rest. As such, it must be 
presumed that there are opposing forces at work within the whole of nature, so that the idea of 
becoming, the idea of change, the idea of evolving in degrees, remains a possibility for reality as 
a whole and for individual entities. Spinoza in his Ethics also conceives the same sort of idea of 
the activity in reality being interplay of opposing forces. For Spinoza everything in reality is in 
motion or at rest ad infinitum. The following passages corroborates this: "A body in motion or at 
rest must be determined for motion and rest by some other body, which, likewise was determined 
for motion or rest by some other body, and this by a third, and so on to infinity" (E2 Pl3 LIII). 
Even the continuity of the modes of the substance as individual entities as such rests on this idea 
of movement and rest. If the balance between motion and rest within these modes, these 
individual entities is broken, then these modes cease to be and become different modes. For 
instance, a molecule of water if the balance of forces at movement and at rest within this 
molecule is broken then the molecule collapses and it becomes two atoms of hydrogen and one 
atom of oxygen. The following passages corroborate this as it asserts that as long as the balance 
within the individual is maintained then the individual will remain. I quote: "If from a body or 
individual which is composed of several bodies certain ones are removed, and at the same time 
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the same number of bodies of the same nature succeed to their place, the individual will retain its 
nature as before without any change in its form" (E2 P13 L4). Presumably, for Spinoza and 
Schelling, if the balance of forces within our reality is ever broken then our reality would cease 
to exist as it is and it would collapse into being something else, something less complex and 
more primordial. 
v. The opposingforces ofnature are themselves equal: that is, Schelling maintains that there is 
no reason for assuming that these opposing forces in nature are unequal. Esposito (1977:85) 
takes issue here with Schelling's views and maintains that "there certainly is a reason for 
thinking them unequal; if they were equal, then nature would either be in a state of perpetual 
equilibrium or would already have been annihilated, but this appears contrary to the idea of 
nature as a dynamic process". I actually disagree with Esposito on this issue as I think that 
Schelling had reasons for thinking that the opposing forces of nature are equal. If those forces 
were unequal, then one force would eventually emerge as the most powerful, a fact which would 
render the other forces ineffective or defunct, and as such the development in nature would come 
to a halt. I think Schelling would probably reply here to Esposito that to say that these forces are 
equal, does not mean to say that they are well-balanced, or in perpetual harmony; rather it is to 
say that these opposing forces possess the same capabilities, they are equal insofar as their 
powers are concerned. Let me explain this with an example. Bearing in mind that Schelling 
understands nature to be a self-created, self-explanatory, and self-contained system, then ifthere 
are opposing forces within this system, it is reasonable to think that if one particular force A acts 
upon a particular force 8, and if this particular force A uses 10 units of its power to act upon 
force 8, then it is reasonable to say that 8, possessing the same resources of A since they are 
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equal, will try to counterbalance A's actions through the use of 10 units also. This could be 
described as action and reaction. Forces will constantly try to dominate each other, but in doing 
so, they will be constantly counterbalanced. This is what generates the dynamics, the changes in 
nature. To my knowledge Spinoza never explicitly argued that the opposing forces in nature, 
which he refers to as motion and rest, required to be either equal or unequal. We can infer, 
however, from his writings that if he was asked about this he would advocate that those opposing 
forces require to be equal in power because the dynamics of reality necessitate such a balance of 
equal forces. A universe in which these forces are unequal is a universe in which everything 
would either end up at rest and thus it would not display the dynamism we experience, or it 
would end up as a universe in which everything is in movement and thus so chaotic to that no 
individual modes could ever arise, or if modes could arise it would be so briefly that no proper 
progress or development could ever come out of it. It is worthy quoting here what various 
commentators have said about this aspect of Schelling's philosophy, and which corroborate the 
point I made against Esposito's views on this issue. Beiser (2002:531) explains the relation 
between the two forces well when he says that "each power is necessary to understand the 
creation of something determinate, a definite product. Without the infinitely expanding 
tendency, there would be nothing at all, and so nothing to restrict, because it is the condition of 
any existence; and without the infinitely contractive tendency, there will be nothing 
'determinate', because negation is the condition of all determination. The product of nature must 
be seen then, as the result of both these forces. And Zizek ( 1997: 18) notes that "what we 
experience as 'reality' is constituted and maintains itself through a balance betv.,een the two 
antagonist forces, with the ever-present danger that one of the fv.'O sides will 'crack', run out of 
control, and thus destroy the 'impression of reality'. Is not this speculation confirmed by the 
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premise of contemporary cosmology according to which the 'reality' of our universe hangs in the 
balance, that is, hinges on the fragile tension between expansion and gravitation? If the 
expansion were just a little stronger, the universe would 'explode', dissipate, no firm, stable 
objects would form,· if,' on the contrary, gravitation were a little bit stronger, it would long ago 
have 'collapsed', fallen in ... ". And Ameriks (2000a:532) says that "true to his dynamics 
principles Schelling insists that the opposition betvveen forces is not static but active. If nature is 
absolute productivity, then its opposed forces must be in a constant struggle with one another, 
where one constantly tries to increase at the expense of the other. If they were to come into a 
stable or lasting equilibrium, then the activity of nature itself would cease, and everything would 
freeze into a static product". 28 
vi. Nature is structured hierarchically and its activity is in accordance with lmvs of evolution: 
this is a very interesting proposition posed by Schelling. That is, Schelling asserts that in nature, 
the most simple processes and products have a tendency to combine themselves in more complex 
processes and products. This activity of combining leads to a hierarchical structure from the 
simplest to the most complex within nature, and it also leads to evolution through the continuous 
combining of different processes and products. Schelling also maintains that this is an open-
ended principle, that is, the activity of combining has no telos, because if it did, then nature 
would be pursuing a particular route, and nature would eventually achieve its goals, which would 
mean, that nature is not dynamic anymore but in absolute rest. Spinoza's ontology also asserts 
28 NB. This aspect reminds me here of the modern reading of Fichte's Absolute I, where the 
individual-1 is in an endless engagement with the not-1, and where one always tries to overcome 
the other with no success. lfthere is no balance of forces between the individual-! and the not-!, 
then the individual-! would be overcome by the not-! and hence it would be unable to reflect on 
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that there are simple bodies (corpora simplicissima) and compound bodies (corpora composita) 
and that the latter occur when the former combine themselves, I quote: "When a number of 
bodies of the same or different size are driven so together that they remain united one with the 
other, or if they are moved with the same or different rapidity so that they communicate their 
motions one to another in a certain ratio, those bodies are called reciprocally united bodies 
(corpora invicem unita) and we say that they all form one body or individual, which is 
distinguished from the rest by this union of the bodies" (E2 A2). In Spinoza's conception of 
reality there is no telos either, there is no ultimate goal, modes are driven together by the amount 
of movement and rest within themselves and around themselves, e.g. simple modes turn into 
compound modes, and compound modes into more complex compound modes, and they remain 
so until such a time when the balance is broken. Schelling's interesting insight is that he applies 
this proposition to processes and products, whilst Spinoza seems to apply the proposition to 
products only. As such, Schelling's views here are a preview of some modern views on 
cosmology, such as the views advocated by Ilya Prigogine, the nobel prize winner, who argued 
that evolution as manifested in processes and products becomes increasingly complex through 
the combining of simpler or less complex processes and products; moreover, these evolutionary 
qualitative jumps in processes and products seem to happen at random and in an unexplainable 
manner.
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the not-1, and if the individual-! could overcome the not-1 then it would be in some sort of 
~ermanent reflective state without the possibility of engaging with reality. 
9 NB. It is worth mentioning here for instance the works of Ilya Prigogine, the nobel prize 
winner in chemistry, who in describing reality advocates that development is not linear it jumps, 
and processes and entities have a tendency to become increasingly complex. cf. Ilya Prigogine, 
From Being to Becoming, San Francisco: Freeman, 1980; and End of Certainty, New York: The 
Free Press, 1997. 
--------
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As I demonstrated above I understand that all these principles and such a view of nature lead 
Schelling's system to mirror some of Spinoza's views in many respects. But one can find even 
further evidence that Schelling was indebted to some of Spinoza's views in other of his works. 
It is appropriate to refer here to a work of Schelling entitled Darstellung meines Systems der 
Philosophie, which was published in 180 I, and which is not available in English, where 
Schelling presents another exposition of his Naturphilosophie project and this time he does so in 
the manner of Spinoza on the Ethics, as noted by Esposito ( 1977 :93-97) and by Lawrence 
(2003: 176). In other words, Schelling presents his Naturphilosophie in a geometrical manner, 
through the use of axioms and propositions, such as the ones listed below where he characterises 
the absolute. The reader will note that the terminology is very typical of the German Idealism 
period, the way in which the terminology is presented, however, is very reminiscent of Spinoza's 
style, particularly of his geometrical method. I quote some of the propositions in order to 
demonstrate this point: 
(1 0) The absolute identity is absolutely infinite. 
( 13) Nothing comes into being in itself 
(21) The absolute identity cannot know itself infinitely without infinitely positing itself as subject 
and object. And Schelling judges this to be a self-evident proposition. 
(32) The absolute identity is not the cause of the Universe, but is the Universe itself 
(35) Nothing individual has the ground of its existence in itself 
(36) Every individual being is determined through another individual being. 
(38) Every individual being is a definite form of the being of the absolute identity, though not its 
being itself, which is only in the totality. This needs explaining. What Schelling is asserting here 
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is that there is only a formal distinction between finites and the infinite. The finites are 
disturbances or mod{ftcations in the infinite. 
( 41) Every individual is a totality in relation to itself 
(44) All potencies are absolutely simultaneous. 
It is interesting to note here that Hodgson ( 1995 :226) informs us in a footnote that He gel, in his 
Lectures on Philosophy of Religion, also referred to this work, the Darstellung meines Systems 
der Philosophy, of Schelling as connected to Spinoza's Ethics. I quote Hodgson: 
Hegel is referring here to Spinoza's Ethics (1677) and to Schelling's "Darstellung 
meines Systems der Philosophy", Zeitschriftfur speculative Physik. .. 
Hodgson's footnote refers to a passage of Hegel's Lectures on Philosophy of Religion where 
Hegel (1995:226) writes that Spinoza's substance and Schelling's absolute play the same function 
within these philosophers' philosophical systems. That is, Spinoza's substance and Schelling's 
absolute are the first principle of their respective philosophical systems, are point of origin of all 
reality, are the point where subjective and objective are united, are thinking and being. I quote: 
This way of comprehending the matter is to this extent more subjective in 
character, and what presents itself as the truth of this finitude is the idea that has 
being in itself- the Spinozistic substance or the absolute, as Schelling conceived 
it. It is shown from natural things as well as from the spiritual world that they are 
finite, that the truth is the disappearance of their limitation in the absolute 
substance, and that the latter is the absolute identity of both -of the subjective and 
objective, ofthinking and being. 
223 
Let us recapitulate what has been established thus far concernmg the fact that Schelling 
subscribed to some aspects of Spinozism. Firstly, there is the similarity of writing style, as in the 
Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie where Schelling makes use of Spinoza famous 
geometrical method and where if were not for the classical terminology coined by German 
idealism, such as the use of terms such as absolute and identity, someone could be forgiven for 
confusing some of Schelling's propositions there with some of Spinoza's propositions in the 
Ethics, as I mentioned above. Secondly, there is the use by Schelling of some of Spinoza's 
classical concepts, such as natura naturans and natura natural a, and Schell ing does so without 
changing the meaning of those concepts, as I asserted previously. That is for Schelling, as for 
Spinoza, natura naturans is nature as a producing force, as a process, and natura naturata is 
nature as product. And lastly there is the issue of the role played by Spinoza's substance and 
Schelling's absolute in their philosophical systems, which was noted by Hegel and which I have 
referred to in the previous paragraph; based on this there is the issue of the similarities between 
the whole of their metaphysical systems themselves. Let us look into these last issues in more 
detail now. 
As I noted in the previous paragraph Hegel understood that Spinoza's substance and 
Schelling's absolute played the same role within their philosophical systems. For Spinoza the 
concept of substance represents the first and simple principle upon which his whole 
philosophical system is based. Moreover, the concept of substance, for Spinoza, represents the 
basis of all reality, the concept of substance is that which maintains all reality together, is that 
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which explains the nature of reality, and is that which explains the nature of things in reality. As 
I previously mentioned, for Spinoza, metaphysics is the science of 'Being', the study of the nature 
of reality (and note that this is the original sense ascribed to metaphysics by the ancient 
philosophers) and this puts him in direct opposition to Scholastics, Wolffians and all those who, 
prior to Kant, changed the study of metaphysics to the study of a reality that seemed to run 
parallel to ours, a reality of souls, immortality and a transcendent God. Spinoza spends much of 
part I of his Ethics arguing and establishing that the substance is the first principle which serves 
as the basis to his whole metaphysical system. The following definitions and propositions 
corroborate this: 
ID I - I understand that to be Cause of Itself (causa sui) whose essence involves 
existence and whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing. 
I 03 - I understand Substance (substancia) to be that which is itself and is 
conceived through itself: I mean that, the conception ofwhich does not depend on 
the conception of another thing. 
I P 14 - Except God [which he later identifies with nature, the whole of nature, the 
natura naturans and the natura naturata] no substance can be granted or 
conceived. [my brackets] 
Schelling's concept of the absolute plays exactly the same role within his philosophical system. 
The concept of the Absolute, is for Schelling, the simple and basic concept of all philosophy, it 
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explains objectivity and subjectivity, it explains the relation between objectivity and subjectivity 
and between subjectivity and objectivity; in short, it explains reality and the nature and relations 
of things within reality. The following passage corroborates this. I quote Schelling (1988:46): 
The absolute ... is necessarily pure identity; it is just absoluteness and nothing else 
and absoluteness per se is equal to itself; but it does indeed also belong to the idea 
that, this pure identity, independent of subjectivity and objectivity, as this, and 
without ceasing to be so in one or the other, is itself matter and form, subject and 
object ... That equal and pure absoluteness, that equal identity in the subjective and 
objective, was what we have defined in this characterisation as the identity, the 
equal essence of subjective and objective ... 
Thus, Spinoza's concept of substance and Schelling's concept of absolute play the same role 
within their respective philosophical system, that is, these concepts ascribe systematicity to their 
thought as these concepts serve as the first, basic and simple principle out of which their systems 
are deduced. 
And connected to the issue of the role played by the concepts of substance and absolute 
within Spinoza's and Schelling's system is the issue of the whole conception of their 
philosophical systems. Let us look into this now. 
After establishing that there is only one substance, that everything is a modification ofthe 
substance, that the substance possess an infinite number of attributes, of which human beings 
have access to two, namely thought and extension, Spinoza identifies God as a substance. 
Crucial is the fact that in some passages of his writings Spinoza makes the move from God 
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simpliciter to God or nature or Deus sive natura; and he explicitly does so, for instance, in the 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Introduction p. 8 of Elwes' translation), in the Short Treatise (ST 
part 2 A pp 11), and in the Ethics (E 1 P 14; 19; and E4 Preface). The important point here is that 
this move is made a number of times. One of the possible reasons why Spinoza did not say Deus 
sive natura or just natura all the time in his writings is that, as the reader will recall, this is a very 
controversial claim for the 17th century philosopher. The first chapter of this thesis has dealt 
with many of the problems faced by Spinoza at the time and with the reception of his 
philosophical thought, so I shall not reproduce that material here. Crucial here, is the issue that it 
is a widely accepted proposition that Spinoza was defending some sort of pantheism since the 
implications of his thought is that everything is a mode of the substance, everything is a 
modification of nature; and that this reality we experience is the only possible reality, there is no 
other reality than the one we are part of, there is no point in talking about a parallel reality to 
ours as the existence of such reality is illogical within Spinoza's system given that the unique 
substance is absolutely infinite. 
I quote an important passage of the Ethics here that corroborates much of what I have just 
asserted: God I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence (El 06). Are not these the 
same sort of propositions Schelling is also putting forward in his project? Schelling does 
identify the absolute, his first principle, with nature and he does say that objectivity and 
subjectivity are features of the absolute, that there is an identity of objectivity and subjectivity 
within the absolute, that the objective is subjective and vice versa. That is, for Schelling 
everything is a feature of the absolute, which he deems to be nature, and as such this doctrine can 
be viewed as a sort of pantheism since the absolute is a term which is usually applied to God. I 
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believe that a way to correctly and philosophically understand this issue is to hold that both 
philosophers are arguing that everything is a modification of Being as both philosophers take 
metaphysics to be the science of Being, as did ancient philosophers. Thus, Being for Spinoza is 
that which he identifies with substance and for Schelling is that which he identifies with the 
absolute; and this is so because both philosophers try to explain the whole of reality, the nature 
of reality and the nature ofthings in reality. 
Moreover, on this same issue of the similarities of their metaphysical systems as a whole, 
I argue that one could equate Schelling's objectivity with Spinoza's extension attribute of the 
substance since both concern the world as a physical system, and one could also equate 
Schelling's subjectivity with Spinoza's thought attribute of the substance since both are 
connected with rationality. Where they may differ here is that Schelling has never suggested that 
the absolute has any other kind of attribute other than objectivity and subjectivity, both of which 
he would certainly consider to be infinite since to place a limit to them would be arbitrary, whilst 
there is a debate between scholars of Spinoza whether Spinoza does say that the substance has an 
infinite number of infinite attributes of which human beings have access to only two, namely 
thought and extension - this is a view largely held by classical commentators - or whether 
Spinoza only meant that the substance has only two infinite attributes, namely thought and 
extension - this is a view held by some modern commentators. I tend to side with the former 
school of commentators as I find that the textual evidence supports their views, i.e. that the 
substance has an infinite number of infinite attributes and we, human beings, given our nature, 
can access only two, thought and extension. I quote the following definitions as support for this 
thesis: "An attribute I understand to be that which the intellect perceives as constituting the 
essence of a substance" (EID4) and as such we, human beings, given that we are corporeal and 
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rational beings can only access the thought and extension manifestation of the substance; and 
God I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite 
attributes each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence (EID6), which clearly states that 
the substance has an infinite number of infinite attributes. If classical commentators are correct 
then Schelling and Spinoza may diverge on this issue, if more modern commentators are correct 
then they are in complete agreement. It is difficult here to establish with certainty one way or the 
other in Spinoza's case, as it is just as difficult to establish the reasons why Schelling did not 
contemplate the possibility of the absolute having further features other than objectivity and 
subjectivity, and as such I shall not pursue this point any further here. 
To conclude this chapter. Following from what I have argued and demonstrated thus far, 
the reader will appreciate that there are a number of similarities between Schelling's views in his 
Naturphilosophie project and some of Spinoza's most well-known metaphysical views. As I 
stated above, there is the issue of the use by Schelling of the same concepts as used by Spinoza, 
such as natura naturans and natura naturata, and more importantly, Schelling makes use of 
these concepts in exactly the same way as Spinoza did and Schelling does not change the 
meaning of these concepts either. Then, there is the issue of Spinoza's substance and Schelling's 
absolute being identified with nature and playing the same role within their respective 
philosophical systems, that is, these concepts are equated with the first, basic and simple concept 
out of which their whole philosophical systems are derived. And lastly, there is the issue of the 
similarities between the whole of their philosophical systems, that is, within their systems, ideal 
and real, objective and subjective, thought and extension are united in a concept, are features of a 
concept (which is the substance in the case of Spinoza and the absolute in the case of Schelling). 
As such, Schelling's debt to some of Spinoza's view is plain. 
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CHAPTER 8: PANTHEISM AND GOD 
SCHELLING AND SPINOZA: ARE THEY PANTHEISTS? ARE THEY ATHEISTS? ARE 
THEY DEFENDING HYLOZOISM? 
Following on from what has been considered thus far I wish to deal with what I judge to be 
another striking similarity between Spinoza and the Schelling of the Naturphilosophie project, 
that is, both philosophers could be said to be what I call, 'sophisticated pantheists', and my 
definition for this term will be given below after I provide my characterisation of 'ordinary 
pantheism'. Strictly speaking, ordinary pantheism is the view that the world as a physical system 
is divine, that everything that exists is divine. Thus, an ordinary pantheist denies the commonly 
held view by theism and deism that there is a clear-cut distinction between a transcendent God 
who wills creation and creation itself because the ordinary pantheist understands that the 
universe is all that there is, and that the universe itself, as a physical system, is divine. This is in 
direct contrast with mainstream religions, such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, since these 
assert that there is a clear separation between the creator and its creation and as such pantheism 
and the charge of atheism very often go hand in hand. 
I argue that Spinoza was not an ordinary pantheist as many commentators hold, 
commentators such as Priest (1991:160) and Hampshire (1953:36), as I shall demonstrate in the 
following paragraphs. And I shall also argue in the following paragraphs that Schelling, at least 
the young Schelling of the Naturphilosophie project, was a sophisticated pantheist. It has been 
argued that later in his philosophical development, Schelling tried to reconcile this earlier 
230 
position with a form of theism as he started to see it problematic for freedom to subscribe to the 
doctrine of pantheism, even if this was a sophisticated form. 30 
It is my understanding that the view that Spinoza was an ordinary pantheist has probably 
ansen from a misinterpretation or misreading of Spinoza's terminology. Commentators have 
misunderstood Spinoza's assertions that i. there is only one substance, ii. God is a substance, and 
iii. God is nature. It is correct that Spinoza asserts that God is a substance and that God is nature, 
but this assertion does not mean that Spinoza is identifying God or nature solely with the 
Universe as a physical system. In fact, Spinoza maintains this in a letter 21 (epistle 73) to Henry 
Oldenburgh: 
Those who think that the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus rests on this, namely, 
that God and Nature (by which they mean a certain mass, or corporeal matter) are 
one and the same, are entirely mistaken. 
Thus, Spinoza clearly says in this passage that he is not what I would call an ordinary pantheist, 
that is, he does not hold that his unique substance, or God or nature, is solely the universe as 
sheer matter, as mass, or to use the terminology I have been using thus far, as a tangible product. 
30 NB: Both Spinoza and Schelling were criticised by their contemporaries for advocating 
pantheist doctrines because of the implications that this doctrine has for human freedom. 
Spinoza remained true to his views and never tried to re-write or re-formulate them to calm his 
critics; he remained true to the doctrine of human necessary freedom, or the idea that we are free 
only insofar as we stay true to, and understand, our human essence, and he also remained 
convinced that only the substance is absolutely free because it is self-creating, it is limited by any 
thing else. Schelling was also criticised by some of his contemporaries for subscribing to 
pantheism for the implications that it bears to human freedom. Schelling's essay Philosophische 
Untersuchungen uber das Wesen des menschlichen Freiheit of 1809 is an attempt to appease his 
critics, but it also represents a compromise by Schelling as he reformulates his project in order to 
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Spinoza understands that God or nature, as the universe, as reality, is more than sheer matter, 
sheer produce. 
This statement of Spinoza, and my explanation of it, do not fit the common 
characterisation for ordinary pantheism, and as such I must press further and ask the question: 
Could Spinoza be what I would call a sophisticated pantheist? Could Spinoza have developed 
ordinary pantheism further? I think one ought to answer these questions in the affirmative here, 
and I shall demonstrate the reasons for this. 
It is my understanding that Spinoza is a sophisticated pantheist because, as the reader will 
recall, he asserts that his substance, i.e. nature, manifests itself in two ways, namely, natura 
naturans and natura natura/a. As I have noted in the previous section by natura naturans 
Spinoza means nature in its active manifestation or nature as a process, and by natura natura/a 
Spinoza means nature in its passive manifestation or nature as product. With this distinction 
between nature as process and nature as product Spinoza is improving on the ordinary pantheist 
thesis that the universe is solely made up of matter and that it is divine. For Spinoza reality is a 
physical system that can be explained in terms of a process and of produce, of essence and 
physical system, because without one the other cannot be obtained. It is only if reality, if nature, 
is seen as process and as product that change and development can be accounted for. Natura 
naturans and natura naturata are inter-dependent, without the one there cannot be the other. 
They are, to borrow an example of Schelling, like the poles of a magnet. The very nature of 
reality is dependent on these two features, produce and process. If there is no process then there 
is no change in reality, and since there is change in reality, reality cannot be seen as a produce 
only, as a physical system only. Spinoza's insight here identifies a possible philosophical 
safeguard absolute human freedom and as such it represents a departure from true Spinozistic 
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problem with ordinary pantheism and this is that it regards reality as product only, and at the 
same time, Spinoza offers a possible solution to this same problem without giving up on the 
notion of pantheism, and this is to understand that reality encompass both process and product. 
There seems to be a case for arguing that in the Naturphilosophie project Schelling seems 
to follow on Spinoza's notion of pantheism very closely. I understand that it is reasonable to say 
that Schelling appears to be advocating the same sort of 'sophisticated pantheism'. I believe this 
to be so for the following reasons. First, Schelling does identify his concept of the absolute, his 
highest principle, as being nature. Note that the concept of the absolute is usually used with 
relation to God, that is, God is the absolute. Philosophers such as Jacobi for instance would only 
regard God as the absolute, everything else being relative to God since everything has been 
created by the will of God. And just to remind the reader, Fichte himself, according to the 
classical reading of Schelling and Hegel, also held that the absolute, his absolute I, is God. For 
the attentive reader of the 18th century Schelling's assertion that the absolute is nature probably 
sounded extremely daring since it would be considered tantamount to pantheism. Thus, 
recapitulating, in the Naturphilosophie project, Schelling puts together the concept of the 
absolute which, as I said, is usually applied to God and asserts that this absolute is nature, and 
from this one can easily infer that Schelling is defending some sort of pantheistic doctrine. But 
the question here is: is he defending what I have called 'ordinary pantheism'? I have to answer 
this question in the negative. When Schelling asserts that the absolute is nature he does not mean 
nature as a lump of matter. To do so would have been to remain in the same track previously 
laid down by Newton, Kant, and Fichte, who considered nature as that which is objective only, 
and this is exactly what Schelling sought to avoid. For Schell ing nature, the absolute, is that 
doctrines. cf. Esposito (1977:157-159), Copleston (1946:51) and White (1983:81-92). 
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which unites objectivity and subjectivity and as such it cannot be merely regarded as a lump of 
matter. Moreover, to consider nature as being a lump of matter, as a physical system only, 
would incur the problem of accounting for change in reality. As the reader will recall Schelling 
makes use of the concepts of natura naturans and natura naturata in his project to account for 
change in reality. Through the use of the same terms used by Spinoza previously, namely natura 
naturans and natura naturata, and through the use of these same terms with the same meaning 
previously ascribed to them by Spinoza, Schelling is able to avoid the problem of accounting for 
change in reality; reality involves both process and produce, it involves both natura naturans and 
natura naturata, like the poles of a magnet these two concepts are interlinked within the nature 
of reality. That is, nature manifests itself as both creator and creation, subjective and objective, 
process and produce. This is the same sort of metaphysical system advocated by Spinoza at the 
end of the 17th century, and which Schelling, a hundred years after Spinoza, tried to revive in his 
project. But does this make Schelling a sophisticated pantheist? I believe that there is a strong 
case for saying so. I believe that there is a strong case for saying so because he affirms that 
there is an absolute which is nature, and this is tantamount to pantheism as I have argued above, 
and because he makes use of Spinoza's notions of natura naturans and natura naturata in 
exactly the same way as Spinoza did, and this fits well within the definition I have given to 
sophisticated pantheism since it conceives of reality as a process and a produce. 
I believe most of Schelling's commentators would agree with my assessment here of 
Schelling being a pantheist, even if a sophisticated pantheist, since this is a commonly held view 
with regards to Schelling's philosophy. I note, however, that despite the fact that there is a strong 
case for holding that Schelling was a pantheist, that Schelling could have disagreed with my and 
other commentators' assessment here. Schelling could reply that he never denies the existence of 
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a transcendent God who wills the world, but that he does indeed hold that reality, as nature, is 
absolute, is a self-contained and self-explanatory system. Let us pursue this possible reply by 
Schelling in further detail in the forthcoming paragraphs as I understand that it may prove to be 
very interesting within the history of Spinozism and within the history of German Idealism. In 
order for me to access Schelling's possible reply I must first demonstrate what Spinoza was 
trying to do in defending pantheism. 
It is my understanding that one of the things Spinoza was trying to do in defending 
pantheism was to try to convert the 17th century orthodox philosopher, such as Descartes, to his 
side, to view pantheism as a logical possibility. It must be noted for the sake of my argument 
that the seventeenth century orthodox philosopher held that i. God and Nature are different and 
distinct entities, ii. that God and Nature are self-contained and self-explanatory systems, and iii. 
that God has necessary existence whilst Nature, insofar as it is the physical Universe, has 
contingent existence because it depends on the will of God for its existence. Spinoza's starting 
point for the conversion of the orthodox philosopher is the ontological argument as I shall 
demonstrate now. 
The ontological argument for the existence of God has as its starting point the definition 
of 'God'. It attempts to prove that 'God exists' by examining the definition of 'what God is'. To 
put this in more modern philosophical terminology: the ontological argument maintains that the 
statement 'God exists' is an analytic statement rather than a synthetic statement because it 
understands that the concept of God encompasses the concept of existence, i.e. the concept of the 
predicated is contained within the concept of the subject; and the ontological argument also holds 
that the statement 'God exists' is also a priori, i.e. it is not dependent on evidence from 
experience, which would deem it a posteriori. Thus, the ontological argument is an a priori 
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argument, which aims to prove that the real existence of God is analytically true. It is also 
noteworthy here that there is no actual single argument, which alone deserves to be called "the 
ontological argument", rather the ontological argument refers to a cluster of arguments, which, as 
I have stated above, intend to prove the existence of God from the concept of God. 
Spinoza's commitment to the ontological argument is clearly shown in the following 
passage of the Ethics, where Spinoza defines "God (Oeus) [as] ... a substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which express eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists", and 
Spinoza's proof is as follows: "If you deny it, conceive, if it be possible, that God (Deus) does 
not exist. Then (Axiom 7, i.e. the essence of that which can be conceived as not existing does 
not involve existence) his essence does not involve existence. But this (Proposition 7, i.e. 
Existence appertains to the nature of substance) is absurd. Therefore God (Deus) necessarily 
exists". (E I pI I) The passages above clearly show that Spinoza is analysing the concept of 
'God' and inferring from it that existence is part of that concept, and moreover, that this existence 
is necessary rather than contingent. So far this is a straightforward version of the ontological 
argument for the existence of God and as it stands it would not present a problem for the 
orthodox philosopher. 
I, however, argue that Spinoza makes use of the ontological argument to convince the 
I 7th century orthodox philosopher that God and the Universe are one and the same thing. The 
conversion of the 17th century orthodox philosopher is done in two distinct stages, as follows: i. 
Spinoza proves, by the use of his version of the ontological argument, that God exists and that 
his existence is necessary, and the orthodox philosopher has to agree with Spinoza because if he 
denies this much he jeopardises his own standing position; and then ii. Spinoza takes his 
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argument a step further and asserts that thought and extension are attributes of God, and this is 
Spinoza's coup de grace against the orthodox philosopher's position. 
Let us now see how the conversion is attempted in more detail. As I have stated above, 
the orthodox philosopher understands that God and Nature are two distinct, self-contained and 
self-explanatory entities, and that God has necessary existence whilst Nature, insofar as it is the 
physical Universe, has contingent existence because it depends on the will of God for its 
existence. Crucial here, and this is an important point concerning the conversion, is the fact that 
the orthodox philosopher tries to explain Nature, or events in the physical Universe, always in 
physical terms, that is, when the orthodox philosopher tries to explain Nature, he does so by 
presupposing that Nature is a self-explanatory system. In order to undermine the orthodox 
philosopher's position Spinoza spends much of his time in the first part of the Ethics, which is 
entitled "Concerning God", demonstrating through the use of axioms and propositions that the 
substance necessarily exists, and within this same context he asserts that God is a substance, and 
therefore it follows that God necessarily exists. And as I mentioned previously, up to this point 
the orthodox philosopher must agree with Spinoza because if he does not do so he is in danger of 
undermining his own position. It is at this point that Spinoza takes his argument further and 
where he attempts to undermine the orthodox philosopher's views. Spi noza develops his 
argument so to demonstrate that thought and extension are attributes of the substance, that is, 
thought and extension are attributes of God, and he does so within the context of the ontological 
argument. He asserts that since: 
all substance is necessarily infinite (E I P8) 
And that 
Except God no substance can be granted or conceived; as God is a being 
absolutely infinite, to whom no attribute expressing essence of substance can be 
denied, and as he necessarily exists, if any other substance than God be given, it 
must be explained by means of some attribute of God, and thus two substances 
would exist possessing the same attribute, which is absurd [because proposition 
one states that "a substance is prior to its modifications" and proposition 5 states 
that "in the nature of things, two or more substances may not be granted having 
the same nature of things"], and so no other substance than God can be granted, 
and consequently not even be conceived ... (El Pl4) [my brackets] 
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In other words, smce the substance necessarily exists and is infinite, and s1nce God is a 
substance, God necessarily exists and is absolutely infinite. And note here that Spinoza does not 
say just 'infinite' but 'absolutely infinite', that is, the substance or God must encompass all forms 
of infinity. I understand that Spinoza makes use here of that understanding of the concept of 
God which asserts that God is absolutely infinite because otherwise it would lack in essence and 
if it lacked in essence it would not be perfect. Thus far the orthodox philosopher has to agree 
with Spinoza. But then Spinoza presents the critical part of his argument, that is, that thought 
and extension are attributes of the substance, are attributes of God, because to deny this would 
incur in the problem of the substance, or God, not being absolutely infinite, and thus lacking in 
perfection. It is here that we find the roots of Spinoza's pantheism, and it is here that the 
orthodox philosopher faces his challenge as he does not consider God to be extended; God, for 
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the orthodox philosopher is a special substance who created all other substances, but God is not 
considered to be extended, only creation is extended. 
What Spinoza is ultimately doing is to say two things to the orthodox philosopher so that 
he can convert him to his side. Firstly, Spinoza is saying to the orthodox philosopher that if the 
concept of God is to encompass absolute infinity then the concept of God must include 
extension, and as such the concept of God collapses into the concept of nature as a physical, self-
contained and self-explanatory system. I believe this to be Spinoza's stronger case against the 
orthodox philosopher's view since it relies on a careful analysis of the concept of God. If this, 
however, does not convince the orthodox philosopher then Spinoza can appeal to more practical 
issues. That is, Spinoza would ask the orthodox philosopher: ifNature is a self-contained system 
and if this system is self-explanatory, as you, the orthodox philosopher presumes, then why 
believe that this system depends on a different self-contained and self-explanatory system for its 
existence, i.e. God? If you, the orthodox philosopher, maintain that Nature is dependent on God, 
you are asserting that Nature cannot be self-explained, because the explanation for its existence 
is dependent on something else, namely, God. Spinoza's conclusion, following his version of the 
ontological argument, is that there is no transcendent God and that all those features and 
characterisations which the orthodox philosopher uses to describe a transcendent God to be 
understood as belonging to Spinoza's Deus sive Natura. 
The following passages exemplify the point that Spinoza uses terminology which is 
usually applied to the God of the theist and deist to his substance. Spinoza describes his 
substance as: i. the highest kind of existence, i.e. "existence appertains to the nature of 
substance" (E I p7), ii. infinite, i.e. "all substance is necessarily infinite" (E I p8), iii. consists of 
infinite attributes, i.e. "the more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it will have" (E I 
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p9), and iv. those attributes are an expression of eternity and infinity, i.e. "nothing is more clear 
than that each entity should be conceived under the effects of some attribute, and the more reality 
or being it has, the more attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity belong to it" (E I 
p 1 0). The key for Spinoza in trying to convert the orthodox philosopher is to try to make him i. 
accept that an analysis of the concept of God yields that God encompasses extension if God is 
understood as being absolutely infinite; and ii. try to force the orthodox philosopher to give up 
on the idea that Nature's existence is contingent, the orthodox philosopher has to see Nature as 
having necessary existence because it is self-contained and self-explanatory; and i i i. to accept 
that since God is extended and since nature is a self-explanatory and self-contained system that 
God and nature are one and the same thing. 
I note that the orthodox philosopher does not have to accept Spinoza's conclusion that 
God and Nature are one and the same thing. In fact, the orthodox philosopher can reply to 
Spinoza that God does indeed possess all attributes including extension, because God is perfect, 
but that God is a special substance, i.e. God is a special substance that has created all other 
substances, and whose reality runs parallel to ours, and as such God being extended does not 
have any bearings on our reality. And the orthodox philosopher can also reply that the fact that 
Nature is a self-contained and self-explanatory system does not entai I that Nature does not 
depend on God for its existence, as it might just be the case that God, the special substance, 
created and has preserved Nature as a self-contained and self-explanatory system. In spite of 
these possible replies by the orthodox philosopher, I understand, Spinoza is able to cast some 
doubt on the thesis that God and Nature are independent entities, that is, there just may be a 
possibility that God and Nature are one and the same thing, and this may just be sufficient to 
convert some orthodox philosophers to Spinoza's side. 
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If we disregard the fact that Schelling is commonly seen by commentators as being a 
pantheist and accept his possible reply then it is conceivable that Schelling is putting forward in 
the project a system which is heavily based on some of Spinoza's doctrines as I have 
demonstrated in the first subsection of this chapter, but a system which does not give up on the 
idea of a transcendent God. In other words, it may just be the case that Schelling agrees with 
Spinoza only insofar as Spinoza's characterisation of our reality is concerned; that is to say that 
Schelling agrees with Spinoza's characterisation of reality as being nature as a whole, as 
encompassing objectivity and subjectivity, as a nature that manifests itself as natura naturans 
and natura natura/a. But this is as far as Schelling will go with Spinoza if his possible reply is 
correct as it appears that Schelling also takes the orthodox philosopher's side by disagreeing with 
Spinoza that God is nature by holding on to the idea of a transcendent God who has willed the 
existence of our self-contained and self-explanatory reality, or nature as a whole. It is interesting 
to note here the following passage from Lovejoy (1965:317) which seems to corroborate what I 
have just stated, and as such it goes against the commonly held view that Schelling was 
defending a straight form of pantheism in the project. Love joy ( 1965 :317) writes: 
In much of his philosophizing between 1800 and 1812, it is true, he (Schelling) 
has still two Gods and therefore two religions -the religion of a time-transcending 
and eternally complete Absolute .... - and the religion of a struggling, temporally 
limited, gradually self-realizing World Spirit or Life-Force. 
If Lovejoy is correct in his assessment of Schelling's project then Schelling has to face up to a 
major problem in his system, that is the problem that his system ends up with two absolutes, one 
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being God, the other Nature. God being the absolute which created another absolute, i.e. nature, 
since Schelling ascribes nature with the role of absolute within his system. In other words, 
nature as an absolute within Schelling's system ends up as being dependent on God, which is the 
other absolute. The problem here is that the concept of an absolute requires that it should not 
bear a relation to anything outside of it, if it does then it is not absolute but relative. And this is 
exactly what would happen to Schelling's systematic paradigm if we take account of his possible 
reply because nature as the absolute principle in his system is absolute only in name since it is 
dependent on God, who becomes the 'real' absolute principle, for its existence. It comes to mind 
that Jacobi would certainly level this objection against Schelling, just as he had done against 
Fichte years earlier. Certainly, what has been argued above only has relevance if Lovejoy's 
remarks are correct and if Schelling's conceivable reply is possible. I note, however, that this is 
not the case as there is no textual evidence within the texts of the project that corroborates either 
Lovejoy's or Schelling's conceivable reply and as such it must be presumed that Schelling was 
indeed defending pantheism in the project as it is widely accepted by commentators. In fact the 
textual evidence supports the view that he was a pantheist and that Schelling was aware that he 
could not hold on to the thesis that the absolute is nature and that the God of the theist or deist 
created this absolute. In the following passage of the Ideas where Schelling is about to start his 
exposition of the identity of ideal and real within the absolute, he comments on the impossibility 
oftwo absolutes. I quote Schelling (1988:46): 
In the whole of the following exposition we presuppose this acknowledgement of 
the indifference between absolute-ideal and absolute-real, which itself is an 
absolute, and we must assure everybody that, if he conceives or requires yet 
another absolute besides that, not only can we not help him to any knowledge of 
it, but also in our own knowledge of the absolute could not possibly become 
intelligible to him. 
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That said here, I must reject this possible reply of Schelling as having any grounds to stand on 
and also reject Lovejoy's reading of Schelling philosophy. 
A further point that can be investigated in this subsection is the issue of atheism. It is 
noteworthy here that at the time when Spinoza and Schelling where writing, the 17th, 18th and 
19th century, pantheism was generally equated with atheism. Both of these -isms went hand in 
hand. This is so because, as I mentioned in the beginning of this subsection, the pantheist 
disregarded the sharp separation between creator and creation; for the pantheist there is only a 
reality which we are pm1 of, a reality which is itself divine. This pantheistic notion of a divine 
world puts the pantheist in direct opposition with theists and deists, who would regard it as a 
form of atheism, since it denies the existence of a transcendent God who wills the world. The 
charge of atheism against Spinoza is well known and I have dealt with this issue in the first 
chapter of this thesis within the context of the reception of Spinoza's doctrines in the Netherlands 
and Germany, so I shall not reproduce that material here. Despite the fact that Schelling was 
never formally charged as an atheist during the period of the project, I understand that he can be 
charged as such because he is defending a form of pantheism and pantheism in those days was 
still regarded as a synonym for atheism because it is a corruption of the common theistic or 
deistic understanding of the concept of God. I can only presume that Schelling was not charged 
as an atheist at the time possibly because he does not directly negate the existence of a 
transcendent God in the project, and because soon after writing the works of the project he does 
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refer to this issue in the works that followed, works in which he tried to solve the possible 
inconsistency between the project and theism or deism (cf. footnote 30). 
Given my argument thus far in this subsection that Spinoza and the early Schelling are 
what I call sophisticated pantheists, there is a related point that could be explored here since it 
bears a correlation with the issue of pantheism. This is the issue of hylozoism. 
The issue of hylozoism, i.e. the doctrine that holds that matter has life, comes to mind 
with respect to Spinoza's and Schelling's doctrines because pantheism sometimes could be linked 
or developed into hylozoism. Let us first look at Spinoza's views in order for us to assess if 
Spinoza could have held the doctrine of hylozoism in his writings. By doing some research on 
Spinoza's commentators it becomes clear that hylozoism is certainly a view that was held in the 
former Soviet Union with respect to Spinoza's doctrines. Kline ( 1952:26), a commentator on 
Spinoza, in particular, notes that Marxist philosophers regard the relation between consciousness 
and being, that is, the relation between thought and extension as a fundamental problem for 
philosophy and that Spinoza's popularity in the former Soviet Union lies on what was considered 
by Marxist philosophers as a materialistic solution to this problem, namely, hylozoism. It is 
certainly true that Spinoza's monism solves the problem posed by dualism, by proposmg a 
momsm in which thought and extension are mere aspects of the one substance. I, however, 
argue that this reading of Spinozism by Marxist philosophers is a mistaken one as it relies on a 
misreading of Spinoza's true philosophical views. It is mistaken because there is not a single 
passage in Spinoza's writings in which he explicitly suggests or argues in favour of hylozoism or 
that matter has life; there is simply no textual evidence that supports this reading. And 
moreover, I understand that these Marxist philosophers are just placing the thought attribute 
under the extension attribute of the substance. That is to say, that they are emphasising the 
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extension attribute to the detriment of the thought attribute, and it is my understanding that 
Spinoza would reject this reading of his doctrines because he explicitly says that the attributes of 
the substance cannot be reduced to one another so that, for instance, the thought attribute would 
fall under the extension attribute, and vice versa. Spinoza argued that the attributes are 
conceived through themselves and they are aspects that represent the essence of the substance 
and as such they cannot be reduced into one another. The following quotes are enlightening 
here: 
And 
Each attribute of the substance must be conceived through itself. An attribute is 
that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence 
therefore it must be conceived through itself. Hence it appears that, although two 
attributes are conceived really apart from each other, that is, one is conceived 
without the aid of the other, we cannot thence conclude that they form entities of 
two different substances. For it follows from the nature of the substance that each 
of its attributes can be conceived through itself: since all the attributes it ever had 
were in it at the same time, nor could one of them be produced from another, but 
each of them expresses the reality of being of the substance. (E I PI 0) 
... the Mind and the Body are one and the same Individual, which is conceived 
now under the attribute Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. (E3P21) 
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Therefore, the doctrine of hylozoism is not true of Spinozism and those Marxist philosophers 
were mistaken in portraying Spinoza's system as defending such doctrine." Given that 
Schelling's project mirrors so closely Spinoza's metaphysical system I decided to investigate if 
any of Schelling's commentators held or advocated that Schelling is defending hylozoism. My 
research here proved to be fruitless as none of Schelling's commentators seem to have ever 
overtly advocated or even suggested that Schelling's project advocates hylozoism. Nevertheless, 
it is still important here to enquire if Schelling's project could have advocated hylozoism since 
his project mirrors that of Spinoza and it has been argued by some commentators of Spinoza that 
Spinoza defended hylozoism. As such, I ask here: is the doctrine of hylozoism true of 
Schelling's project? I think the answer to this question ought to be no. Schelling, as I have 
demonstrated in the previous subsection, defended, as did Spinoza, the view that the ideal or 
subjectivity is real or objective and vice versa, and that both are united in an absolute principle 
which he deems to be nature, the whole of nature, nature as process and as product. The notion 
of identity between real and ideal is crucial here, one cannot be reduced to the other, one cannot 
31 NB. Schelling's third phase, where he advocates that reality requires a ground, which he 
advocates to be the Real, proved to be quite appealing to Marxist philosophers, for the obvious 
reason that it grounds reality in 'matter'. This is a point noted by Ji.irgen Habbermas in his paper 
"Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism: Schelling's Idea of a Contraction of God and 
its Consequences for the Philosophy of History", in The New Schelling, ed. Norman, J., and 
Welchman, A., London and New York: Continuum, 2004. However, by the time Schelling 
reached his fourth phase, where he develops his Philosophy of Mythology and Philosophy of 
Revelation, the Marxists did not see Schelling's philosophy with good eyes- these were not 
topics Marxists were fond of or have interest in. Alberta Toscano, in his paper "Philosophy and 
the Experience of Construction", in The New Schelling provides a quite detailed account of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels disdainful attitude towards Schelling's fourth phase. This 
demonstrates quite clearly Schelling's erratic philosophical development, and how his different 
phases appealed and repulsed different schools of thought, and perhaps this justifies his 
reputation for being fickle. It is interesting to quote the following quote from Marx (1975:349-
350), who sarcastically notes that: "To the French romantics and mystics he [Schelling] cries: '!, 
the union of philosophy and theology', to the French materialists: '!, the union of flesh and idea', 
to the French sceptics: '!, the destroyer of dogmatism', in a word, '/...Schelling'. 
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be brought under the other, they are rather aspects of the absolute, they are different facets of the 
absolute. As such Schelling could never have defended hylozoism since this would contradict 
his own doctrine that ideal is real and vice versa. To defend hylozoism would imply that the 
ideal comes under the real, it would imply that subjectivity comes under objectivity, and this 
implies a top bottom relation rather than a relation of equals as it is advocated in the project. 
Should Schelling have subscribed to hylozoism then his project would have to de described in a 
different light, that is, instead ofthe commonly understood: 
i. objectivity and subjectivity are irreducible aspects ofthe absolute; 
We would have the hylozoistic reading: 
ii. objectivity is an irreducible aspect of the absolute and subjectivity is an aspect of objectivity 
It is widely agreed by Schelling's commentators that i. is correct and as such these commentators 
would agree that ii. was never argued by Schelling. 
The view held by both Spinoza and Schelling that ideal and real, that thought and 
extension, that subjectivity and objectivity, are irreducible aspects of the absolute, also cuts 
against, mutatis mutandis, any sort of strong idealist reading of these philosophers. Reading 
Spinoza as an idealist was a fashionable trend during the late 19th century (cf. for instance "The 
Idealism of Spinoza" by Murray (1896)). Reading Schelling as a pure idealist is perhaps also a 
deviation from the true views of this philosopher because of his holding of the thesis that ideal is 
real and vice versa. I understand that both Spinoza and Schelling are better described as 
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defending idealism-realism or realism-idealism, as one aspect does not take precedence over the 
other. It is interesting to quote here the following passage from Richards (2002:20 I) where he 
comments on this aspect of Schelling's philosophy, an aspect which is present in the philosophy 
of some of Schelling's Romantic contemporaries. I quote: 
Romantic philosophers, scientists, and poets - given the idealistic-realistic 
metaphysics that grounded their conceptions - found in nature the selfs other 
kingdom. Navalis, for instance, after having read Schelling's Jdeen began a novel 
- Die Lehrlinge zu Sais (The Novices of Sais) - in which the young quested to 
remove the veil of nature and to become one with her. He dramatically captured 
Schelling's abstractions with distinction: "One succeeded- he lifted the veil of the 
Goddess of Sais - But what saw he? He saw - wonder of wonders - he saw 
himself'. Nature and the self were doubles, each welling up for a common 
source. That common source was not a personal God who might be lurking in the 
dark, ready to condemn any breach of moral convention - and with the Romantics, 
that would have taken a truly divine effort - or to unveil all to be a conjuror's 
trick, a bit of thing-in-itself here and an arbitrary fiat there. Rather the laws of 
morality and the laws of nature arose from the self; they were our laws freely 
imposed and, at the same time, the laws ofthat greater reality which we were all a 
pa11. That reality simultaneously was both creator - natura naturans - and the 
created - natura naturata. Its creations, whether of natural beings or literary life, 
did not drop from the heavens as the intelligible commands of a hidden divinity; 
rather they grew as arabesques of wilful reason and archetypal structures. 
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To conclude this subsection. It is my understanding that Spinoza could not be classified as an 
ordinary pantheist because, as I demonstrated above, he develops ordinary pantheism further by 
ascribing to it the notions of process and product, the notions of natura naturans and natura 
naturata, and as such he could be characterised as a sophisticated pantheist. I have also 
demonstrated that Schelling falls within this same characterisation of being a sophisticated 
pantheist for exactly the same reason. Also, the issue of hylozoism has been briefly treated here 
in connection with Spinoza's and Schelling's doctrines and I have rejected the claim that either 
philosopher could have subscribed to this doctrine because both, Spinoza and Schelling, 
advocate the identity of ideal and real and to subscribe to hylozoism would imply that the ideal is 
a feature of the real, that is, that the ideal comes under the real. Finally, I have proposed that 
both Spinoza and Schelling may be better described as defending idealism-realism or realism-
idealism rather than as pure idealists or realists. Thus far in this section I have dealt a great deal 
with issues in Schelling's and Spinoza's metaphysics. I now wish to turn my attention to the 
ethical implications of subscribing to these metaphysical views, and as such I shall now turn to 
the field of Deep Ecology. I turn my attention to Deep Ecology because theorists in this area 
have sought in some of Spinoza's metaphysical views support for their own views, and since 
Schelling's metaphysical system is a reflection of Spinoza's, I understand that it is appropriate 
here to investigate if Schelling's system can provide the same level of support, or even a better 
level of supp011, to Deep Ecologists. 
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CHAPTER9:DEEPECOLOGY 
DEEP ECOLOGY: SPINOZA AND SCHELLlNG 
ln this chapter I wish to investigate the possible support that Spinoza's views and Schelling views 
may provide to the field of Deep Ecology. Theorists in this area have sought, in varying degrees, 
in some of Spinoza's thesis support for their own views on Deep Ecology. I understand that 
since Schelling's is largely indebted to some of Spinoza's views that his system may also be able 
to provide Deep Ecologists with the same level of support that they seek in Spinoza. Thus far, 
however, Deep Ecologists seem to have largely ignored Schelling's system; this is so perhaps 
because Schelling's philosophy became unfashionable and fell from memory until its recent 
revival; or perhaps because they prefer to seek support in a better known philosopher, such as 
Spinoza; or perhaps because they prefer to go direct to the source, Spinoza himself. In this 
section 1 shall provide the reader with a brief characterisation of Deep Ecology, and this requires 
a contrast with Environmental Ethics. Then I shall investigate if and how can some of Spinoza's 
views and of Schelling's views provide support for this new philosophical field. I shall then 
conclude this section. 
Deep ecology and Environmental Ethics are two fast growing and prominent areas of 
modern philosophical thinking. Perhaps more so due to the nature of the current state of affairs 
of our planet, a state of affairs never experienced in the history of our planet. Humanity has 
spread itself all over the planet and has interfered greatly with the environment around through 
the exploitation of natural resources, pollution of the earth, air and water, and through the 
required changes for turning environments into suitable milieus for human use as dwellings, 
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agricultural land, sources of energy and so on and so forth. The outcome of this extreme 
interference with our environment has led the scientific community to raise the alarm that the 
rich biodiversity of our planet is at risk, that there can be some climate and environmental 
changes that may lead to serious consequences to human life, and that the exploitation of natural 
resources at the current levels is unsustainable as it will lead to a complete depletion of 
resources; I believe a recent example of this is the problem that Europe currently faces with its 
fishing grounds in the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea, or the example of heat wave 
that hit France in 2003 and which led to the death of fifteen thousand people. 
In the face of these challenges some philosophers have started to question the nature of 
human interaction with the environment as it currently stands. Some have advocated that an 
Environmental Ethic is required, that is, a moral theory to guide human behaviour, about the 
rights and wrongs in human dealing with the environment. Others were not satisfied with this 
because they understand that Environmental Ethics, as a moral theory, remains too 
anthropocentric because it is only normative and does not inspire a change in the way people 
perceive the world around them, it only seeks to guide human action. These theorists who are 
not satisfied with Environmental Ethics have advocated in favour of Deep Ecology, that is, they 
have defended that a change of 'perspective' and attitude is required, and not merely a widening 
of the moral circle. It is worth quoting a passage from Fox (1984:204), a deep ecologist, who 
explains this well in his paper "On Guiding Stars for Deep Ecology": 
In seeking to change the way in which we experience the world (i.e. our state of 
being), deep ecologists place their primary emphasis upon changing our 
'underlying perception of the way things are' ... rather than upon what we might 
term the 'conceptual fix' approach of 'bigger and better' ethics (in the sense of 
arguments that ultimately issue in particular codes of conduct... 
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And to the definition of Deep Ecology provided by Kohac (1997: 159) 111 his "Varieties of 
Ecological Experience": 
[Deep Ecology] sees the root of our environmental problem m our own 
conception of the place of humans in nature. 
The divide between Environmental Ethics and Deep Ecology is sometimes very tenuous and 
there is a debate as to whether Deep Ecology is, or would be, effectively practical since it does 
not primarily seek to be normative but to change our perception of reality. I believe that the 
charge of impracticality against Deep Ecology here has echoes of the same charge when applied 
to Virtue Ethics. That is, those who oppose Virtue Ethics often say that Virtue Ethics does not 
provide clear guidelines for action because when the Virtue Ethicist is asked "What shall! do in 
this particular situation?" the seeker of guidance is faced with the reply "Do whatever the 
virtuous agent would do". The same could be said of Deep Ecology, that is, when asked "What 
shall I do in this particular situation?" The seeker of guidance faces the reply "You must change 
your perspective on the world". The foes of Deep Ecology would say that this is easier said than 
done and that the Deep Ecologist is being vacuous. That said, Virtue Ethics and Deep Ecology 
have many defenders who understand that seeking to develop one's virtues and one's character, in 
the case of Virtue Ethics, and seeking to change one's perception of the world through a change 
in both the way human beings see themselves in the world and in the way human beings see the 
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world, in the case of Deep Ecology, will ultimately provide the agent with some sort of 
awareness, perhaps I would dare to say here phronesis, of what ought to be done in a situation. 
Interesting to note here is that Fox has tried to develop his particular branch of Deep Ecology by 
linking it to Virtue Ethics, so there appears to be some sort of affinity between these two theories 
which has been noticed by some commentators, but this is not an approach to which most Deep 
Ecologists subscribe to by any means. I do not wish to add much more to the debate between 
Environmental Ethics and Deep Ecology here since this is not particularly pertinent to this thesis. 
I merely wished to point out that there is a distinction between Environmental Ethics and Deep 
Ecology at the outset of this subsection since this is an issue that may be confusing to those 
outside the field. 
Also before progressing I find it important here to provide the original principles of Deep 
Ecology as set by Devall and Sessions (1985:70) in their paper entitled "Deep Ecology: Living as 
if Nature Mattered", and it is noteworthy here that Sessions is a Deep Ecologist and Spinoza 
scholar. These principles have become influential in the related literature and have been widely 
reprinted and their relevance for this thesis will become evident below when I discuss Deep 
Ecologists' reliance on some of Spinoza's thesis in more detail. These principles are: 
I. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in 
themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for 
human purposes. 
2. The richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and 
are also values in themselves. 
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3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs. 
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of 
the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such decrease. 
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is 
rapidly worsening. 
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, 
technological, and ideological structures, the resulting state of affairs will be deeply 
different from the present. 
7. The ideological change ts mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in 
situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasing higher standard of 
living. There will be a profound difference between big and great. 
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to 
try to implement the necessary changes. 
Now that I have provided a brief characterisation of Deep Ecology I shall investigate if and how 
some of Spinoza's and Schelling's views may provide support for Deep Ecology. Deep 
Ecologists, such as the prominent Naess (1977, 1978, 1981), Mathews (1988, 1991), Jonge 
(2004), Fox ( 1990), and Devall and Sessions ( 1985) have sought in some of Spinoza's views 
support for their own views on Deep Ecology. By no means do they all agree on how to go 
about developing the field and as such these theorists have developed their own patticular views 
on Deep Ecology by privileging different aspects of Spinozism. It is, however, beyond the scope 
of this thesis to provide a detailed account of their views and as such I shall merely concentrate 
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on those particular aspects of their views that are pertinent to Spinozism and to this thesis. This 
said, it does not take much effort and research to note that there are some particular aspects of 
their views that do cut across the board, and which are subscribed in different degrees by these 
theorists. These aspects are: 
i. intrinsic value, which could be defined as the view that every thing has a value in itself 
and this value is not dependent on their usefulness to human beings; 
ii. biocentric egalitarianism, which could be defined as the view that all entities, whether 
a cell, an entity, or an ecosystem such as the Amazon Basin or the planet Earth, have 
equal value; 
iii. self-realisation, which could be defined as the view that every thing seeks to self-
realise itself, however self-realisation is understood, i.e. as enduring for as long as it 
possibly could and/or as fulfilling its own purpose. 
Intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism, for instance, are clearly at the heart of Devall and 
Sessions above stated principles of Deep Ecology. An example of this is principle I. "The well-
being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves. These 
values are independent of the usefulness ofthe non-human world for human purposes.", which is 
clearly based on intrinsic value, and principles 2. "The richness and diversity of life forms 
contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves." and 3. "Humans 
have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.", which has its 
foundations in biocentric egalitarianism. 
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As I mentioned previously Deep Ecologists have sought in some of Spinoza's views 
support for their views on the subject. This may appear strange to those not greatly acquainted 
with Spinoza's work or who have not truly grasped the spirit of his philosophy, and as such they 
could pose the question: "How can a metaphysician from the 17th century provide support to the 
modern philosophical field of Deep Ecology?" I have already demonstrated in part II of this 
thesis, the part of this thesis that deals with Fichte's Spinozism, and more specifically in chapter 
6, entitled "Ethics", that Spinoza's metaphysics brings with it some ethical implications. As an 
extension of my discussion of that particular section, it could be said that Deep Ecologists 
understand that given the nature ofthe universe, and given the nature of things in the universe, a 
particular kind of attitude is appropriate; given that everything is a mode of the substance, given 
that every thing, including human beings, are a modification of God or Nature, given that every 
thing is interconnected, human beings should treat with an attitude of reverence the other modes 
of creation. Spinoza must have been aware of the fact that his metaphysical system brings with it 
some ethical implications, otherwise why would he call his major work, a substantial 
metaphysical work, the Ethics? Let me rephrase this: why should a work that discusses 
substance, attributes, modes, in short, a work that discusses the nature of reality be entitled the 
Ethics if Spinoza did not hold the view that the nature of reality impinges on morality? But it is 
not enough here just to rely on conjecture; it is necessary for me to demonstrate how Spinoza's 
metaphysics provide support for those three themes in Deep Ecology, namely intrinsic value, 
egalitarian biocentrism and self-realisation. And I remind the reader, it is through these three 
themes that Deep Ecologists seek a change in human attitudes towards other entities in the 
universe, towards ecosystems, the planet and the universe itself. This change of attitude aims at 
rejecting anthropocentrism either as the notion that i. grants human being with an unwarranted 
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dominion over the rest of reality, or ii. the view that human beings are superior to the rest of 
reality. I shall demonstrate Spinozism's support for these views now. 
Let me now demonstrate how two of Spinoza's theses provide support for some of the 
views that are defended by Deep Ecologists. Spinoza's monism provides support for the Deep 
Ecologist's views on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism and Spinoza's thesis of conatus 
provides the cornerstone for the Deep Ecologist's views on the important theme of self-
realisation. Let us look first at the issue of monism and intrinsic value and biocentric 
egalitarianism in some detail. The central point of Spinoza's Ethics is his argument in favour of 
monism. That is, his theory that only one substance exists and that God or Nature (Deus sive 
Natura) is a substance, and that everything is a modification of the substance. The aspect that 
everything is a modification of the substance implies that the substance is to be understood as the 
totality of all forms of Being as well as being the highest form of Being. Given that according to 
Spinoza everything is a modification of the substance and given that the substance is God or 
Nature then one can in fer that the substance does not hold any sort of preference towards its 
modifications, because if the substance held any form of preference towards any of its 
modifications it would be ascribed with a humanity that is alien to it. It follows that from the 
perspective of the substance all its modifications possess the same value or standing, each 
modification possesses an intrinsic value only in so far as they are all modifications of the 
substance, and this value is not in any way whatsoever connected to their usefulness to human 
beings. And hence all modifications possess an equal intrinsic value because the substance holds 
no preference towards its modifications, all modifications count as the same. In other words, all 
modifications of the substance have the same value because from the point of view of the 
substance the substance holds no preference towards its modifications, and to presume otherwise 
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would be to invest the substance with human characteristics that are alien to it. If the substance 
were to ascribe more value to one of its modifications than to others then the substance would be 
incoherent, it would become anthropomorphic. 
Deep Ecologists understand that given that the substance holds all its modes as equally 
important and valuable then everything - from the smallest of the substance's modification, to 
human beings, to ecosystems, to the remaining features of the universe itself - should be 
understood as possessing an intrinsic value, a value which bears no connection whatsoever to 
their usefulness to human beings. Deep ecologists derive their thesis of biocentric egalitarianism 
from the thesis of intrinsic value, that is, given that all living modifications of the substance have 
an equal intrinsic value then all living entities, from a slug to a human being count as the same. 
From the point of view of the substance it makes no difference if the universe is inhabited by 
slugs or amoebas or by rational entities like human beings. This is a very contentious claim and 
I shall come back to it below as I analyse if this is indeed the case. 
There is one last implication that could be drawn from Spinoza's monism here. Given 
that everything is a modification of the substance, given that everything is a mode of God or 
Nature, then everything should be treated with some sort of reverence by all human beings 
exactly because they are modifications of the substance just as human beings are. In Spinoza's 
monism everything is interconnected because everything is a modification, a mode of the 
substance. Everything is a modification of God or Nature as such it deserves to be treated with 
respect. It is from such a reading of Spinoza's monism that the Deep Ecologist infers his thesis 
of self-realisation, which he then grounds in Spinoza's thesis of conatus. Deep ecologists 
understand that every thing should be able to self-realise itself, should be able to fulfil itself, its 
purpose, its essence because everything is a mode of the substance, since the substance is 
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ambivalent towards its modes. I will come back to the issue of self-realisation below but before 
doing so I wish to refer to the following quote from Devall and Sessions ( 1985:67) where they 
explain well the interconnection between intrinsic value, biocentric egalitarianism and self-
realisation: 
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal 
right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and 
self-realization within the larger Self-Realization. This basic intuition is that all 
organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are 
equal in intrinsic value. 
The Deep Ecologist's notion of self-realisation is connected to Spinoza's thesis of conatus, the 
thesis that every modification aims at enduring as it is for as long as it possibly can. Deep 
Ecologists have interpreted Spinoza's thesis of conatus as asserting that one should be able to 
fulfil oneself, as being able to fulfil one's telos, one's purpose. Interesting to note here that 
Spinoza holds that all modifications of the substance have a conatus, that is, all modifications of 
the substance aim at striving for as long as they possibly can as they are. 32 And this leads Deep 
Ecologists to hold that all entities should be able and enabled to seek fulfilment, and here some 
Deep Ecologists would include everything, even ecosystems, mountains, the planet etc. (cf. for 
32 NB. In Spinoza and Deep Ecology, Eccy de Jonge questions if this is indeed the case, if 
every thing aims at enduring for as long as it can as it is. In chapters 3 and 4 de Jonge provides 
an interesting and insightful discussion on this issue and it puts forward the view that sometimes 
one's conatus, at least in the case of human beings, may be damaged by, for instance, mental 
illness, abuse, etc. which may drive this particular human being to suicide or to behaviour which 
goes against its own conatus. 
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instance Lovelock's Gaia theory). 33 Following from this Deep Ecologists affirm that human 
beings should interfere as little as possible with the self-realisation of these other entities, as 
everything should be able to self-realise itself because everything has an intrinsic value and all 
life is held to be equal in value. This raises two questions. The first question is: what qualifies 
as 'little as possible'? The Deep Ecologists answer here is always vague and as such Deep 
Ecologists have faced a great deal of criticism on this issue. The second question is: should 
every thing be able to fulfil itself? What about a virus that has the potential to kill all humanity? 
I understand this second question to be more serious for the Deep Ecologist and l shall come 
back to it later when I suggest an alternative reading of Spinoza's views and their potential 
support for Deep Ecology. 
Before proceeding, however, I wish to turn to Schelling and enquire if his views can 
provide support for Deep Ecology. I argue here that Schelling's Naturphilosophie project could 
also provide Deep Ecologists with support for their views since it mirrors Spinoza's philosophy 
so closely. Schelling's Absolute, nature, is the first and simple principle out of which everything 
is derived and deduced. Every thing is in one way or another related to the Absolute, or in other 
words, every thing comes under the Absolute, every thing is within and connected to nature, the 
absolute. Schelling also argues that nature is structured hierarchically and its activity is in 
accordance with the laws of evolution (vide supra p. 206), that is, Schelling asserts that in nature 
the most simple entities, whether processes or products, have a tendency to combine themselves 
in more complex entities. And this tendency is an open-ended principle because if nature was 
pursuing a particular telos then when it reached its goal it would come to an absolute rest, and as 
such nature's activity must be regarded as being endless. It could be argued here that since 
33 NB. cf. James Lovelock, The Ages of Gaia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; Gaia, 
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nature's activity has no particular telos and is endless then all activity in nature just happens and 
it just becomes more complex. As such it could be said that from the point of view of nature 
everything has a particular value only insofar as every thing is part of nature itself and plays a 
part in nature's activity, and this is in no way whatsoever related to their usefulness to human 
beings. And here the Deep Ecologist could derive their views on intrinsic value, the intrinsic 
value of being part of nature and in playing a part in nature's activity. And it could also be said 
that each thing has the same value because to say that nature ascribes more value to a particular 
entity than another would be to humanise nature. And from this aspect of Schelling's philosophy 
the Deep Ecologist could derive their principle of biocentric egalitarianism because all living 
entities, be it a slug or a human being, have the same intrinsic value insofar as the absolute, 
nature, is concerned. It is noteworthy here that Spinoza also puts forward the proposition that 
simpler bodies have the tendency to combine themselves in more complex entities (vide supra. p. 
207). Where Schelling differs from Spinoza and where Schelling may provide a better support 
for Deep Ecologists is in the fact that Spinoza only applies this proposition about the tendency 
that simpler entities have to combine into more complex entities to Nature as produce only (to 
nature as natura naturata, to individual and finite modes) whilst Schelling applies this proposition 
to Nature as both product (to the natura naturata, to individual and finite entities in nature) and 
process (to the natura naturans, to those creative processes of nature). Schelling's views here 
seem to be a more accurate account of the nature of reality because it portrays that both entities 
and processes have a tendency of becoming increasingly more complex. And as such Schelling 
may be in a better position to aid Deep Ecologists in their efforts of defending their view that 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
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everything is interconnected in one way or another and that human beings must treat the rest of 
reality with care. 
Let me now continue with my discussion on the Deep Ecologist's thesis of self-
realisation. As I mentioned above the Deep Ecologist gathers support to this thesis from 
Spinoza's thesis of conatus. But the Deep Ecologists could also refer to, for instance, Schelling's 
Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie, where Esposito (1977: 95-96) notes that, Schelling 
lists the following two principles: 
( 41) Every individual is a totality in relation to itself 
(80) Every individual body strives to be a totality 
These two principles that have been put forward by Schelling are similar to the following 
propositions by Spinoza in the Ethics: 
3P6 - Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being 
And 
3P7 -The endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in its being is nothing else than the 
actual essence of that thing 
It is interesting to note here that the words 'strives' and 'endeavours' and 'persists' are English 
translations for the Latin word conatus and they are usually linked to Spinoza's concept of 
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conatus. Let me now demonstrate the similarities between those two principles of Schelling's 
and those two propositions of Spinoza's. When Schelling maintains in principle ( 41) that every 
individual is a totality in relation to itseifhe is assetting that every thing is a unity, is a whole, in 
relation to itself; and when we add to this notion principle (81) that every; individual body strives 
to be a totality we could assert that Schelling is arguing that every individual is a unity in itself 
and that every individual strives, endeavours to persist, as an unity, as a whole, in itself. If we 
turn to Spinoza's propositions (3P6) that everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to 
persist in its own being and (3P7) that the endeavour wherewith a thing endeavours to persist in 
its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing then we reach much the same 
outcome as Spinoza is arguing here that every thing aims at persisting for as long as it possibility 
can because it is in every thing's nature to do so. These are very similar arguments from 
Schelling and Spinoza. And I note that these arguments, which are based on the notion of 
conatus or striving, could be used by the Deep Ecologist to ground his thesis on self-realisation, 
i.e. the notion that every entity should be able to self-realise themselves. The Deep Ecologist's 
argument here needs to be holistic and link the thesis of self realisation with the thesis of 
intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism, and it could be something like the following: 
• (Proposition A) because it is in every entity's nature to strive to remain as it is for as long 
as it possibly could; 
• (Proposition B) and given that every entity has an intrinsic value and since all entities are 
equal in value (from slugs and amoebas to human beings, from mountains and rivers to 
whole ecosystems); 
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• (Conclusion from A+B) then it follows that every entity should be able to strive for as 
long as it possibly could, should be able to fulfil its essence. 
Thus far I have demonstrated that some of Spinoza's and Schelling's thesis could provide support 
for Deep Ecology. I wish now to move on and do two things. Firstly, I want to point out 
possible criticisms to the interpretation given so far of Spinoza's and Schelling's views and their 
possible support for Deep Ecology, and secondly, I want to suggest a different interpretation of 
Spinoza's and Schelling's views, an interpretation that, in my opinion, provides a better basis for 
the Deep Ecologist views. 
I note that questions could be asked concerning the Deep Ecologist's interpretation of 
Spinoza's views on substance, and its consequences for Spinoza's views on conatus or mutatis 
mutandis these questions could be asked with reference to Schelling's views on the absolute and 
on its implications for the notion of striving in Schelling. I mean here that it could be 
questioned whether the substance, or the absolute for that matter, would indeed be so impartial, 
whether it would value an amoeba just as much as it values a human being; and connected to 
this, it could also be questioned whether all entities should be able and enabled to fulfil 
themselves, to pursue their telos, to strive and endeavour for as long as it possibly could. What 
happens when there is conflict between the conatus of one mode and of another mode? What 
happens when an entity's striving to remain as an unity for as long as it could jeopardises the 
striving of another? What happens, for instance, when the conatus of a virus conflicts with the 
conatus of its host human being? These are important questions that require some attention not 
merely for a better understanding of Spinoza's and Schelling's system but also for the field of 
Deep Ecology. 
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It is certainly true that Spinoza's substance and Schelling's absolute are the basis of all 
reality, and that everything is a modification of the substance (in the case of Spinoza) or relative 
to the absolute (in the case of Schelling). It is also certainly true that the substance and the 
absolute do not possess a telos since if they did there would be a time when reality would come 
to a stand still. So far so good for the Deep Ecologist. The weak point of their interpretation 
comes in connection with their understanding that Spinoza's substance 'does not hold any sort of 
preference towards its modifications or relative entities' or their possible understanding that 
Schelling's absolute 'does not hold any sort of the preference towards entities that are relative to 
it'. They interpret the substance, and they could interpret the absolute, as being totally impartial 
because to ascribe partiality to the substance and to the absolute would be to anthropomorphise 
them. 
The question here is: is ascribing partiality to the substance or to the absolute ascribing 
them with human features? The Deep Ecologist certainly thinks so. But one could still question 
this by referring to another aspect of Spinoza's and Schelling's system, that is, that the substance 
and the absolute are akin to an organism, and not to a mechanical apparatus, and that Spinoza 
and Schelling are defending an idealism-realism or a realism-idealism, and not merely realism or 
idealism as some commentators have held in the past. The implications of holding the substance 
and the absolute as organisms, and of defending an idealism-realism or realism-idealism, are 
important here since the substance and the absolute start to share similarities with live and 
conscious organisms. That is, the substance and the absolute as organisms are alive, and because 
the substance and the absolute also possess the features of thought and extension, subjectivity 
and objectivity, this also implies that the substance and the absolute possess some sort of 
consciousness. Perhaps the sort of consciousness that Kant ascribed to God with an immediate 
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intellectual intuition in which to think p is to be presented with p without the mediation of 
sensibility, or perhaps a much more primal and latent sort of consciousness that realises itself in 
all its modifications or relative entities, or perhaps even a well developed sort of consciousness 
that realises itself in its most developed modes or relative entities, viz. the human being, 
something akin to Hegel's Geist. Either way, if the substance or the absolute is understood as 
akin to some sort of conscious organism then it is possible to hold that the substance or the 
absolute do hold some sort of preference towards some of its modes or relative entities. For 
instance, I, as an organism, do not care much for the bits of skin that fall from my body 
continuously, but I do care about my limbs and my vital organs. In the same way, the substance 
or the absolute may not care as much for its simpler modifications or relative entities such as 
amoebas or slugs or viruses, but they may care more for a more developed mode or relative 
entity such as the human being. The only way to counterbalance this perspective would be to 
argue that every entity is necessary in the chain of Being, that is, that without smaller entities 
such as amoebas or slugs or viruses that Nature's development would come into a hold or be 
hindered. To argue this would be to give up on the notion that Nature has no telos that things in 
nature just happen. To argue that there is a necessary chain of Being is to argue that Nature is 
pursuing a particular developmental avenue and this contradicts Spinoza's and Schelling's that 
Nature has no telos because if it did then when it reached its telos reality would come into a halt. 
The thesis of nature having no telos has to be undermined first, which is a difficult thing to do. 
The burden of proof here is with those who challenge this thesis. 
Spinoza certainly never advocated such views openly (i.e. that the substance is conscious 
and that it may hold some sort of preference towards some of its modifications), and given his 
historical biography and his philosophical development, it is doubtful that he would have even 
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contemplated this. Schelling never advocated this openly either, but he probably set the seeds 
for such a development in Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit and the theory of Geist, the absolute for 
Hegel, an absolute that is conscious and that discovers and unfolds itself through human history. 
Still, it is important to point out that such a development could be drawn from Spinoza's and 
Schelling's systems, and this development may just cast enough doubt on the Deep Ecologist's 
thesis of intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism because if the substance or the absolute 
hold some sort of preference towards some of its modes or relative entities then some modes and 
entities may be viewed differently by the substance or absolute and this is damaging to intrinsic 
value (i.e. some entities may not have a value at all for the substance or absolute) and to 
biocentric egalitarianism (i.e. some entities are more valuable than others to the substance or 
absolute). This may present a major problem to Deep Ecologists, such as Naess and Devall and 
Sessions whose Deep Ecological views are, by and large, heavily based on the issues of intrinsic 
value and biocentric egalitarianism, and as such this problem may render ineffective the Deep 
Ecologist's call for a change in human attitudes towards live beings, ecosystems, the planet and 
the universe. The Deep Ecologist may just have to give up on the thesis of intrinsic value and 
biocentric egalitarianism. 
Despite facing this challenge not all is lost to Deep Ecologists. Some of Spinoza's and 
Schelling's views may still provide supp01t to Deep Ecology by following a different strategy. A 
more productive and accurate path, in my opinion, has been tread by Deep Ecologists such as 
Matthews ( 1991 ), who places more weight in the thesis of self-realisation and who seeks in 
Spinoza's thesis of conatus the basis for her views. Let me demonstrate how this can be 
achieved. In general Deep Ecologists derive their views of self-realisation from their views on 
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the intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism. It ts perhaps worth quoting the following 
passage of Devall and Sessions ( 1985 :67) again here: 
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal 
right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and 
self-realization within the larger Self-Realization. This basic intuition is that all 
organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are 
equal in intrinsic value. 
And as I have stated and argued there may be some serious problems concerning the Deep 
Ecologist views on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism. However, I understand that it is 
possible to bypass or give up on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism and still hold on to 
the thesis of self-realisation by referring solely to Spinoza's thesis of conatus, or to Schelling's 
views on striving, and by also referring to the interconnectivity of all things since everything is a 
mode of the substance or an entity that is relative to the absolute. But let me explain this in some 
detail here. 
The reader might recall that in Part 11 of this thesis, on Fichte, in chapter 6 entitled 
"Ethics", I dealt with the issue of conatus also. There it was established that prima facie, Spinoza 
appears to be an ethical egoist, since he defends the view that one should pursue whatever would 
benefit one's conatus, one's pursuit of self-realisation, one's striving to endure for as long as one 
possibly could. So for Spinoza it is true that human beings are primarily egoists since each 
individual human being wants to preserve his own life for as long as he possibly could (and to do 
so he must consider the consequences of every action to himself, i.e. ethical egoism). But in 
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doing so, human beings realise that all other human beings are pursuing the same goal and in the 
same manner. This very fact, demonstrates that the best thing for a human being to do is to team 
up with other human beings. To do otherwise would result in wars, violence and disputes, which 
would threaten, and not-enhance, one's existence. By working as a group, human beings are able 
to help each other to endure for as long as they possibly could.' 4 Therefore, that form of 
individualism that first strikes any commentator on Spinoza is fast replaced by a form of 
communitarianism once Spinoza's system is truly understood. It is worth quoting the following 
passages of Ethics again since they corroborate what I have just said: 
4P31 -In so far as anything agrees with our nature, thus far it is necessarily good. 
4P35 - In so far as men live under the guidance of reason, thus far only they 
always necessarily agree in nature. 
4P36 - The greatest good of those who follow virtue (reason) is common to all, 
and all can equally enjoy it. [my brackets] 
4P37- The good which each one who follows virtue (reason) desires for himself, 
he also desires for other men, and the more so the more knowledge he has of God 
(Nature). [my brackets] 
34 NB. Perhaps here we see that tendency that simpler entities have of combining themselves 
into more complex ones at work in a very interesting way. By combining themselves, human 
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As it is quite clear, these four propositions are concerned with the relations between human 
beings and the conditions for a mutually beneficial and sustained intercourse in community life. 
It is also worth quoting the following passage from Garrett (1997:227) again: 
Spinoza holds, as a general metaphysical thesis, that whenever two things "agree 
in nature" they will, to that extent, be mutually beneficial, since the nature that 
each strives to benefit is the same (E4P31). Human beings necessarily "agree in 
nature" to the extent that they are guided by reason (E4P35). For human reason, 
as reason, is the same in all, and it aims at the same thing - namely, knowledge or 
understanding. Understanding, moreover, is a good that can be shared by all 
without diminishing anyone's enjoyment of it (E4P36). In fact, Spinoza holds, 
nothing is more useful to a human being than another human being who is guided 
by reason (E4P35c I). Hence, individuals who are virtuous, or guided by reason, 
will all seek, from their own self-interest, the same goods for others that they seek 
for themselves (E4P37). Indeed to the extent that if a community of human 
beings is guided by reason, its members can "compose, as it were, one Mind and 
one Body" (E4P 18s) - that is, a complex individual, composed of like-minded 
human beings, that has its own endeavour of self-preservation. 
Therefore, according to Spinoza, it is in a human being's interest, who is guided by reason, to 
associate himself with other human beings, since they are all pursuing the same goals. That is, 
they are all pursuing self-knowledge and knowledge of the world around themselves in their 
beings, create a supra-human-entity, i.e. a community, which in turn develops itself into larger 
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attempt to live for as long as they possibly can. It is at this point, I understand, that Deep 
Ecologists could come in. They could argue that given that everything is interconnected, since 
everything is a mode of the substance, that it is in the human being's best interest to establish the 
same sort of 'communitatarian relationship', not only with other human beings, but with the 
whole of existing entities, with all the other modes of the substance. For instance, given that 
everything is interconnected, is it not problematic for human beings themselves if human beings 
destroy a particular species or ecosystem? Since everything is interconnected, if human beings 
do not establish a communitarian relation with the other entities, from the smallest modes to 
ecosystems, then there may be consequences that will come about due to such human behaviour. 
For instance, if an ecosystem is destroyed then its biodiversity richness is destroyed and with it 
the knowledge that it could yield, knowledge of animal species and animals' behaviour, 
knowledge of plant species, not to mention knowledge of the chemical compounds that these 
species could yield, compounds which could yield new and more effective medicines against 
human ailments for instance. 
By linking the notions of interconnectivity and conatus which are found in both Spinoza 
and Schelling we can reach the conclusion that human beings should do their best to maintain 
equilibrium with all things because this is in their own interest. I believe this to be a better 
position than the position argued for by most Deep Ecologists for it calls for a change in human 
attitude but it does not do away with human discretion for action. For instance, when faced with 
the dilemma of destroying an ecosystem for harvesting its wood, the human being will have to 
ponder whether it is worth destroying that particular environment for that purpose or whether it 
is more beneficial to harvest the wood somewhere else or even to replace the wood by another 
supra-human-entities, such as states and nations. 
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material; or when faced with the opportunity of killing a virus and saving the human host, let's 
say small pox, the human being will be able to decide for the human life with no qualms for the 
human life is a higher modification of the substance (within the reading that the substance 
holding a preference for its higher modifications) or simply because the human being's conatus 
calls for it, the human being's striving for enduring for as long as it possibly could demands it. 
This outcome should appease those who are suspicious of views based on intrinsic value and 
biological egalitarianism for their higher demands on human behaviour. 
Schelling's system would yield much the same argument, given that he holds that every 
thing is relative to the absolute, and given that he also holds the thesis of striving as a unity. 
Everything is interconnected insofar as everything is related to the absolute and everything 
strives to remain as an unity. The metaphysics of Spinoza are imbedded in Schelling's views on 
this issue. The implications of this metaphysics only need to be teased out as Schelling never 
advocated that human beings would fare better by associating themselves in their pursuit of their 
interests, he did however call for a change of human attitude towards nature, human beings 
should see nature not as the other, human beings should rather see themselves as part and parcel 
of nature itself. It is perhaps worth quoting the following passage of Schell ing ( 1988: I 0-11) here 
agam: 
As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external world, the first step to 
philosophy has been taken. With that separation, reflection first begins; he 
separates from now on what Nature has always united, separates the object from 
the intuition, the concept from the image, finally (in that he becomes his own 
object) himself from himself. But this separation is only means not end .... Man is 
not born to waste his mental power in conflict against the fantasy of an imaginary 
world, but to exert all his powers upon a world which has influence upon him, lets 
him feel its forces, and upon which he can react. Between him and the world, 
therefore, no rift must be established; contact and reciprocal action must be 
possible between the two, for only so does man become man ... But its 
preoccupation with dissection does not extend only to the phenomenal world; so 
far as it separates the spiritual principle from this, it fills the intellectual world 
with chimeras, against which, because they lie beyond all reason, it is not even 
possible to fight. It makes the separation between man and the world permanent, 
because it treats the latter as a thing in itself, which neither intuition, nor 
imagination, neither understanding nor reason, can reach. 
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As such, Spinoza's and Schelling's views could provide Deep Ecologists with a strong ground to 
defend their views, to defend their call for a change in human attitudes towards the whole. Deep 
Ecologists may just achieve this by demonstrating that everything is interconnected, by 
demonstrating that we have a choice in changing our attitudes, by demanding a shift of 
perspective that involves the way we see the world, and by also acknowledging that every thing 
aims at enduring for as long as it possibly could. Before concluding this section I would like to 
quote the following passage of Matthews (1991: 140) who explains well this possible shift of 
attitude: 
Our identity as human beings is .... demonstrably as much a function of our culture 
as it is of our ecological relations. So if our culture is not a regional one, 
ecologically integrated with the elements of a particular environment, then to that 
extent we as individuals are not ecologically integrated either. Having stepped 
back from a particular ecological role we have indeed to a certain extent stepped 
out of nature - and this standing outside is mirrored in our freedom to choose how 
we shall live. Of course given the freedom of choice, we can choose to make 
culture an instrument of Nature. With the level of objective knowledge already 
attained we can readily recognize our physical dependence on general forms of 
life such as vegetation and soil micro-organisms. It would be possible, in light of 
this knowledge, consciously to build a reverent and conservationist attitude into 
the concepts of these life-forms - in the sense that these concepts could acquire an 
emotive charge, a connotation of preciousness, as the concept says, motherhood 
tends to have. If such attitudes were built into the very concepts of the elements 
of the global environment, then the resultant culture would be determined by its 
system of representation to prescribe ecologically positive patterns of interaction 
with the environment. 
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To conclude this section. At the outset of this section I set to provide a brief characterisation of 
Deep Ecology and to demonstrate that Deep Ecologists have sought support in some of Spinoza's 
thesis for their own views, and that they can achieve much the same by referring to Schelling's 
VIews. I have argued that their views on intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism may 
present some serious problems, and I have suggested that they could give up on these and still 
advocate Deep Ecology by defending self-realisation and by referring to Spinoza's thesis of 
conatus and by the interconnectivity of all things in the substance. This suggestion may prove to 
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be a more desirable path as it avoids the short commgs of intrinsic value and biocentric 
egalitarianism. I have also demonstrated that Schelling's systems may yield much the same 
suggestion. 
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CONCLUSION 
In chapter l I demonstrated that the common understanding that Spinoza's vtews were 
successfully suppressed in the late 17th century is mistaken. In fact, my research in this area 
yields quite the opposite view, Spinozism was not entirely and successfully suppressed at the 
time, and it was being spread either through the works of commentators who felt that they 
needed to reply to Spinoza's views, or through the works of Spinoza's supporters who disguised 
Spinoza's views in their works; moreover, about a hundred years after Spinoza first published his 
works and thanks to the pantheism controversy, Spinozism and its views became fashionable 
again and were discussed in the open without fears of the reprisals that had occurred in the years 
that immediately proceeded the publication of Spinoza's works. Chapter 2 provided an outline of 
the Enlightenment and Romantic movements and the philosophical crises of the time which led 
to either scepticism or dogmatism. In chapter 3 I outlined Kant's project in the First Critique and 
I demonstrated that he was unsuccessful in solving the crises, and this led Fichte and Schelling to 
seek in some ofSpinoza's views the solutions to the problems ofthe Critical Philosophy ofKant. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I believe, I provided a very detailed analysis of Fichte's and Schelling's 
Spinozism. There I demonstrated that both Fichte and Schelling acknowledged in letters that 
they were very influenced by some of Spinoza's views, and this point has also been corroborated 
by both commentators of the time and modern commentators. I have also demonstrated in these 
two chapters the many similarities between some of Fichte's and Schelling's views and some of 
Spinoza's views. Some of these similarities are Fichte's Absolute I and Spinoza's substance, 
Fichte's and Spinoza's understanding of freedom and determinism. and the similarities between 
their Ethical views which place them within the Stoic tradition; or Schelling's Absolute and 
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Spinoza's substance, Schelling's and Spinoza's concepts of natura naturans and natura naturata, 
and Schelling's and Spinoza's possible support to the field of Deep Ecology. 
At the outset of this thesis I stated that my main aim was to demonstrate that some of 
Spinoza's views were a major influence in Fichte's and Schelling's respective philosophical 
developments. I wish to draw particular attention to and re-state here the fact that Fichte and 
Schelling sought in some Spinozist views either the answers to the problems which were left 
unanswered by the Critical Philosophy of Kant or the solution to some inherent problems of the 
Kantian system itself. As such it is worth mentioning here some points which were discussed at 
length in chapters 4 and 5. For instance, Fichte and Schelling saw in Spinoza's thesis ofmonism 
a very appealing avenue to be followed in pursuit of finding solutions to the problems faced by 
Kantianism- one such problem was the various dichotomies of the Critical Philosophy of Kant, 
which rendered it a non-unified system, and as such open to various criticisms at the time, such 
as the problem of the relationship between the thing-in-itself and appearances which was pointed 
out by Jacobi, and the problem of the connectivity between sensibility and understanding which 
was pointed out by Maimon (problems which I discussed in chapter 3). 
As the research into this thesis progressed a few issues aroused my attention, issues 
which deserve further research and which are not dealt with in this thesis, but which I would 
hope to devote attention in the future. One such issue concerns Fichte's notion of the summum 
bonum as the search for perfection, for perfecting oneself and one's community. This search for 
perfection is achieved through knowledge, knowledge of one's nature and of the nature of the 
world (NB. in Spinoza, the reader may recall, the summum bonum is understood as self-
preservation which is achieved through knowledge of oneself and ofthe world around one). This 
notion, found in Fichte, the notion of perfecting oneself and of perfecting the world, is also found 
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in Jewish Ethics, in the Jewish notion of Tikkun Olam, in perfecting the world. Tikkun Olam is a 
notion that could be characterised by the following dictum: one must aim at perfection in 
whatever one does. To my knowledge, it is only Fichte among modern western philosophers, 
who develops this notion. This fact per se raises questions. One such question is the following: 
since Fichte was not Jewish could he have picked this up through a particular reading of Spinoza, 
given that Spinoza was Jewish and a major influence on Fichte? Another question that could be 
raised here is: given that both Fichte and Jewish ethics defend this notion of perfecting oneself 
and the world around oneself then does this mean that God did not create the best of all possible 
worlds? If so could this raise doubts regarding the nature of God, about his perfection and his 
powers? This second question raises numerous issues for Philosophy of Religion and Theology 
and a study of the Midrash (i.e. those imaginative texts about Torah or Bible stories written by 
rabbis throughout the ages) and of the Talmud (i.e. the collection of Jewish thoughts and laws 
compiled between 200 BCE to 500 CE) along with Fichte's writings may shed some light on this 
ISSUe. 
Insofar as Schelling is concerned I believe that an attempt to develop a Deep Ecology 
based on Schelling's views and system may prove to be a very satisfactory and interesting 
project. Especially given that, as I mentioned in the section on Deep Ecology, Schelling's 
account of reality is more accurate than Spinoza's because Schelling applies the notion of 
complexity to nature's products (natura naturata) and also to nature's processes (natura 
naturans), whilst Spinoza only applies this notion to nature's products. In pursuing this avenue I 
have suggested that Deep Ecologists should give up on the notions of intrinsic value and 
biocentric egalitarianism, notions which aim at undermining anthropocentrism, and rather 
emphasise the interconnectivity of everything, which is based on the thesis of monism, and the 
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natural tendency that every thing has to strive to continue as it is and for as long as it possibly 
could, which is based on the thesis of striving or conatus. This avenue, as I suggested, may yield 
a more satisfactory form of Deep Ecology since it largely avoids those criticisms faced by the 
Deep Ecologist's thesis of intrinsic value and biocentric egalitarianism. 
As a concluding remark I wish to remind the reader that this thesis was written in an 
attempt to provide a detailed study of the influence of Spinozism on Fichte and Schelling. In 
doing so I aimed at providing a better understanding of Fichte's and Schelling's systems by 
demonstrating that Fichte's and Schelling's philosophy should not be merely understood in the 
light of the Critical Philosophy of Kant but also under the influence of some of Spinoza's views. 
Both Kant and Spinoza set the background for a proper understanding of Fichte's and Schelling's 
system, and without this background their philosophical systems are in danger of not being 
properly understood or interpreted. If by reaching these final lines the reader feels that he has 
gained a better understanding of Fichte's and Schelling's philosophy through my analysis of 
Fichte and Schelling as Kantians as well as Spinozists, as well as a better understanding of some 
of Spinoza's views, then I shall consider my goals in this thesis attained. 
----------------
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